DRC DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL

2020 Conflict Analysis
Central Darfur,
Sudan

Table of contents

List of Acronyms

DRC	**Danish Refugee Council**
FFC	**Forces of Freedom and Change**
FGD	**Focus Group Discussion**
FNC	**Forest National Corporation**
IDP	**Internally Displaced Person**
IOM	**International Organisation for Migration**
KII	**Key Informant Interview**
NFI	**Non-food items**
PRC	**Peace and Reconciliation Committee**
RSF	**Rapid Support Forces**
SAF	**Sudan Armed Forces**
SLA	**Sudan Liberation Army**
SLA-AW	**Sudan Liberation Army- Abdulwahid**
SRF	**Sudan Revolutionary Front**
STG	**Sudan Transitional Government**
TMC	**Transitional Military Council**
UNAMID	**United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur**
UNDP	**United Nations Development Programme**
UNOCHA	**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
UNSG	**United Nations Secretary General**
WFP	**World Food Programme**

List of figures

List of tables

Executive summary

Intercommunal conflicts are one of the major elements of instability in Darfur. The Jebel Marra area of Golo is no exception and experiences intercommunal conflicts intermittently. Intercommunal conflicts are integral parts of a system of war shaped by multi-level factors at national, regional and local levels.

This report presents the findings of a baseline conflict analysis in Golo, Central Darfur that was commissioned by Danish Refugee Council Sudan in August 2020. The conflict analysis aimed to highlight the major drivers of intercommunal conflicts in Golo and the main actors who contribute to these conflicts negatively or positively. Developing recommendations for a conflict-sensitive presence for DRC in the area as well as for proposing activities for tackling the roots causes of these intercommunal conflicts was a main purpose for this baseline. The baseline objectives were achieved using a mix of qualitative methodologies engaging a wide range of stakeholders.

Conflict actors' analysis

In analysing the intercommunal conflict actors, our analysis moved away from the broad generalisations about intercommunal conflicts in Darfur that employ ethnicity or livelihood lenses. Instead, communities were categorised into villages, inhabited mostly by sedentary communities and *damrahs* or nomads' settlements inhabited by mobile pastoralists. The relationship between the villages and *damrahs* are not always shaped by antagonism. Guldo villages and Golo *damrahs* enjoy relatively good relationships, however, the relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* is disrupted. The disruption of the relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* resulted from a series of criminal incidents committed by individuals perceived as community members of one group against the other group. These crimes included animal theft, crop destruction or murdering of community members.

It is very important to note that the relationship between these communities is heavily influenced by the national level conflicts. These actors, whether on the government's side or the rebels' side are increasingly fragmented. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement between the government and the Sudan Liberation Army- Abdulwhid (SLA-AW) plays a negative role in the relationship between the villages and the *damrahs*. However, the fragmentation within the government and SLA negatively affects the overall security of the area. This is particularly true given the documented crimes committed by military elements on both sides.

In Golo, various actors are involved in conflict resolution for different types of conflicts including those related to access to natural resources as well as other forms of disputes. The Native Administration's structure of Ajaweed (customary mediators) is responsible for mediating settlements for natural resources-based conflicts. A local Peace and Reconciliation Committee (PRC) comprised of Native Administration leaders in all communities is responsible for tackling intercommunal disputes. These local structures have been successful in resolving many disputes in the area, but they are faced with different contextual and organisational challenges.

The humanitarian sector plays a vital role which is appreciated by all communities in responding to urgent needs of communities and in conflict resolution. There is a Peacebuilding Coordination Forum led by the Locality Commissioner and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and comprised of different humanitarian actors that was established to ensure a coordinated approach to peacebuilding interventions. Despite the role the sector plays, communities still face many gaps in health, water, education and food security.

Conflict causes analysis

The findings of the baseline conflict analysis indicate that the conflict between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* is caused by grievances on both sides. The grievances are associated with security incidences or violations of institutions that organise access to natural resources. Crop damage; felling down of trees; and animal theft committed by *damrahs*' pastoralists are the main grievances of Golo villages community members. Moreover, Golo villages blame attacks on farmers by armed militias associated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Golo *damrahs*. On the other hand, the grievances of Golo damrahs are fuelled by animal rustling crimes committed by the SLA-AW elements, whom they consider community members of Golo villages, that in many cases result in murdering or injuring of herders from the *damrahs*.

A proper understanding of the issues involved in the intercommunal conflict should acknowledge the historical grievances of the communities and how these grievances were incorporated into the wider system of conflict in the region. As other communities in Darfur, the communities in Golo have been marginalised by successive central governments. A lack of basic services and infrastructure as well as poor public institutions are at the heart of Darfur's marginalisation. While many individuals in Golo villages opposed the neglect of the central government by supporting the rebellion, the Northern Rezeigat historical grievances of being landless and poorly served were manipulated by the central government in its counterinsurgency. This has resulted in a polarised relationship between the groups that opposed the government and those who allied with the government.

"There has always been competition between Jebel Marra communities, but it is now shaped by antagonism", one participant to this study indicated. In discussing this tense relationship, there is a need to recognise the environmental, political, and contextual processes in play. Successive droughts and population growth has played a role in intensifying the conflict over natural resources and economic and political interests are associated with the triggers of the intercommunal conflict. Moreover, prevalence of small arms is one of the dynamics of the conflict in the region that leads to increased criminal activities and hinders the local conflict resolution mechanisms.

The baseline conflict analysis identified a wide range of negative consequences on the daily lives of Golo communities. Loss of community members was the highest cost the communities endured. Women and youth are severely affected by the communal conflicts because it has limited their livelihood opportunities and increased their economic hardships. The disrupted relationships between the villages and *damrahs* had an adverse impact on their rural livelihoods and reduced their resilience.

Peacebuilding architecture analysis

Locally driven and externally promoted peacebuilding interventions exist in Golo under five major themes, i.e. environmental, political, economic, social, and security. Local initiatives for cooperation over access to natural resources and environmental conservation activities are being implemented by a wide range of actors. These local initiatives are supported by communal and governmental institutions.

The transitional period in Sudan is heralded as the pathway for peace in the country. Sudan's Transitional Government (STG) declared that their objective is to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with the SLA-AW. If a breakthrough in the negotiations between these two parties is made, that would have a positive trickle-down effect on the relationships between the villages

and *damrahs*. The appointment of a new civilian government in Central Darfur is expected to contribute to stability in Golo and the whole state.

Livelihood interventions implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) support the recovery of Golo's population after long periods of displacement and instability. The economic recovery in some areas is built on exchange of services and goods facilitated by markets, with markets being an important institution for connecting different communities.

Attempts at promoting peaceful dialogue between different communities in Golo are led by the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and local structures of the Native Administration. Moreover, there are examples of communal actions that bring communities from *damrahs* and villages to work on common goods. All these activities play a positive role in rebuilding the relationships between different communities.

Government military and police checkpoints as well as the ceasefire agreements between the government and SLA-AW improved the overall security situation in Golo.

A robust peacebuilding approach needs to address the proximate and structural causes of local conflicts. Accordingly, the report recommendations to focus on the following issues:

1. DRC and its partners should concentrate their efforts on supporting the existing peacebuilding and conflict preventions structures instead of creating parallel ones. These structures need to be supported by capacity building and their efforts needs to be complemented with impactful development interventions. Moreover, more inclusion for women and youth in these structures is needed to ensure that their interests are not overlooked.

2. Enhancing the social economic wellbeing of local households through promoting social services of health and education; supporting traditional livelihoods; building the entrepreneurship capacity of women and youth through skills development and finance; and investing in basic infrastructure.

3. Setting clear advocacy goals around key structural causes of conflict including reaching a comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan that leaves no actor or community behind; implementing a security sector reform policy; protecting human rights; and promoting the rule of law.

1. Introduction

Golo town and the surrounding areas are located in Central Jebel Marra Locality of Central Darfur State. Early in 2016, the area was adversely affected by the fighting between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan Liberation Army – Abdulwahid (SLA-AW) when the government of Sudan launched a military operation in Jebel Marra (OCHA, 2016). At that time, the fighting between the government and SLA-AW led to the displacement of 129,000 individuals from Jebel Marra (OCHA, 2016). By mid-2016 people began to return to their areas in Jebel Marra as the government controlled Golo and aimed to improve the security of the area (OCHA, 2016).

DRC has been working in Central Darfur since 2004 with programmes focussing mainly on community-based protection. Recently, the Government of Sudan granted DRC access to Golo to respond, amongst other organisations, to the needs of the people affected by the instability

in Jebel Marra. Besides its protection activities, DRC implements food security and livelihoods programmes as well as emergency shelter and distribution of non-food items (NFIs). In addition, in 2020, DRC initiated Safer Communities programming. Engaging in this sector requires developing a deeper understanding of the causes and drivers of conflict in Golo to explore if and how DRC could play a more effective role in community peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Towards achieving the goal of enhancing its understanding of the conflict in Golo, DRC commissioned a baseline conflict analysis in the area to assess the relationships between communities and identify the root and immediate causes as well as the drivers of the intercommunal conflicts in the area. The baseline aimed at developing recommendations for conflict-sensitive programming and direct interventions that could contribute to tackling the causes of the conflict.

This report presents the findings of the analysis that was carried out in Golo and the surrounding areas from August to September 2020. The next section describes the methodology adopted for carrying out the baseline conflict analysis. SectionThree provides a contextual analysis where the historical background, the recent incidents of conflict and the current situation are discussed. Section Four contains analysis for the actors that are present in the area and contribute negatively or positively to intercommunal conflicts. The actors' analysis is followed by a conflict causes analysis in Section Five. In Section Six, the existing peacebuilding processes, structures and institutions are highlighted. The report ends with conclusion and recommendations for intervention in Section Seven.

1.2. Context

Central Jebel Marra is one of the north-eastern localities of Central Darfur State. In the past it used to be part of North Jebel Marra (Rokoro) locality. It is located 120 km north-east of Zalingie, the capital of the state. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimations, the locality's population is 164,000 including returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The area is characterised by mountainous terrain with extremely difficult movement due to absence of paved roads (UNDP, 2019a; UNDP, 2019b).

The population of Golo include sedentary communities living in Golo town and the surrounding villages, and increasingly sedentary pastoralists living in semi-permanent settlements for pastoralists called *damrahs*. Sedentary communities are predominantly from the Fur tribe. However, other tribes live in the area including Zaghawa and Berno. The mobile pastoralists living in *damrahs* are Nawaiba, Jallo, Mahria, Erigat and Awlad Zaid.

The area is considered to be the conflict hotbed between the Government of Sudan and the SLA-AW. Since 2003, the fighting between the central government and SLA in the area has resulted in dire humanitarian conditions. Many people were displaced from Golo and the surrounding villages to other areas of Central Darfur and beyond. According to different participants in this baseline study, people have been caught in instability up until 2016, as they were fleeing the area and returning to it on many occasions. One key informant summarised the situation by saying that "we live in the middle of two governments in Golo. There is a government in the Jebel and another one in the town. If any conflict happens between the government and the rebels, we are the ones who pay the cost as we always return to square one in terms of lives and livelihoods (Abdallah, 2020)".

In the past three years, the security situation in Golo has relatively improved due to two factors. First, a peace agreement between the government and some SLA-AW factions in Jebel Marra (UNDP, 2019). Second, the SLA-AW and central government announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in 2019 (UNSC, 2020). This ceasefire was underpinned by SLA-AW agreement to the de facto cease-fire in response to the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), António Guterres' call for a global ceasefire in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic (UN, 2020). Despite the improved security situation, it is important to note that this stability remains fragile as STG and SLA-AW has not reached a peace agreement with incidents of fighting still occurring.

The letter of the Security Council panel of experts on Sudan addressed to the president of the Security Council covering the period from March to December 2019 indicates that skirmishes between the government security forces and the SLA-AW happened intermittently (UNSC, 2020a). Recently, the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan reported that a SAF checkpoint was attacked by SLA-AW in Kutrum, leading to the killing of 27 soldiers from SAF and 9 elements of SLA-AW (UNSC, 2020).

Since the end of 2018, Golo was amongst the areas worst affected by human rights violations in Jebel Marra, including sexual gender-based violence. This gender-based violence is conflict related and perpetrated by armed individuals from different militias including the RSF and SLA (UNSC, 2019a; UNSC, 2020). Over the last two years, attacks on civilians in Central Darfur by RSF and other militias took place intermittently. These attacks brought to the surface the question of whether UNAMID should withdraw from the region (Amnesty International, 2019; ARC, 2020). In the last three months, the relative stability in Jebel Marra was disrupted by 48 incidents of armed clashes. According to the UNSG António Guterres, these 48 clashes led to 115 fatalities, which is significantly higher than the casualties between March and May 2020 (Sudan Tribune, 2020).

The security situation in the area took a new dimension as a result of a leadership contest taking place within SLA-AW that escalated into fighting between two factions led by commanders Mubarak Waldook and Saleh Borso in areas close to Golo. According to the panel of experts on Sudan, the fighting between the two groups involved attacks by each of them on villagers supporting the other faction with reports of displacement, murder and rape (UNSC, 2020a; Relief Web, 2020). Indeed, the number of incidents of armed clashes between the two factions of SLA-AW is significantly higher than those involving SAF and SLA-AW. These clashes take place around the area of Daya north-east of Golo. During the period from May to September 2020, the infighting amongst SLA-AW displaced 9,419 families and caused 17 fatalities (UNSC, 2020; International Organization for Migration, 2020).

Over the last two years, there were several events of intercommunal conflicts in Central Darfur. These conflicts involved communities of different identity backgrounds as well those who share a similar background. Early in 2019, fighting between Beni Halba and Beni Hussein in Korari area took place as a result of altercation between two youths and led to injury of several people (UNSC, 2019b). Intercommunal clashes in Dulayq village Wadi Saleh resulted in displacement of 900 people and claimed the lives of 13 people. The source was not clear about the communities involved (UNSC, 2019d). Moreover, the 2019 farming season, particularly in Nertiti-Thur area of Central Darfur, was disrupted by attacks on farmers by the Nawaiba branch of Northern Rezeigat pastoralists who prevented Fur communities from accessing their farmlands (UNSC, 2019e).

In Golo area, a pregnant woman was beaten and seriously injured when she resisted pastoralists who drove their cattle into her farm. The woman was reported dead and her death escalated tensions between the Northern Rezeigat and Fur communities in the area (Dabanga, 2019). This incident worsened the relationship between Golo villages, and the nomads settled in *damrahs*. The relationship was further disrupted by the murder of five pastoralists in a clash with armed robbers who the pastoralists believe are SLA-AW elements (UNSC, 2019c; Dabanga, 2020).

2. Methodology

The methodology for conducting the baseline conflict analysis was developed with two assumptions in mind. First, local level conflicts involving communities and users of natural resources cannot be understood in isolation from the wider conflict at the national and regional levels. Second, while many local conflicts in Darfur are driven by competition over access to natural resources like land and water, elements of culture, identity and politics are also involved.

The approach for conducting the baseline conflict analysis was participatory in which a multi-stakeholder process was followed. The methodology adopted comprised of the following components:

a) Desk Review

Secondary data were collected from a wide range of sources including those produced by DRC, national and international agencies and government departments. The data collected from these sources was crucial for having up-to-date information about the conflict situation in the area as well as the humanitarian situation in general. Previous studies on intercommunal conflicts in Darfur were also reviewed.

The desk study findings formed the background against which the baseline conflict analysis was conducted. A bibliography of all the sources used for the conflict analysis is included in this report.

b) Primary Data Collection

The primary data collection consisted of a mix of tools including key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus groups discussions (FGDs). These tools were developed in consultation with DRC's team in Khartoum and Copenhagen. In total, four KIIs were conducted with community leaders, Native Administration and community members. The team managed to conduct eight FGDs in four communities (see figure 1, 2 and 3). Out of the eight FGDs, four were with women, two were with youth, and two were with men. See table 1 for further details about the communities visited to conduct the activities of the baseline conflict analysis.

Figure 1. Youth Focus Group Discussion in Bardani

Figure 2. Men focus group discussion in Sonosono *damrah*

Table 1. Communities visited as part of the field work

Area		Number of participants			Description
		Men	Women	Youth	
1	**Koron**	15	15	15	Koron is the nearest community to the south of Golo. Agriculture is the primary livelihood for the village's households. They produce millet, sorghum, onions, potatoes, tomatoes, garlic and oranges. This is different from the generation of the grandparents who used to have larger lands and owned herds of livestock. Mobile pastoralists used to come to the area at the end of the rainy season, but this is no longer the case.
2	**Bardani**	0	15	15	Bardani is located north of Golo. Agriculture is the major source of income for the households. The crops farmers produce in Bardani includes millet, potatoes, tomatoes, okra and lupin. Making charcoal and selling firewood are amongst the major livelihoods during the dry season. The generations of the grandparents used to have large herds, but now insecurity makes rearing large herds unfeasible. Nomads used to come to the area after the harvest, but the conflict in the region disrupted the relationship between them and the sedentary groups.
3	**Althowrah**	0	15	0	Althourah is a neighbourhood of Golo town. The majority of the population rely on agriculture as a source of income. Many are also involved in the commercial business of importing and exporting goods to and from the area. A limited number of individuals have vocational skills. People lost their livestock as a result of the Darfur conflict and the associated animal thefts.
4	Sonosono	15	15	0	Sonosono is a pastoralists settlement area located north-west of Golo. Pastoralism is the major livelihood for the community members. Households usually rear mixed herds of camels, goats, cows and sheep. The mobility distance of this group has significantly decreased in the last 10 years. During the rainy season, many households practice farming and they produce millet, sesame and groundnut.
	Total	30	60	30	
	Grand Total	120			

c) Conflict analysis workshop

A two-day conflict analysis workshop was organised in consultation with DRC Golo team with both DRC staff and external actors attending. The analysis comprised of eight sessions divided into two days (see Annex 4). Three major tools were used in the conflict analysis workshop, i.e. conflict tree analysis; conflict actors mapping; and peace architecture analysis. These tools were very useful in facilitating the analysis about the causes of the conflict, the actors involved and the gaps that need to be addressed with peacebuilding interventions.

Fifteen participants took part in the workshop (11 men and 4 women) including staff members from DRC Golo; community leaders from Golo and surrounding areas; relevant government departments; and community members (see Annex 2).

Figure 3. Participants in conflict analysis workshop developing a conflict tree

Limitations

1. Although the initial number of communities to be visited as part of the baseline conflict analysis field work was six, the team managed to visit only four communities due to two reasons. First, the communication with the two *damrahs* started a couple of days before the planned dates of the visits. At the end the team managed to organise only one meeting with the *damrahs*. Second, one visit to Guldo community was cancelled because there was not an available vehicle for the field trip.

2. The team could not do KIIs with community leaders in each community as in many cases those community leaders did not turn up for the interviews when the team visited the villages. Several attempts were made to invite community leaders for interviews at DRC's office but few of them came for the interviews.

3. The time allocated for the conflict analysis workshop was not sufficient to spend enough time on different conflict analysis tools.

3. Conflict actors' analysis

In this section, we provide information about individuals or groups who are involved, influence or affected by the conflict whether negatively or positively. We also shed light on actors who are dealing with the conflict with different peacebuilding interventions. Moreover, we present our analysis in terms of the relationships of conflict actors and the issues shaping these relationships. See Figure 4 for the conflict actors map that was drawn by the conflict analysis workshop participants.

3.2. Communities: villages and *damrahs*

The literature on Darfur conflict is full of generalised comments about intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. In some cases, an ethnic lens is applied to present local conflicts as confrontations between those who broadly fall under the category of 'Africans' and those who broadly falls under the category of 'Arabs'. On one hand, the ethnic lens conceals the divisions within 'Arab' and 'African' groups. On many occasions 'Arab' groups also fought each other. Indeed, many 'Arab' communities abstained from taking part in the government of Sudan's counterinsurgency against the rebels in which civilians from rebel groups' communities were targeted. The line between 'Arabs' and 'Africans' is permeable, and it reflects identity divisions more than an ethnic one (Brosché, 2008). This generalisation also falls short of explaining why some militias that are associated with the 'Arab' identity are currently in alliance with SLA-AW in Jebel Marra. In fact, "the tribal dimension is not the major issue behind the conflict between the 'Fur' and 'Arabs', but it was manipulated by the government to mobilise some of the 'Arab' groups against our communities", one youth in Koron said.

On other occasions, a livelihood lens is employed to present the intercommunal conflicts as an outcome of competition between pastoralists and farmers. However, it is important to note that although there are livelihoods specialisations in different communities, households often adopt a mix of livelihoods strategies. Farmers are specialised in agriculture, but they also rear some animals to sell when they have cash needs to reduce the amount of crop they sell. Pastoralists also cultivate small parcels of land to reduce the number of animals they need to sell when they have cash needs for food. Using this mix of strategies, makes the livelihoods of both groups more productive and resilient to shocks (Fitzpatrick & Young, 2016). Relying on the identity or the livelihood categorisation conceals other factors involved in the conflict which in turn limits the ability of peacebuilding interventions to respond to the root causes of the conflict. In an FGD with community leaders of Sonosono *damrah*, the participants explained that one of the pastoralists that was killed in an incident of animal theft by groups allegedly part of the SLA-AW was a hired herder from a Fur background.

This conflict analysis uses the categorisation of villages and *damrahs* as its unit of analysis instead of tribal lines or livelihoods system subgroups of pastoralists and farmers, as this allows for better understanding of the relationships the communities have with one another as well as for better identification of peacebuilding opportunities. Our analysis suggests that conflicts between communities are not mainly driven by differences in tribal backgrounds. Two communities with different tribal backgrounds might be in conflict but there are examples of relatively good relationships between other communities with a similar contrast of tribal background. Some villages have relatively good relationship with the *damrahs*, while other villages have a totally disrupted relationship with *damrahs*.

Within the area covered by the conflict analysis, the communities could be divided in terms of their settlement as follows:

   1. Golo villages: this is comprised of the communities between Golo up to Taringa and Usagai in the northern parts of Golo. These villages are mostly inhabited by people from the Fur tribe.

   2. Guldo villages: these are the communities living around Guldo village which is located west of Golo. The inhabitants of these communities are mostly from the Fur tribe.

3. Golo *damrahs*: these are settlements of nomadic groups scattered in the area between Usagai and Guldo. The inhabitants of these communities are from Northern Rezeigat groups of Nawaiba, Jallo, Mahria, Erigat and Awlad Zaid.

Guldo and Golo villages enjoy very good relationships fostered by kinship and a shared tribal background. There is no formal relationship between these communities and the government departments or SLA-AW. However, SLA-AW have many elements and members from these communities. However, there are also elements in the formal security sector, including in the RSF, from these communities. A recent report published by Small Arms Survey indicated that,

> "While rebel movements continue to recruit among civilian youths, these movements' low chances of attaining their objectives also mean that many young men, including non-Arab youths and former rebels themselves, have found it more appealing to join the RSF, notably with the motivation of receiving lucrative payment for fighting in Yemen (Tubiana, et al., 2020, p. 70)".

Golo and Guldo villages have mixed relationship with Golo *damrahs*. While Golo villages have disrupted relationship with Golo damrahs, Guldo villages have better relationship with Golo *damrahs*. For more than two years, the community leaders in Guldo villages and Golo *damrahs* have been able to work together in organising farming and grazing activities as well as in resolving disputes between communities. Pastoralists from Golo *damrahs* can access Guldo markets to purchase their daily needs and also to sell their animals. This access to the market is crucial for supplying livestock to Golo villages. The centrality of markets for the three clusters of community makes it a very good connector for those communities.

The disrupted relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* is a result of a series of incidents that affected both communities. This includes grazing livestock of pastoralists from the *damrahs* in crop fields of Golo villages; theft of livestock from villages; theft of livestock from *damrahs*; and the associated incidents of murdering and abducting community members from both groups. These incidents led to loss of trust on both sides. Currently, community members of Golo *damrahs* cannot go to Golo town and the surrounding villages or access Golo market. Moreover, farmers from Golo villages cannot access lands in the fringes of the *damrahs* north to Golo.

The current state of relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* does not reflect the shared history of cooperation these communities used to enjoy, in some cases until very recent times. In Bardani, FGD participants indicated that despite the fact that the area was controlled by SLA-AW, mobile pastoralists used to come to the area for grazing up to 2012. The migratory route they used to come through was blocked when they began to commit some crimes.

In several FGDs, the communities indicated that there were numerous forms of cooperation and synergy between these different groups in different aspects of life. Before the Darfur conflict, there were lots of cross-marriages between the different ethnic groups living in the area and communities used to support one another in, both, good and hard times. It is worth mentioning that in some FGDs that took place in the villages the participants showed understanding for the grievances of the *damrah* dwellers. "We know that 'Arabs' are victims of a long history of marginalisation. The government never invested in their education or services and have always exploited them in the conflict", one participant from Golo said.

Amongst the major forms of cooperation was the exchange of produce. Villages used to supply food crops to *damrahs*' dwellers and *damrahs*' community members used to supply livestock to the villages. Within the tough topography of Jebel Marra, transporting goods to other areas and big markets was only possible through the camel caravans of the pastoralists.

Besides exchange of benefits, events like horseracing and festivals acted as connectors by bringing communities from these areas together to share times with one another. In order to build on that history, UNAMID recently supported a horseracing event and many other sport-based events that brought people from diverse background together to promote peaceful coexistence (UNAMID, 2020).

In the past, the relationship was built on trust and peaceful coexistence, but the conflict played a major role in disrupting this relationship. The history of cooperation between the two groups provides a very good opportunity for peacebuilding in the area.

3.3. Sudan Liberation Army – Abdulwahid

SLA-AW was formed in 2004 as a result of a split within the SLA-AW. Since then, the SLA-AW was split several times. The movement is led by the exiled Darfuri lawyer Abdulwahid Mohamed al Nur who is currently settled in Paris (HSBA, 2011). As indicated in the context section, SLA-AW is currently experiencing infighting led by two SLA commanders in Jebel Marra. SLA-AW splits have historically been attributed to Abdulwahid's poor management as well as his distance from the movements' operational areas. Similar splits took place early in 2010 (HSBA, 2011). According to several informants in Golo, elements of the notorious leader of the Janjaweed Musa Hilal sought refuge in Jebel Marra when he was arrested at the end of 2017 and many of them are fighting alongside SLA-AW in Jebel Marra. This is confirmed by the letter of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan in January 2019, although the report indicates that Hilal's elements "keep low-profile" (UNSC, 2019).

Participants of the analysis workshop indicated that SLA-AW enjoys good relationships with, both, Golo and Guldo villages. However, given the current division within the SLA-AW this assumption appears to be vague. Recent reports of fighting between the two SLA-AW factions in Jebel Marra shows that different factions are supported by different communities and that each faction attacked the communities they perceive as being a supporter of the other faction. This division within SLA-AW accompanied by the increased independence of community leaders from SLA-AW hinders the movements' ability to influence decisions at community level. Moreover, the relationship between these different factions of SLA-AW and the villages of Golo and Guldo needs further investigation as it may cause divisions within these communities.

The relationships between SLA-AW from one side and the government and its regular forces on the other side is officially disrupted. The SLA-AW persistently refused to join the peace talks in Juba and fighting between the government and SLA-AW continues in Jebel Marra.

Golo *damrahs*, on the other hand, have a disrupted relationship with SLA-AW. The movement perceives the *damrahs* as elements of the RSF and considers them as targets for its operations. Criminal activities of animal rustling directly target the pastoralists of the *damrahs*, which makes SLA-AW perceived as a threat by *damrahs* communities.

3.4. Sudan Transitional Government (STG): a fractured structure

The transitional government in Sudan was formed in August 2019 when the members of the political alliance of Forces of Freedom and Change accepted a power-sharing agreement with the Transitional Military Council (TMC). The agreement was reached after four months of tense disagreements, security sector's violence against protesters supported by Egypt and the Gulf States, as well as diplomatic pressure by regional and international actors (Crisis Groups, 2019).

Although most of the day-to-day responsibilities for managing the country fall within the mandate of the civilian government cabinet, most of the components of the military power, including law enforcement, falls under the responsibility of the generals of the security sector (Crisis Groups, 2019). It is therefore important to consider the different components of the STG separately.

3.4.1. Civilian component

A civilian governor was appointed for Central Darfur just as the other seventeen states of Sudan. (Reuters, 2020). The move was welcomed widely by the citizens of Central Darfur. The demand for civilian governors to replace military governors was shared by the Sudanese people in all states. The new governor visited Golo in September 2020 and met with the Native Administration and the local resistance committee to discuss the issues of the area.

Despite the formation of the civilian cabinet after the signing of the constitutional document and the appointment of the civilian government, farmers in Golo and elsewhere in Central Darfur continue to face security challenges including rape and murder preventing them from moving ahead with their farming activities (Dabanga, 2020). The insecurity is largely driven by the prevalence of armed militias in the area, particularly those affiliated with the RSF. Attacks on farmers demonstrates the local government has little control over the components of the security sectors and the weak ability of the government at all levels to achieve the long-demanded security sector reform in the whole country.

Although, it is early to assess the relationship between the new local government and the local communities, the communities have a lot of hope in the new government in terms of improving security and rolling out development programmes. This hope is mainly derived from the appointment of a new civilian governor from Central Darfur, who is known for his rejection of the policies of the ousted regime.

3.4.2. Military component

The security sector itself is not a united structure and there are lots of divisions amongst its components i.e. the SAF, the Intelligence Services, the RSF and their allied militias (Crisis Groups, 2019). This is important to acknowledge because it shows how the civilian government cabinet and its lower administrative structures may find it difficult to work with a divided security sector. Moreover, it shows that the components of the security sector present in Golo and other parts of Darfur are far from being a cohesive body.

In discussions held with different key informants and focus group discussions, participants said that the new military commander in Golo is much better than his predecessors in terms of respect for human rights and protection of civilians, but it might be too early to make such judgements. However, there was resentment in Golo villages about the RSF and its allied militias. Given the fact that the RSF is the most powerful security actor in Darfur and that it enjoys significant independence from the other components (Crisis Groups, 2019), it represents a key risk to communities' relationships as it has been a major spoiler in the region. The scale of the RSF risk is very high given the economic, political and diplomatic vigour its leader enjoys in post-Bashir Sudan. However, under the pressure of Nertiti sit-in last July, the RSF deployed troops in some areas to protect farmers. Participants reported that in some cases the government took serious action to return livestock stolen from Guldo.

The ambiguity in understanding the security sector is further enhanced by the fact that some of the elements of SLA-AW factions who signed an agreement with the government in 2018 have joined the RSF. These divisions between the components of the security sector and amongst them represent a major threat to social cohesion in the area. First, their position outside the control of the civilian government means they could behave according to their own interests

and continue to perpetrate atrocities against civilians. Second, the divisions within those components may result in conflicts that may directly affect the relationship between the villages and *damrahs* in Golo.

3.5. Native Administration and peace and reconciliation committee (PRC)

In Golo areas, the Native Administration plays a significant role in managing access to land; arranging the Talaig[1]; and resolving disputes and conflicts (Box 1 provides information about the talaig institution and how it is organised). This was indicated by all the communities visited as part of the conflict analysis. However, the power of the Native Administration appears to be challenged by different factors. First, there appear to be divisions within some communities about the performance of the Native Administration, particularly in Golo area. In some areas, this is due to alleged corruption of the Native Administration in aid services distribution. Some FGD participants claimed that sometimes sheikhs[2] include fake names in their community lists of beneficiaries while excluding other community members. Second, youth groups raised the issue of Native Administration politicisation by the previous regime and indicated that this politicisation affected their legitimacy in terms of how they represent the agenda of their communities. Finally, some youth participants raised the issue of the need to move towards "modern" state institutions and that Darfur cannot continue to be managed by those structures. Some of these challenges have also been documented elsewhere in Darfur (Young & Ismail, 2019).

Despite the challenges raised above, the Native Administration in the context of Golo plays a key role in conflict resolution within communities and amongst communities. In line with the findings of other studies like Young, et al., 2019, the most recognised mechanism for settling conflicts between farmers and pastoralists at local level is the judiya which is facilitated by local mediation sheikhs under the Native Administration called Ajaweed in the area. These Ajaweed recommend settlements for conflicts related to natural resources including early talaig and animals trespassing crop fields. Agreeing on reparation for damage caused to crops or livestock prevents the conflicts from escalating into individual conflict that may fuel intercommunal conflict. Every year, the government forms a committee from the Native Administration and the police for resolving disputes between farmers and pastoralists during the farming season. The activities of that committee allowed some famers from Golo to cultivate lands in areas close to *damrahs* north of Golo. Box 2 explains the judiya customary system and how it is facilitated.

Although the Ajaweed role is crucial for preventing individual conflicts from escalating into intercommunal conflicts, this role is also challenged by the context of insecurity in Darfur. The issue of prevalence of arms in the region is a key challenge that makes it very difficult for the Ajaweed to assert their authority within their respective areas. In different FGDs and KIIs, the participants said that the power that armed individuals have when they carry guns gives them impunity from any decisions made by the Ajaweed regarding any dispute. Women in Golo said that the Ajaweed would be effective when the government disarms militias and sign a comprehensive peace agreement with all rebels.

Towards resolving intercommunal conflicts in Golo area, the Native Administration in all the villages and *damrahs* formed a peace and reconciliation committee (PRC). It is comprised of eight members from the *damrahs* and ten members from the villages. The PRC is informally *damrahs* and ten

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[1] The date set by the local tribal authorities when pastoralist livestock herds are permitted to enter farms after the harvest of rain-fed sorghum and millet in order to graze on the stubble and crop residues
[2] Executives at community or village levels

members from the villages. The PRC is informally mandated with facilitating mediations for conflict involving different communities. However, sometimes the police and legal authorities work closely with them in resolving intercommunal conflicts.

In recent years, the PRC were able to resolve some of the major events of conflict in the area including those resulting from homicide crimes or animal thefts. The head of the PRC is a sheikh from Bardani village called Adam Nour. Sheikh Adam Nour has successfully led PRC in resolving many intercommunal conflicts. The key to his success, as other community members and Native Administration leaders explained, is his negotiations skills and his ability to maintain the trust of different actors including communities, different Native Administration leaders, as well as different political and military entities. The qualities Sheikh Adam show are the qualities usually found in Ajaweed members across the region of Darfur. The experiences of Sheikh Adam and other Ajaweed members would be very useful for the local mechanisms that DRC could establish as part of its future peacebuilding interventions.

In the last two years, the PRC was able to settle many intercommunal conflicts, some of which were very complicated. The animal rustling that affected the Northern Rezeigat living in Jebel Marra provoked a retaliation against the villages of Golo. The retaliation was by abducting a group of Fur pilgrims returning from Haj in Saudi Arabia along with the vehicles transporting them to Golo. After long negotiations that lasted for six months in which the government was involved, the PCR managed to free the pilgrims.

Recently the PRC wrote a letter to Abdulwahid al-Nour, the leader of the SLA, complaining about the increased rates of animals rustling, allegedly committed by SLA-AW elements, that affects *damrahs*' pastoralists of Jebel Marra. PRC members and the Native Administration have direct lines of communication with the local government as well as the SLA-AW, but this is more for community leaders to raise their communities' issues with these actors including security and services issues.

Box 1. The customary institution of talaig

The talaig is a natural resources management customary institution through which farmers and pastoralists share access to land. It is a date negotiated between farmers and pastoralists and the Native Administration in the area. When talaig date comes, farmers would be expected to have all their crops harvested and pastoralists would be allowed to graze their animals in crop residues. Besides sharing the land between different users, negotiating talaig aims to prevent livestock-related crop damage and to avoid conflict (Satti, et al., 2020).

Box 2. The judiya arbitration system

Ajaweed: The system of judiya is the local-level system of arbitration established to reconciliate between disputants; and to restore social relationships in the community. This system handles local-level crimes that does not need court interventions.

The judiya is facilitated by individuals known as 'ajaweed' (Ajwad is the singular and Ajaweed is the plural). Those local individuals are expert community members on customary law. Usually, they are old highly respected community members who know the history of the area as well as the communities and tribes who live in it. To reconcile between different parties, they use the unneutral strategy of putting pressure on the party that resist settlement instead of finding one party guilty of committing a crime.

Setting up a judiya meeting is straightforward and it could be organised in one of the ajaweed's houses or a place that everyone can access. In Golo, people refer to the judiya place as the 'rakobah' which means a shed made from bamboo and straws. A typical judiya is run by five ajaweed. If successfully facilitated, judiya sessions could be completed in one sitting. It begins with verses of the Quran read by one of the ajaweed. Following the Quran verses, one of the ajaweed presents the case in front of the other party. Each party identifies a spokesman who should abide by the judiya rules. These rules include not provoking the other party or pointing fingers at him. The aggrieved party is usually heard by the ajaweed before the accused one. The ajaweed always remind conflicting parties of the shared history and the importance of cooperation.

3.6. Resistance committees

Resistance committees are grassroot local associations that were formed during the uprising against the Bashir regime. They are mostly led by youth in their neighbourhoods. In Golo, there is a resistance committee and it is actively engaged with the local government in identifying the priorities of Golo residents for development and security.

The influence that resistance committees have on local governments in Sudan could allow them to play a positive role in pushing the local government to be more proactive in resolving the intercommunal conflicts between the *damrahs* and the villages. However, in order to be successful in playing a peacebuilding role, it needs to include representatives from different villages and *damrahs*. Currently, the *damrahs* community members are not represented in the resistance committee.

3.7. Humanitarian sector

There are different development and humanitarian actors working in Golo. During the analysis workshop, the participants counted eighteen actors within this sector. This includes DRC and many other NGOs as well as the World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). All these humanitarian actors have projects with direct or indirect peacebuilding objectives. The approach is a multi-sectoral one through which different actors exert efforts to address different humanitarian needs and increase access to different services sectors such as health and nutrition, WASH and food security, protection, agriculture and education sectors. Despite the efforts of the humanitarian actors, all the communities visited still face many challenges in for example access to water and health services.

There is a Peacebuilding Coordination Forum in Golo co-chaired by the Locality Commissioner and UNDP with support from UNICEF and UNAMID. This forum is potentially a connector for communities and could contribute to resolving intercommunal conflict by developing a coordinated peacebuilding approach in the area.

Figure 4. Golo conflict actor map

Key	
🔴 (red ellipse)	Actor
▬▬▬	Close relationship
	Alliance
────	Informal links
───▶	Direction of influence
∿∿∿	Discord
────	Broken relationship

4. Conflict causes analysis

The most serious intercommunal conflict in Golo, Central Darfur is the one between the village dwellers who are mostly Fur and *damrahs*' dwellers who are predominantly from mobile pastoralist groups of Nawaibha, Mahryah and Awlad rashid and associate themselves with the 'Arab' identity. Based on the testimonies of the analysis participants, disputes between these groups are caused by issues related to access and control of natural resources including land and water. However, various environmental, political and economic processes are involved in causing intercommunal conflicts in the area. In this section, we highlight the major drivers of conflict between the villages and *damrahs* in Golo.

4.2. Grievances of the village dwellers

For villages the conflict over land takes place when pastoralists graze their animals on crops that are not yet harvested. This form of conflict usually happens towards the end of the farming season. However, disputes erupt at early stages of the rainy season, usually in June, when some armed individuals associated with the *damrahs* of the mobile pastoralists prevent farmers from starting their cultivation activities. Indeed, many of Golo's farmers were unable to cultivate rainy season crops in 2020 due to the conflict between them and pastoralists *damrahs*. However, the relatively better relationship between Golo *damrahs* and Guldo villages allowed many farmers from Guldo to access land around the damrahs.

Another form of conflict takes place during the dry season, when water pools and ponds formed during the rainy season dry up. Some pastoralists find it difficult to access water in the wadis, and they often found the areas around a wadi cultivated by dry season crops. The pressure to provide water for their animals pushes them to sometimes trespass the cultivated areas and that results in crop damage. This kind of incident often results in disputes between farmers in Golo villages and the pastoralists from the *damrahs*.

One of the key grievances of farmers in Golo and elsewhere in Darfur is the increased attacks on farmers by armed militias associated with the RSF. This fuels the divisions between the villages and the *damrahs* because the *damrahs* are viewed politically as supporters of the RSF.

4.3. Grievances of the damrahs' dwellers

Damrahs' dwellers were affected largely by animal theft. In the discussions that were held with this group, they indicated that SLA elements from Golo were responsible for the theft of their animals. They stated that by tracing the hoofprints of the stolen animals, they realised that the animals end in Golo. When they investigate the incidents with Golo villages, the villages say that the livestock went to Jebel Marra, usually into SLA-AW areas, and the *damrahs* blame the theft on Golo villages. Animal thefts targeting *damrahs*' community members lead to the most serious confrontation between the two groups as the theft often involves murdering or injuring the herders. This leads to armed mobilization of *damrahs* community members in attempt to retrieve the stolen animals.

4.4. Historical grievances of both groups

The causes of intercommunal conflicts cannot be considered in isolation from the wider national, regional and international dynamics that shaped the conflict in Darfur and elsewhere (Young & Osman, 2006). DRC's response to intercommunal conflicts in Golo would benefit from understanding the different factors at different levels, if actions are to address the root causes of these conflicts.

The population of Darfur has endured long-term processes of economic and political marginalisation by the central government of Sudan. The inequality that affected all the communities weakened the local institutions and underdeveloped the region. This led to resentment against the government and encouraged many in the region to join armed resistance (Young & Osman, 2006). "We see other regions growing, but we are not, and that is why we fought the central government", said one FGD participant.

The marginalisation of the region dates to the nineteenth century when Darfur and the rest of the Sudan were controlled by Turkish colonial rule as well as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium who focused development in the central regions of the country. Post-independence, the successive national governments followed the same path. The underdevelopment of the region takes

the shape of poor education, health care, transport, veterinary and other services which affect all the communities in Darfur, but to different extents. The marginalisation of Darfur is further exacerbated by the weakened institutions of the judiciary system and the police who were also biased against certain groups (Young & Osman, 2006).

The grievances of the Darfuri population intensified by Darfur conflicts and the crimes committed against civilians. In all FGD in Golo, the participants indicated that historically their grievances were fuelled by the government of Sudan's counterinsurgency measures against the rebellion that started in 2003, in which the government relied on tribal militia from different pastoralists groups who associate themselves with the 'Arab' identity including Northern Rezeigat groups, many of them currently live in Golo *damrahs*. The scorched earth campaign adopted by the government and these militias caused a dire humanitarian situation for the village dwellers in Jebel Marra through destruction of villages, mass killings and displacement (Young & Osman, 2006).

The grievances of Golo village dwellers in Jebel Marra and other communities in the region cannot be denied, but it is very important to recognise the historical vulnerabilities of those who live in the *damrahs* and other from the Northern Rezeigat communities. Often, the marginalisation of pastoralists and pastoralism in the peripheral parts of the Sudan is less known. This marginalisation disrupted the relationship between these groups and the government as well as the relationship between mobile pastoralists and sedentary communities.

Like many other mobile pastoralists' groups in Africa, those pastoralists who live in *damrahs* across the region of Darfur face many social, political and economic challenges. Indeed, the dominant land tenure system in Darfur is the Hakura system established by the Fur sultanate in the seventeenth century (Young, et al., 2009). This system has been institutionalised by colonial powers and post-independence governments. However, the Anglo- Egyptian rule entrenched structural inequalities into this system as it denied the Northern Rezeigat the right to control land, particularly when the condominium relocated them from the Hakura given to them by the Fur Sultanate north of Kutum. Since then, Northern Rezeigat can access land during a certain period in the year, based on usufruct rights, particularly post-harvest to graze their animals on crops residues. However, they don't enjoy the right to control land as the other groups. Event this right to access land post-harvest is increasingly challenged by various political, demographic and insecurity factors (Young, et al., 2009). Asking the *damrahs* about how they can access land for cultivation, they indicated that "we do not own land, but we can get 'dahryah', a permit from the landowner to cultivate the land for couple of years". Box 3 provides a background on the history of the Hakura system and its evolution.

The grievances of access to land are further exacerbated by the government neglect of mobile pastoralists right to veterinary services, health care and education services. Moreover, the government's chaotic natural resources management policy which often lacks the integrated approach needed to foster equitable rights to land and landed resources has severely affected these groups (Young, et al., 2009).

In all communities, there was a consensus on the negative role played by other actors in the local level conflicts between villages and *damrahs*. "There is political interference in the relationship between the *damrahs* and the villages, I genuinely don't know why we are in conflict with the *damrahs*", one youth FGD participant in Koron said. Another FGD participant in Bardani indicated that, "the historical relationship between us and the 'Arabs' deteriorated when the government armed them. This made them feel powerful and they became disrespectful to our shared history of cooperation". Commenting on the same issue, another FGD participant in Bardani indicated that,

"the historical relationship between us and the 'Arabs' deteriorated when the government armed them. This made them feel powerful and they became disrespectful to our shared history of cooperation". Commenting on the same issue, another FGD participant in Sonosono *damrah* said that "the relationship with the villages was shaped by security and trust. Village dwellers used to send their livestock with our mobile herds. However, the criminal activities of the SLA that target our community negatively altered this relationship".

Box 3. The Hakura customary land tenure system

> The Hakura is Darfur's customary land tenure system that dates back to the 17th century's Fur Sultanate. When it was first established, the Sultan granted concessions or estates to tribal nobles to control the land and encourage migrations to the kingdom. The rights granted by the Sultan were usufruct rights for the group led by each noble. Under that system, land is communally owned and individual rights of selling and inheritance never existed. Since the colonial rule, a statutory land tenure system coexisted with customary system of Hakura. Under the pressure of increased population and the ambiguity created by the coexistence of two tenure systems, individuals' rights under the Hakura system began to emerge. Land now could be sold, inherited and rented under the Hakura system (Osman, et al., 2013).

4.5. Environmental processes

Severe droughts in the mid-1980s and their associated social, demographic and economic consequences played a major role in intensifying pressure on natural resources. While Jebel Marra was not directly affected by these droughts, they had an impact on Jebel Marra and the southern parts of the region. The environmental pressure in the northern parts of Darfur contributed significantly to the increased incidences of intercommunal conflict in Darfur for the last 30 years. This is due to increased migration of northern populations to the southern parts of the region and the increased demand for land that accompanied that migration. In Golo villages, older participants indicated that there were migrations to Jebel Marra from North Darfur in the aftermath of the 1980s droughts. The environmental pressures are further exacerbated by the increased population in the region, which meant more competition over the existing land and water resources for farmers as well as pastoralists. It also led to degradation of natural resources as the expansion of traditional rainfed agriculture often meant clearing large areas of forests that are vital sources of fodders for camel herders (Young, et al., 2009).

In all villages visited, the communities indicated that their demand for land has increased due to the increased population. Whilst in the past community members of Golo, Bardani and Koron used to cultivate around their communities, they now need to have access to land elsewhere. This increased demand for land was met by accessing lands in areas north of Golo. Lands in these northern areas are the ones that currently many community members from Golo cannot access due to insecurity. They indicated that the insecurity is due to the fact that these areas are currently controlled by "Arab" groups who forcibly prevent them from cultivating that area.

Indeed, the increased pressure on land led to significant change in patterns of production. Farmers in all communities reported reduction in soil fertility. This reduction of soil fertility is a phenomenon that is shared with other parts of Darfur and it is mainly due to the shift from a 'shifting cultivation' production pattern, in which farmers cultivate different parcels of lands in different years, to 'continuous cultivation,' in which farmers cultivate the same land every year and throughout the year. The reduced land fertility means that farmers need more land to increase their production (Osman, et al., 2013) and that intensifies the competition for land resources and leads to environmental degradation as well.

On the other hand, pastoralists from *damrahs* reported that their pattern of mobility has changed from long-distance mobility in which they go all the way to northern Wadi Howar in North Darfur to medium-distance mobility between Golo and Kebkabiya. This shorter pattern of mobility was also documented in other parts of the region (Sulieman & Young, 2019). Indeed, the main driver indicated by the *damrahs*' participants for shortening the distance of mobility is their need to access social services, mainly education for their children. Long-distance mobility is not good for the future of the children", one *damrah* participant said. However, some participants of the focus groups discussions indicated that long-distance mobility is no longer feasible with fewer numbers of animals. It is important to understand the move towards shorter-distance mobility as a response to the negative impact of the conflict on pastoralist groups through blockage of livestock migratory routes and animal thefts by rebel groups throughout the region which pushes them to remain in areas they consider safe for them and their livestock (Young, et al., 2009).

4.6. Economic processes

Economic interests appear to be linked with *damrahs* animal theft as well. The January 2020 letter of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council indicated that the increasingly weakened control of Abdulwahid in Jebel Marra and the loss of various sources of finance for his movement pushed many of the movement's elements to resort to animal theft to support themselves (UNSC, 2020). Moreover, there are claims that the infighting within the movement led to animals rustling from the communities affected by that infighting.

4.7. Political processes

There is a general trend of intensifying intercommunal conflicts in Sudan after the previous regime was overthrown. These conflicts are on the rise in Darfur, eastern Sudan and Kordofan. In many cases, the institutions of law enforcement failed to prevent intercommunal violence and elements from those institutions were involved in the violence. This was quite stark in Genina and eastern Sudan. There is a need to further investigate this trend of increase in intercommunal conflicts and the political interests it may serve. According to other analyses, this violence is fuelled by elements of the previous regime who are trying to destabilise the transition in Sudan through their supporters within different formal and informal structures.

The political transition that took place in Sudan in 2019 is not expected to reform the security sector in a way that serves the interests of the Sudanese citizens across the country. The generals of the TMC, who were part of the previous regime, managed to secure powerful political positions within the transitional government including in the Sovereign Council and the ministries of defence and interior. This represents a huge challenge for implementing a security sector reform as part of the transition to ensure that peace prevails in the country. The chaotic security sector that is uncontrolled by a competent civilian authority is the main driver for violations of human rights by individuals and militias associated with the different components of the security sector. Diverting government spending from security to development in marginalised areas like Darfur would also be challenged by the powerful position of the military generals in the transitional government (Young, 2020).

4.8. Prevalence of small arms

Although there was a disarmament campaign in 2018, prevalence of small arms and the easy access to them have been identified by Golo communities as a major contributing factor to the intercommunal conflicts in the area. In all FGDs, prevalence of small arms is considered as one

of the factors that undermine any possibility for negotiating settlements to disputes and as a major driver for criminal activities that target the communities in the area.

Despite the UN arms embargo and other multilateral restrictions, the demand for small arms and light weapons has significantly increased with the beginning of hostilities that flamed the Darfur conflict in 2002 (HSBA, 2009). Estimates of Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment in 2009 indicate that two million weapons are held by individuals outside the government control all over Sudan (HSBA, 2009). Individuals from diverse Darfuri backgrounds have been involved in arms trafficking using direct or indirect smuggling routes via the Chadian borders (Tubiana, et al., 2020).

These arms probably end up in the hands of tribal militias and criminal groups and contribute to the disruption of relationships in Golo and the rest of the region. It is worth mentioning that across the region, many individuals keep guns to protect themselves and their assets. As noted elsewhere in the world, arms trade is directly related to the failure of governments to control its fighters due to the economic interests associated with criminal activities committed with those arms (Keen, 2008).

4.9. Consequences of the conflicts

Intercommunal conflicts in Golo have a very negative impact on the lives and livelihoods of different segments of the villages and *damrahs*' communities. The major consequence highlighted by all communities is the killing of community members. Killing incidences significantly worsen the relationship between the *damrahs* and villages and perpetuate grievances and resentment.

Women in both communities are the most affected group by intercommunal conflicts. At times of conflict, they are usually targeted by harassment, abuse and rape. The loss of a husband or a child has psychological and economic consequences. When women lose their husbands, all the responsibilities of their households fall on them. This includes securing a household income besides the traditional roles assigned to them.

Youth in all communities were affected by the overall situation of war, but intercommunal conflicts exacerbate their suffering. Youth lost their educational opportunities because of the damage to schools in the area as well as the economic hardships that limited the capacity of their families in meeting the costs of their education. This pushed many youths to resort to maladaptive strategies like illegal migration and joining armed militias. Moreover, drug abuse and violence have become very rampant among youths.

The social norms in the area oblige male community members to take part in intercommunal conflicts and that exposes them to the risk of death. However, harassing and raping women is also a way to humiliate men.

Indeed, intercommunal conflicts have an adverse impact on livelihoods and economic wellbeing. Pastoralism and farming livelihoods in Darfur evolved through developing symbiotic relationships between the people who practisce them. The disrupted relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs*' resulted in the loss of the symbiotic relationships the pastoralists and farmers in both sides used to enjoy. Farmers cannot access lands near the *damrahs* and pastoralists cannot go for grazing in Golo. Denying pastoralists access to Golo villages markets led to an increase in meat prices in Golo. On the other hand, the insecurity prevents many farmers from trying to grow flocks as they are exposed to the risk of thefts. The tense conflict between the *damrahs* and the villages have destroyed the historical social cohesion that characterised relationships in the past.

5. Peacebuilding architecture analysis

In Golo, there are various structures and institutions that are put in place to tackle intercommunal conflicts. Some of these structures and institutions represent local capacities that communities derived from local initiatives, and others are outcomes of interventions led by national and international actors. In order to be strategic and context specific, DRC needs to align its interventions with the existing initiatives.

In this section, the existing peacebuilding structures and institutions are mapped. It is divided into five themes - environmental interventions, political interventions, economic interventions, social interventions and security interventions.

5.2. Environmental interventions

Existing processes

1. In some areas, people from the *damrahs* and from the villages began to share land for farming. Although this is very limited, it shows that there is an opportunity for extending this practice into other areas to promote synergy and cooperation between individuals from these communities.

2. In partnership with Siyag Charity Organization, the UNDP implemented a livelihood project in which planting Acacia Senegal trees for gum Arabic production was a core activity. The trees were grown through collaborative action involving community members of Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* in areas of contiguity between the two clusters of community. Although fires destroyed the gum Arabic trees grown, participants in the analysis workshop indicated that the activity was effective in bringing people from these communities together to build their relationships.

Existing structures and institutions

1. The traditional judiya system led by Native Administrations is crucial for resolving intercommunal conflicts. This system is cross-cutting and plays a vital role under other thematic areas as well. The capacities of mediation and conflict resolution have been very successful in de-escalating tensions between different groups.

2. The Talaig institution that organises access to land by farmers and pastoralists is recognised by pastoralists and farmers in all communities. In Golo areas, farmers use the land from June to February and allow pastoralists to graze their animals in crop residues from March to May.

3. There are Forest National Corporation (FNC), agriculture and livestock administrations in Golo. These institutions are mandated with the technical support and extension services to farmers and pastoralists. The services they provide include forest conservation, improved seeds distribution and livestock vaccination. Their role in improving the rural economy of this population is crucial for peacebuilding.

4. There are high levels of awareness of the importance of forests for the environment and that imbedded the norm of not felling trees in the communities of the area.

5.3. Political interventions

Existing processes

1. After years of civil wars in the country, a popular uprising overthrew the regime of Omar al-Bashir. One of the major demands of the Sudanese people was to achieve peace in all the peripheries of the Sudan. The pledge of the newly sworn-in prime minister and his cabinet is that they will aim to tackle the root causes on the conflict in Sudan (UN News, 2019). So far, the government succeeded in reaching a peace deal with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and they are engaging with the other rebel groups of Sudan People's Liberation Movement- Abdelaziz Al-Hilu (SPLM-al-hilu) and SLA-AW (UN News, 2020). This commitment to tackling the root causes of the conflict, if genuine, may result in a comprehensive peace agreement with all the opposition groups, including SLA-AW. A comprehensive peace agreement would address the grievances of all the communities in Jebel Marra.

2. In several FGDs, the participants highlighted the peace agreement that Sudan government reached with some SLA-AW factions in 2017 as a significant step towards improving the overall security in Golo area and its surroundings. Elements of these factions are now deployed in Sabanga and Deba Nyra where they play a key role in maintaining security in the area.

Existing structures and institutions

1. The appointment of a new civilian governor to Central Darfur in July 2020 by STG was a very good move towards fulfilling the demands of the local people in Central Darfur. People and their organisations began to engage with the government actively through meetings and memoranda to raise their demands for security and development. The new civilian government can play a positive role in ending intercommunal clashes if it treats them equally.

2. The local PRC plays a vital role in settling intercommunal disputes, despite the contextual and logistical challenges they face. The representation of the Native Administration from different communities, in both villages and *damrahs*, makes it a trusted entity by all communities. The networks of its individual members within the local government and the respect it enjoys amongst other actors further underpins its position within the peacebuilding architecture.

3. The resistance committees as a grass-roots movement have a strong capacity to mobilise the youth in Golo villages. It can play a vital role in bringing the youth from different communities together and empower them to influence the decision-making structure to make genuine steps in peacebuilding.

5.4. Economic interventions

Existing processes

1. Most of the activities that aim to improve the economic wellbeing of Golo communities are implemented by NGOs. These activities focus on supporting the existing livelihoods of the communities and in filling food gaps through food distribution. So far, there are not any government interventions that aim to foster the local economy.

Existing structures and institutions

1. In areas where people from the villages and those from *damrahs* are able to access the same market like in Guldo, these markets are good connectors of people as they can exchange goods and services.

5.5. Social interventions

Existing processes

1. Since 2019, UNAMID has been organising peaceful coexistence conferences in different areas of central Darfur including Nertiti and Golo. These forums were organised in collaboration with Native Administration leaders. In Golo, the participants of the conference in November 2019 discussed the prerequisites for peaceful coexistence in the area; the negative consequences of the intercommunal conflicts in the area on livelihoods and access to natural resources; the role that different actors could play in settling intercommunal conflicts; and the importance of constructive dialogue for social cohesion in Golo (UNAMID, 2019). This conference was mentioned in all FGDs conducted in Golo, but participants were not all satisfied with its outcomes. In Althourah, the FGD participants said that they were not fully aware of the conference objective.

2. Towards promoting peaceful coexistence in Jebel Marra and the rest of Central Darfur, UNAMID organised several festivals and sports events under the "Together for Peace" campaign in which people from different communities participated. The effectiveness of these events is not clear, but in different interviews participants thought that this is a good way to build relationships amongst the youth of different communities.

Existing structures and institutions

1. The social norm of nafeer is central to the Sudanese social life. Nafeer is communal collective action that brings people together to support household activities for a public good. In this farming season, the community members of Guldo villages organised a nafeer to support the farmers of Sonosono *damrah* with their cultivation operations. This kind of cooperation and solidarity between the two communities shows how nafeer activities could be connectors between different communities.

2. The Peacebuilding Coordination Forum led by the Locality Commissioner and UNDP in Golo has the potential to play a positive role in coordinating the peacebuilding and development activities in the area an inclusive manner.

5.6. Security interventions

Existing processes

1. The participants in the analysis workshop indicated that the army check points located in Deba Nyra and Sabanga have contributed to the overall improved security in the area. The force deployed there consist mostly of the SLA factions who signed the peace agreement with the government in 2017.

2. The ceasefire agreement between SLA-AW and STG have also improved the security situation, although it was violated on several occasions.

3. The Government is showing more commitment to prevent cattle raiding. In August, Guldo villages were affected by cattle rustling, but the government troops managed to return the stolen cattle to the community.

Existing interventions

1. Protests and demonstrations as a new norm in big towns puts pressure on government to act more actively in preventing criminal activities.

Table 2. Golo's peacebuilding architecture matrix

	Environmental	Political	Economic	Social	Security
Existing processes (initiatives, programmes and projects)	Sharing the land for farming amongst individuals from the damrahs and the villages has begun in some areas Reforestation interventions that aims to protect the environment to improve the resilience of farming and pastoralist livelihoods.	At the national level, STG is committed to end conflicts with all rebel groups. The government is making efforts to engage with SLA in talks. If successful, that may have a trickle-down effect and improve relationships at the local level. The peace agreement that the government of Sudan made with some SLA factions improved the security situation in the area and promoted stability.	The humanitarian sector is actively engaged in responding to the lifesaving and development needs of Golo population	UNAMID has been organising peaceful coexistence forums in Golo and elsewhere in Central Darfur. These forums were good opportunity for communities to discuss the issues that are essential for promoting peace between different communities in the area. Under "Together for Peace", organised many sport-based events that brought together people from different backgrounds to enhance the social relationships between different groups	Army checkpoints put in different locations around Golo have improved the overall security situation Intermittent Ceasefire agreements between SLA and the government improved the security situation The government has shown seriousness in tackling cases of criminal activities
Structures and institutions (structures, institutions and norms)	Local reconciliation capacities in the form of customary Judiya system continue to play a major role in resolving local disputes and conflicts. The customary institution of talaig is recognised by all communities and the Native Administration of each community continue to coordinate pastoralists' access to crops residues. Relevant government departments concerned with tackling the environmental issues are present in Golo. They could play a positive role in peacebuilding if they respond positively to the environmental issues facing the communities	The appointment of a new civilian governor for Central Darfur created an environment for an active engagement for Central Darfur's residents including in Golo There is an active PRC with members that are keen to resolve intercommunal conflicts in Golo and surrounding The grassroot movement of the resistance committee has a lot of support amongst youth and can organise people in all communities for peacebuilding	In areas where all communities are allowed to participate in the market, markets provide a very good avenue for building the relationships and for exchanging goods and services.	There are good examples of the villages and the damrahs supporting each other through collective action of *nafeer* Golo commissioner and UNDP lead a Peacebuilding Coordination Forum in Golo with the aim of having a consolidated approach in responding to peacebuilding needs.	Protests and demonstrations as a new norm in big towns put pressure on government to act more actively in preventing criminal activities.
Gaps (missing structures and processes)	Insecurity preventing people from accessing natural resources. Village dwellers do not feel secure to access their lands *Damrahs* inhabitants cannot access Golo because of different criminal incidences involved Excessive use of land led to decreased soil fertility	Inclusive peace agreements that involve all actors. The deadlock in reaching a peace agreement between the transitional government and SLA-AW	Limited access to market by different producers Poor infrastructure Arms trade in the regions Drugs trade and other illicit Commodities Lack of agricultural extension activities Limited training opportunities for women and youth Lack of financing opportunities for poor women and youth from both groups.	Poor access to water in many villages, particularly during the dry season. Pressure on the existing services.	Fighting between SLA factions Communities are still experiencing cattle raiding.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

This baseline conflict analysis used the categories of villages and *damrahs* (pastoralists settlements) as its units of analysis. This categorisation is helpful for revealing the similarities and differences in relationships between different communities. Based on that categorisation, the communities are divided into three clusters i.e. Golo villages, Golo *damrahs* and Guldo villages.

In Golo, the tensest intercommunal conflict is the one that involves the inhabitants of the villages and those who live in *damrahs*. The scale of this conflict varies from one area to the other. The relationship between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* is disrupted. However, Guldo villages and Golo *damrahs* enjoy relatively better relationship as community members from both clusters can access markets and land in both areas.

Intercommunal conflict between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* are often triggered by incidents affecting individuals from both communities. These triggers include villages' farmers crop damage by livestock of pastoralists from the *damrahs*; theft of livestock from villages; and theft of livestock from *damrahs*. In many cases, these incidents result in murdering, wounding or abducting community members. When they happen, those single events can lead to retaliation and revenge by individuals or groups from the affected communities against the community with whom they associate the perpetrators.

There are different local peace actors and conflict resolution mechanisms in Golo. The Native Administration plays a key role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the area. They continue to play the role of organising access to land for farmers and pastoralists via the customary institution of talaig. Moreover, Native Administration in Golo manage the customary reconciliation groups of Ajaweed. They are also involved in the government agricultural season protection committees. Recently, a (PRC was formed by Native Administration leaders to resolve intercommunal conflicts and achieve social cohesion. The PCR enjoys good relationships with national level actors including the State's government, the security sectors and the SLA.

Despite the existence of local peace actors and local conflict prevention mechanisms in Golo, the local resilience to conflicts is undermined by actions of spoilers at the national level. On one hand, militias associated with the RSF target farmers from the villages. On the other hand, elements of SLA-AW attack herders from the *damrahs* and steal their livestock. The actions of individuals associated with the RSF and SLA-AW fuel the conflict between the villages and the *damrahs* because the villages associate RSF militias with the *damrahs* and the *damrahs* themselves associate the SLA-AW with the villages.

The triggers of the intercommunal conflicts, whether committed by individuals at the local level or armed groups at the national level, stems from contextual factors that create a conducive environment for disputes and conflict in the area. These factors are diverse and represent the proximate causes of conflicts between the villages and the *damrahs*. The increased population in Golo and the significant changes of farming and pastoralist production patterns increased the demand for land and contributed to the intensified competition over natural resources between villages' farmers and *damrahs*' pastoralists.

Besides the local natural resources' dynamics, there are other proximate causes associated with actors at the national level. The existence of undisciplined military entities in the area is the most important proximate cause that sustains intercommunal conflicts. These undisciplined military entities show little respect to human rights or rule of law. Indeed, the security sector in Sudan is

fragmented and the new civilian component of the transitional government at national and local level appears to have very limited capacity to manage and monitor its different components. The lack of civilian control over the security sector makes it act against the interest of local communities. It is the driver for continuation of abuses and attacks against Golo dwellers.

Lack of discipline in the security sectors extends to the SLA-AW movement which currently suffers from infighting and internal divisions that have weakened the leadership of Abdulwahid and lessened the funding of the movement. The problem of funding encouraged many of the SLA-AW to resort to livestock thefts to finance themselves. While animal thefts mostly target mobile pastoralists from the *damrahs*, there are claims that villages are also affected by this criminal activity.

The prevalence of small arms has been identified by all the communities visited and individuals interviewed as a destabilising factor in the local context. Smuggling of small arms via routes through the Chadian border has become a major economic activity for many Darfuri individuals from different backgrounds. FGDs and KIIs conducted as part of the conflict analysis indicated that easy access to small arms is perceived as a major threat to conflict resilience in the area as it undermines the role of local peace actors including the Native Administration and the Ajaweed.

The conflict between the villages and the *damrahs* are influenced by the overall political and governance context of Darfur and the rest of the Sudan. Laws and institutions that organise access to land have changed significantly in Darfur. The establishment of the Native Administration system by the colonial rule in the 20th century reorganised the communal land ownership but left the Northern Rezeigat, some of them currently live in Golo *damrahs*, without a communal land.

The underdevelopment of Darfur region and the marginalisation of the Darfuri population are amongst the key structural causes of intercommunal conflict in the whole region. The increased population in Golo have increased demand for natural resources, as the vast majority of the population have limited opportunity for decent living outside the traditional farming and livestock production sectors. This intensifies the competition over natural resources as involvement in conflict becomes a strategy for survival. The majority of Golo population lacks access to social services and basic infrastructure.

The legacy of the Darfur conflict represents a key structural challenge for conflict resilience in the community. The Government of Sudan's policy of arming and supporting specific ethnic groups to fight the rebels led to polarisation of different communities in the region around ethnic lines. The continuation of the conflict between the government forces and the SLA-AW continues to fuel that polarisation and prevents any genuine attempt to rebuild the disrupted relationships between different communities.

The transitional period was heralded as a great opportunity for peace in Sudan. However, the power-sharing agreement between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the generals of the Transitional Military Council granted the generals the authority to appoint ministers of defence and interior. Indeed, this represents a huge challenge for the long-demanded security sector reform in the country. Lack of proper security sector reform is the major reason behind the conflict incidents caused by the security sector in Golo.

Although DRC and other actors should aim to tackle the natural resources issues causing intercommunal conflicts in Golo, a robust peacebuilding approach that engages other actors in the

the humanitarian sector as well as other stakeholders is needed to build relationships and end hostilities. The following recommendations are identified as essential for promoting peace and social cohesion in the area.

Recommendations for direct peacebuilding interventions

1. There is a need of reinforcing the existing practices, structures and institutions that organises access to land and other natural resources. The expertise the Native Administration leaders developed over years is very crucial to build on for restoring the symbiosis between mobile pastoralists and farmers in the area.

2. Local conflict resolution mechanisms need to be reinforced and to be part of any future peacebuilding project development and implementation. Working closely with these mechanisms and engaging the relevant government departments and other stakeholders could play a key role in addressing the root causes of the conflict.

3. The PRC needs to be logistically supported in order to facilitate their movement and to enhance their ability to settle conflicts. In many cases, their limited ability to move limits their capacity to respond to tensions and conflicts before they escalate.

4. DRC should consider working with other actors including PRC, the Peacebuilding Coordination Forum and the local government to mediate between Golo villages and Golo *damrahs* and negotiate settlements for their conflicts. An entry point could be through enhancing the relationship between Guldo villages and Golo *damrahs*. Designing inclusive development projects that address the needs of all communities equitably through a consensus building modality could be a good way to improve the intercommunal relationships. For example, access to water is a major issue facing all these communities, as expressed in all communities visited in this study. A durable solution could be by investing in facilities that could be shared by villages and *damrahs* community members.

Recommendations for improving a conducive environment for peace

1. The long history of marginalisation of the region and the destruction caused by the conflict have reduced the economic wellbeing of the population overall in Jebel Marra. There is a need to support the traditional livelihoods of pastoralism and agriculture, and the services associated with them including water, improved seeds, crop protection and veterinary services. These services need to be extended to other areas in Central Jebel Marra locality.

2. The Native Administration and their local executives should be encouraged to be more transparent, accountable and inclusive to their communities. This entails encouraging the Native Administration to support the participation of women and youth in their structures to make these structures more representative of different needs within the population.

3. Due to the rough roads and the difficult topography of the areas, producers find it difficult to access big markets in Darfur and the rest of the Sudan. Any contribution to improving roads and constructing crossing points would have a direct impact on the local economy in the area. Access to markets could be strengthened by organising different categories of producers in associations or cooperatives. This would allow them to obtain inputs with relatively lower cost (fertilisers, seeds, etc.) and sell their produce for better prices.

4. The high rate of unemployment in Darfur pushes many individuals, particularly youth, to seek illegal emigration or to join militias. It is very important that youth employment is supported through vocational training and small businesses.

5. Women were the most affected in all communities, the death of household head and sons of many women in Golo has overburdened them with huge household responsibilities. Supporting women through vocational skills and small business would reduce their vulnerabilities and improve their households' resilience.

6. DRC would contribute to the overall wellbeing of the communities by investing in the promotion of social services of education and health. This would ease the hardships the communities face from the gaps in these sectors and would indirectly respond to the grievances of the local populations. Promoting social services should be done in coordination with local authorities in order to restore trust between the government and the local population, a relationship that is crucial for peacebuilding, but has been damaged by the protracted crisis in the area.

7. All communities complained about poor access to water during the dry season. Supporting the existing water facilities in the area would play a very important role in improving social cohesion within communities as issues of access to water services are beginning to cause tensions between different communities sharing the same water resources.

8. Organising social events that bring community members from the villages and *damrahs* together could play a positive role in restoring the relationship between these communities.

9. In all the FGDs, the communities complained about the way with which relief services are being delivered. The lack of transparency by community leaders is fuelling disputes within Golo villages. To avoid exacerbating divisions within communities, humanitarian actors need to pay more attention to ensure inclusive community engagement and transparency in the preparation/-consultation phases, implementation and monitoring of the relief activities.

Recommendations for advocacy

There are structural issues that have a direct impact on the intercommunal conflicts in the area. DRC's mandate may not allow it to respond to those issues, but by lobbying and advocating, the organisation might be able to influence the overall context of the conflict positively. The following are some of the areas that could be addressed by advocacy.

1. Inclusive peace agreements that involve all actors. "Without engaging the RSF, SAF, SLA, nomads and the sedentary communities in conflict resolution, those issues could not be resolved", a member of PCR said. A top-down approach to peace may risk leaving out some of the structural issues around access to land and livestock migratory routes unresolved.

2. The rule of law needs to be restored and the security sector needs to be reformed. This is very important given the spoiling effect the actors at other levels have on the relationship between the communities of Golo. Moreover, a comprehensive peace must address all the injustices faced by the communities of Jebel Marra, those who lost their relatives in atrocities committed through violations of human rights committed by government forces throughout the period of conflict.

3. The illicit cross-border arms trades continue to supply small arms to the region. Without regional and global actions to ensure that arm trade is confined by international regulations, the flow of arms would continue to destabilise Golo and the rest of Darfur.

4. The fighting between the two factions of SLA-AW has been causing dire humanitarian consequences. There is a need to work with the humanitarian sector as well as the regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the Security Council to put pressure on both parties, so they abide by international humanitarian law and to stop attacks on civilians.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Conflict analysis field team

	Name	Institution
1	Afaf Adam Salih	DRC
2	Yasin Ahmed Mohammed	DRC
3	Hassan Abderasoul Salih	DRC
4	Hassan-Alattar Satti	Team leaders, Independent consultant

Annex 2: Conflict analysis workshop participants

	Name	Gender	Institution
1	Afaf Adam Salih	Female	DRC
2	Norah Abbakar Mohammed	Female	Teacher, Ministry of Education
3	Jamaleldin Yunis Jumah	Male	DRC
4	Yasin Ahmed Mohammed	Male	DRC
5	Mohammed Abderahman Abbakar	Male	DRC
6	Kaltom Abdullah Adam	Female	Teacher, Ministry of Education
7	Ishag Hassan Ishag	Male	DRC
8	Ishag Adam Hussein	Male	Activist, Golo Resistance Committee
9	Abuobeida Mustafa	Male	DRC
10	Badreldin Mohammed Arbab	Male	Ministry of Animal Resources
11	Hassan Abderasoul Salih	Male	DRC
12	Halima Abderasoul Salih	Female	Teacher, Ministry of Education
13	Adam Alnour Mohammed	Male	Peace and Reconciliation Committee
14	Salah Salih	Male	Native Administration leader, Guldo
15	Abdulmola Adam Mohammed	Male	Native Administration leader, Guldo

Annex 3: Baseline conflict analysis work plan

Day	Date	Activities	Remarks
1	25- Aug	Travel from Khartoum to Golo Finalise administrative arrangements (reporting to HAC) Meeting with DRC staff to finalise schedule	
2	26- Aug	Mini workshop with DRC staff; CBPN members and any other relevant stakeholder. In this workshop, the conflict analysis purpose and methodology would be explained. Preliminary conflict analysis would be conducted.	
3	27- Aug	Meet with key informants in Golo (Native Administrations, NGOs staff members or government departments)	
4	30- Aug	Filed visit to community (1)	Location to be discussed with DRC
5	31- Aug	Filed visit to community (2)	Location to be discussed with DRC
6	1- Sep	Filed visit to community (3)	Location to be discussed with DRC
7	2- Sep	Filed visit to community (4)	Location to be discussed with DRC
8	3- Sep	Filed visit to community (5)	Location to be discussed with DRC
9	6- Sep	Filed visit to community (6)	Location to be discussed with DRC
10	7- Sep	Conflict Analysis Workshop (Day 1)	DRC is to identify venue and invited relevant stakeholders
11	8- Sep	Conflict Analysis Workshop (Day 2)	
12	9- Sep	Analysis results validation	With participation of DRC and partners staff
13	10- Sep	Travel back to Khartoum	

Annex 4: Analysis workshop agenda

Conflict Analysis Workshop
Golo, Central Darfur
7 to 8 September 2020

Time	Session	Theme
Day One		
8:30 to 8:45	1	Opening remarks
8:45 to 9:00	2	Introduction to workshop objectives and participants
9:00 to 9:15		Coffee break
9:15 to 11:00	3	Conflict tree analysis
11:00 to 12:00		Brunch
12:00 to 1:00	4	Conflict tree Analysis (Cont.)
1:00 to 1:30	5	Conflict actors' analysis
Day Two		
8:30 to 9:00	6	Recap of day one and introduction of day two agenda
9:00 to 9:15		Coffee break
9:15 to 10:00	7	Conflict actors' analysis (Cont.)
10:00 to 11:00	8	Peace architecture analysis
11:00 to 12:00		Brunch
12:00 to 12:45	9	Peace architecture analysis (Cont.)
12:45 to 1:30	10	Conflict sensitivity matrix