

The Choice: Cooperation or Conflict Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border

**Summary Fieldwork
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Rizeigat at Makuei, Aweil North County, Northern Bahr al Ghazal State

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Contents

Glossary	3
Introduction	6
Summary	6
- Background	6
- Tribal Patterns	10
- Historical Relations	12
- Peace and Security Structures	13
- Economics and the “Road”	16
- National Politics	20
- Sketch Map	21
County Context 1: Aweil North and West/Rizeigat	
- Overarching Structures	22
- Tribal Patterns	27
- Individual Choice: Security	32
- Individual Choice: Economics	37
- Peace Structures	40
County Context 2: Aweil East/Misseriya Fayareen	
- Overarching Structures and Tribal Patterns	52
- Individual Choice: Security	59
- Individual Choice: Economics	64
- Peace Structures	67
County Context 3: Mayom County/Misseriya Awlad Omran	
- Overarching Structures	84
- Individual Choice: Security	88
- Individual Choice: Economics	93
- Peace Structures	96
County Context 4: Pariang and Abiemnom/Misseriya	
- Background	104
County Context 5: Pariang and Abiemnom/Fellata	
- Overarching Structure	107
- Individual Choice: Security	109
- Individual Choice: Economics	111
- Peace Structure	112

Glossary of Common Terms

Adal: 'Correction' in Arabic, the circumcision and re-circumcision of women each time they give birth. Circumcision involves removing the clitoris and both labia and is nearly universal. Male circumcision is done when boys are young.

Ajaweed: Ad hoc councils usually formed to resolve specific reconciliation and conflict issues. Members are selected either by elders or by tribal/family gatherings on the basis of their achievements, experience, wisdom and the respect of the community.

Amir/Amirs: More recent word for Nazir, the most senior position in the Native Administration with authority over a tribe, the Amara.

Aourf: The customary law of the Native Administration; it outlines a set of sanctions to different offenses. It is the Baggara "constitution". The Auorf contains different rules for inter-community and intra-community offenses.

Aouwad: The payment/compensation (the Auorf) to be paid in the case of damage to property or herd loss resulting from the actions of another.

Awlad: "Sons [of]" used to designate a tribal unit.

Azaba/Azaaba: A baggara camp that does not contain women. Azaba means alone in Arabic.

Bagar/Baggara: Pastoralists who follow a nomadic lifestyle reliant on cattle.

Bahr: River

Baret al Surra: A gift of cattle given to a child one week after birth, normally 1-2 heads.

Bayt: 'House' in Arabic used to mean a Baggara dome, the structures erected by each household in the fariq.

Bir: Water well (dug).

Birka: Large natural water pool/watering hole.

Dar: Land.

Daret: Early dry season.

Diya: The payment/compensation (the Aourf) to be paid in a case involving a death due to the actions of another.

Eema: The white headdress worn by Baggara elders.

Fariq/Furgan: Pastoralist camp/s usually containing a number of Surras (families).

Gabilla: 'Tribe', the unit involves conceptions of blood relations, identity, shared systems for mutual aid, a shared authority structure, and integrated livestock production systems. Key to the notion of gabilla in the traditional pastoralist setting is the embeddedness of economic practice in social institutions and the importance of these for social reproduction.

Haffir: Man-made water pool/watering hole, commonly formed in South Sudan as a side product of road building.

Kharif Bukli: The height of the rainy season.

Kharif: The rainy season (May-October).

Khashm al Bayt/Biyut: Sub-tribal unit/s, or 'House/s', composed of extended families. This level is a primary point of reference for mutual aid and mutual responsibility.

Khor: Seasonal small river that is dry during the dry season.

Mal: Wealth, held by Baggara as livestock.

Mandoob/Manadeeb: Delegates selected to take responsibility for implementing Native Administration decisions, for example, the collection and payment of diya.

Masar: The movement of a Baggara camp from one location to another, over a great distance.

Moushta: End of rainy season latitudinal migration, lots of issues around grazing rights and crop damage.

Mouwota: End of rainy season/beginning of dry season migration southwards, danger of damage to crops.

Munzala/Manazil: The new place/s in which a Baggara group establish or intend to establish their fariq.

Murhal/Murahil: A migration route/s. For longer migrations, each tribal group will have two routes. One for southwards movement and one for northwards movements.

Nazir: The highest office in the system of Native Administration with authority over the entire tribal group, his Nazara.

Nefi: The process of excommunicating a member of the tribe. This ends the individual's community rights and responsibilities, notably the collective payment of diya.

Omda/Omad: The second highest office in the legally designated system of Native Administration with authority over a tribal section called the Omadiya (for example, one Khashm al Bayt).

Ragaba: Inland streams, commonly a network, filled from a main river source.

Rahad: Small natural water pool/watering hole.

Rahoul: The movement of a Baggara camp from one location to another, not a great distance.

Rushash: Early rainy season, first rains.

Rushash: End of dry season/Early rainy season latitudinal migration, animals are weak after dry season, damage to planted areas occurs.

Ruwagha and Ruwagh/Ruwaghiin: Ruwagha is the scouting expedition to determine the new place to establish a fariq (Munzala); Ruwagha/Ruwaghiin is the person/s who undertake the expedition and the key issues to assess are: 1) water; 2) grazing; 3) community relations.

Sabny: A period of dry weather within the rainy season.

Sarra/Haraami: Thief, criminal.

Seyf Hannan: The height of dry season.

Seyf: The dry season.

Sheikh/Sheikhs: The lowest legally designated position in the Native Administration, with authority over Mashiykha, usually a collection of Surras.

Surra: Family group consisting of immediate relatives

Tadali: Main rainy season northwards migration.

Toic: Low lying swampy areas subject to seasonal flooding; providing fish and good dry-season

Wadi: A seasonal small river that is dry during the dry season, bigger than a khor.

Introduction

1. Aims

This report investigates the incentive structure that frames decision-making amongst Misseriya and Rizeigat along the Northern Bahr al Ghazal/East Darfur and Unity/South Kordofan sections of the Sudan-South Sudan border. The aim is to better understand the push and pull factors acting on Sudanese pastoralist communities as they decide how best to pursue their interests in South Sudan: through cooperation or conflict.

This introduction first outlines some background information and then summarizes findings in five spheres. These are: 1) Tribal organization and dynamics; 2) Historical factors and conflict memory; 3) Security and peace structures; 4) Economic considerations; and 5) National politics.

2. Background

2.1 The 'Baggara'/Sudanese Border Communities

Baggara (meaning 'cattle-keeping') tribes live in the Savannah belt between the White Nile and Lake Chad. They define themselves ethnically and culturally as Arab, claiming descent from the Guhayna of Hijaz, Saudi Arabia, and speak a dialect of Arabic. They are predominantly Sunni Muslim and members of Sufi orders, such as the Ansar sect in Sudan. A 1995 estimate placed their number at around 5 million with over one million in Sudan, where there are seven main Baggara tribes: Hawazma, Misseriya Humr, Misseriya Zuruq, Rizeigat, Ta'isaha, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, Awlad Himayd and Beni Selam.¹


The word 'Baggara' is now used by Misseriya and Rizeigat to designate only those families following a nomadic or transhumant way of life, and not to the increasing permanently settled population. The 'baggara', still popularly deemed a majority within the tribes, migrate seasonally between pasture in the northern semi-arid savannahs in the rainy season to higher rainfall savannah of southern riverbed areas in the dry season. There are two main north-south movements (*tadali and mou-wota*) and two minor movements (east-west) each year. Each tribe or sub-tribe has a route, called a *murhal/morahil*) for the *tadali* and *mou-wota* movements.

Movement	Description
Rushash	Early rainy season, short, latitudinal
Tadali	Rainy season, long, south to north
Mou-wota	Late rainy season, long, north to south
Moushta	End of rainy season, short, latitudinal

The Baggara believe that they share a common ancestor called Al Juneid² but this has limited contemporary cohesive import. Sub-tribes are similarly perceived as agnatic lineages based on common paternal ancestors but in practice the situation is more fluid and sections can and have assimilated into one another to become full members of the welcoming community (though the historical fact of assimilation is rarely entirely forgotten). The sons of Attia and Heymat form the tribes (*qabilla/qaba'il*) known as the Sudanese Baggara, of which we are here primarily interested in the Misseriya and Rizeigat groups.

¹ Haskins et al. 1995

² Adil A Mahmoud, 2006m, verified in field interviews May-June 2013



The structure of community governance is headed by the position of Amir or Nazir whose jurisdiction encompasses the whole tribe, the *Amara*. His immediate subordinates are called *Omda* (pl. *Omad*) and preside over their *omodiya*. These resolve most cases within and between tribes. A tribe is divided into a number of *khashm al bayt* (pl. *khashm al biyut*) or 'houses' to which the level of *omodiya* most closely applies, though larger *khashm al biyut* may have more than 1 *omad*. If a case requires, it will be passed up to the Amir/Nazir or into the official state court system. Below the *Omad* are Sheikhs, who preside over a collection of families, or *surras*, their *Mashiykha*. They deliver messages and collect taxes. Each official will have a number of *Mandadeeb* (s. *Manadoob*) or 'delegates' who assist in enforcing and implementing decisions. Among the pastoralist and nomadic 'Baggara', each camp (or *fariq*) is represented by a cattle camp leader (*Rais al-Fariq*) responsible for the affairs of the camp. The Rizeigat also have the position of *Delil*, responsible for cattle affairs at the level of *khashm al bayt*, whereas the Misseriya have powerful cattle chiefs organized by migration route/*murhal* whose authority is invested in their personal authority and experience rather than their office.

This system of Native Administration, introduced by the British administration (and already a corruption of indigenous authority in service of the expansion of state influence) has been severely weakened by successive Sudanese administrations. The politicization of Native Administration through its reintroduction in the 1990s has left both Rizeigat and Misseriya without a genuine community structure capable of representing its interests, though community-selected cattle leaders are perhaps more representative among the nomadic baggara groups. This crisis in community leadership is a fundamental for understanding the dynamics of inter-community cooperation mechanisms along the Sudan-South Sudan border.

2.2 Rizeigat

Rizeigat are the largest of the Baggara tribes in Sudan and comprise both *Aballa* (camel-herders of northern Darfur and Chad) and the Baggara (of southeastern Darfur). They are organized into three large sections called Nuwaiba, Maharia and Mahamid. These divisions exist within both *Aballa* and Baggara but importantly, the southern Baggara Rizeigat were conferred customary land rights (*hakura*) by the Fur Sultans whereas the *Aballa* Rizeigat of northern Darfur were not. This has contributed to a situation where the Nazir of the Rizeigat, though claiming authority over all, has limited influence over, and different interests from, his northern cousins. He retains a remarkable degree of influence over the southern Baggara Rizeigat when compared to the segmentation of authority among the Misseriya Ajaira (see below).³ This is perhaps most starkly illuminated by their differing approaches to the Darfur conflict, in which southern Baggara Rizeigat largely refused mobilization whereas their northern counterparts were core participants in the counter-insurgency. Rizeigat are famous for horse riding, war poetry (*heday*), female singers used to motivate and reward fighters (*hakamat*) and for building strong

³ The *gabilla* or 'tribe' – the primary social and economic organisation – for Rizeigat remains at the level of 'Rizeigat' and it is at this level that compensation for the killing of an outsider will be arranged). For most Misseriya interviewed for this report the word *gabilla* now refers to what was once a sub-tribe level and compensation is arranged at sub-tribe or even *khashm al bayt* level.

historical military alliances with others.⁴ The main sections, sub-tribes and migration routes are outlined in the tables below. The focus is on the Rizeigat Maharia because they are of primary relevance to the study area.

Southern Rizeigat		
Nuwaiba (HQ is El Ferdous)	Maharia (HQ is Ad-Daein)	Mahamid (HQ is Assalaya)
	↙	↘
	Mohamed (HQ is Abu Matariq)	Um Dahiya (HQ is Abu Jabra)
	↓	↓
	Mohmed/Um Ahmed	Awlad Mohimid
	Awlad Hanana	Awlad Ghadyania
	Awlad Ahruj	Abu Selama
	Naas Atom	Awlad Zeit
	Awlad Ghayed	Awlad Hassan

Route/Murhal	Rizeigat Group	Destination in South Sudan	
Western Route/Murhal as Gharbi	Nuwaiba and Mahamid	Raga County	Western Bahr al Ghazal State
Totaha Route/Murhal	Totaha (a sub-tribe of Mahamid)	Raga County	
Central Route/Murhal al Awsat	Mohamed (Maharia)	Kiir Adem Gok Machar Jorbioc Achana	Northern Bahr al Ghazal State
Eastern Route/Murhal al Shergi	Um Dahiya (Maharia)	Jaac, Rum Aker, Abouth	



A group of Rizeigat youth in Moins, near Makuei

2.3 Misseriya

⁴ The legend of Al Angha'a, known throughout Baggara tribes, says that a Rizeigat named Arigi mobilized all the sons of Juneid – the Attia, Heymat and Rashid, to defeat King Sharango of Chad's Beni Khuzam tribe after he stole his prize camel 'Al Angha'a'. Rizeigat are also known for leading alliances of Baggara tribes in support of the Mahdi's revolution and against his successor.

The Misseriya live in western Kordofan and part of western Nuba, in central Darfur and in Chad. All Misseriya groups acknowledge common ancestry but the geographic divisions can now be considered as distinct tribal units. In West Kordofan the Misseriya are divided into Misseriya the Zuruq (*dark ones*) and Misseriya Humr (*red ones*) though the origins of these names is lost in time. Traditionally the Humr and Zuruq shared an overarching customary administration. The Amir would be drawn from the Humr and his deputy from Zuruq. This arrangement now carries limited import and the Misseriya have become increasingly segmentary, with most sub-tribes now led by their own Amir and only expressing a loose allegiance, if at all, towards the overarching office of Misseriya Amir held by the Amir of Awlad Kamil.⁵ Indeed, the *gabilla* or 'tribe' – the primary social and economic organisation – for Misseriya Ajaira is now the 'sub-tribe' level (e.g. Awlad Omran/Fayareen). The strongest identification of social belonging is even more segmented to the level of *khashm al bayt*, at which compensation arrangements are made. The Humr are further divided into Ajaira and Fallaita. The former primarily migrate from Meiram, Muglad and Debab into Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Abyei and Unity State and the latter from Al Fula and Keilak into Pariang County of Unity State. The overarching tribal structure of the Misseriya and their traditional migration routes into South Sudan are outlined below. The primary sub-tribes that migrated into the study area in 2012-2013 are shaded in grey and form the focus of our inquiry.

Misseriya							
Zuruq ⁶	Humr						
↓	Fallaita	Ajaira					
7 KaB ⁷	↓	↓					
	Metanin Surur Ziyud Gubarat Salamat	Fadliya (HQ at Debab)	Fayareen (HQ at Meiram)	Omran (HQ at Debab)		Kamil (HQ at Muglad)	Mezagna (HQ at Muglad)
		↓	↓	↓		↓	↓
		8 KaB.	↙ ↘	↙ ↘	↙ ↘	14 KaB	12 KaB
			Eissa ↓	Aiman ↓	'Addal ↓	Menama ↓	
			Hamra	Am Hani	Um Hamat	Um Jodd	
			Sedak	Awana	Um Gordaya	Rahama	
			Na'im	Ogula	Himeid	Dar Zebeli	
			Alanta	Kimeil	Ingaya	Shoroug	
					Nawazha	Dar Banat	
					Samaheen	Dar Habibella	

Route/Murhal	Misseriya Group	Destination in South Sudan	
Western Route/Murhal as Gharbi	Fayareen Some families of Awlad Kamil	Aweil East	Northern Bahr al Ghazal
Central Route/Murhal al Awsat	Awlad Kamil Mezagna	Abyei, Warrap	Abyei
Eastern Route/Murhal al Shergi	Awlad Omran Fadliya Few from Awlad Kamil and Mezagna	Abiemnom and Mayom Counties	Unity State

⁵ For example, with the appointment of a Mezagna Amir post-CPA, all the Ajaira sub-tribes except Fadliya now possess their own Amir. Fadliya shares an Amir with Awlad Omran.

⁶ The difference between the Zuruq and Humr was described by Misseriya as akin to that between Nuer and Dinka. Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

⁷ Khashm al Biyut

3. Sphere 1: Collective Decision-making and the Tribe/'Gabilla'

The first sphere that helps explain decision-making is social organisation; decisions made by Sudanese pastoralist groups about whether to engage in cooperative relations with South Sudan exhibits some patterns at the level of tribal unit. These patterns are mediated by patron-client relationships, in which the Government of Sudan exploits its political and resource monopoly to buy influence from economically marginalized, and hence weak, representatives in the periphery.

3.1 Rizeigat

Tribal Level: Since the establishment of East Darfur in January 2011, the Rizeigat have a state of their own⁸ but do not have sufficient water and grazing to sustain their livestock production systems, which are central to the social identity and economy of the state. By peace or war, cattle keepers therefore need to come to South Sudan in the dry season. Following the high level agreements of September 2012 the majority of Rizeigat of all sections chose to interpret developments as recognizing Sudan's rights to Mile 14.⁹ This sentiment was reinforced by frequent visits from high-level politicians between September and December 2012. Broadly speaking, during this time the Rizeigat supported the Government of Sudan's policy of closed borders and violent strikes at Kiir Adem.

Mohamed-Um Dahiya Division: Following a number of unsuccessful attacks at Kiir Adem and with the onset of high dry season approaching, Rizeigat leaders, including the Nazir, recognized that the expected long-term benefit of non-cooperative strategies was not forthcoming. Since January/February 2013, the Rizeigat tribe split on the issue of relations with South Sudan. The Um Dahiya branch (which includes the Nazir's family) engaged in peaceful coexistence mechanisms, trade and livestock migration, whilst the Mohamed branch, broadly speaking, did not. By May 1st, for example, over 100 cattle camps were present in Makuei and Jorbioc and all of them were from the Nazir's Mohimid house of the Um Dahiya branch.

Hanana-Ghayed: The Awlad Hanana and Awlad Ghayed houses of Rizeigat Mohamed share a close tribal affiliation with the northern Aballa Rizeigat and were heavily recruited into northern Maharia Rizeigat Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo's (Hemeti's) Fut 8 battalion (described by Small Arms Survey as "the most active, best armed section of the Border Guards").¹⁰ The appointment of Governor Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha, a staunch supporter of peaceful border relations promises to change this dynamic. He is a son of Awlad Ghayed and his mother is from Awlad Hanana. Indeed, in early May, following his appointment as Governor in April 2013, a Rizeigat delegation including Omda Haj Hamad Gadim from Awlad Hanana arrived in Gok Machar to help negotiate peaceful relations in advance of a visit by the Governor.

Akech Jaali: Some families within Awlad Hanana of Mohamed Rizeigat of Abu Matariq have Dinka ancestry, particularly from the Pariath and Padhieu clans. Known as the Akech Jaali, they are variously said by Dinka Malwal to have assimilated by inter-marriage, desertion or abduction. They were present during the times of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium and it is possible that they descend from those Dinka who served in joint units with Rizeigat during the Mahdist revolution of 1881. The Akech Jaali are split on the issue of cooperation with South Sudan: 1) Some families support peaceful coexistence on the basis of shared interests and shared ancestry (which serves as a connector); 2) Others have engaged in conflict during 2012-

⁸ East Darfur is also home to a number of other tribes (notably the Tergem, Maalia or Bornu peoples) but the Rizeigat are a large majority of the population.

⁹ Mile 14 is a strip of land encompassing the area 14 miles south of the Bahr al Arab/Kiir River. Contested by Sudan and South Sudan, the technical argument revolves around the interpretation of the Munro-Wheatly agreement of 1924 which conferred grazing and hunting rights to the Rizeigat. This agreement was never accepted by the Dinka Malwal of Northern Bahr al Ghazel but by independence in 1956, the Munro-Wheatly line had become the de facto administrative border.

¹⁰ It is also interesting to remember that in Hemeti led several thousand border guards into opposition in late 2007 over government failure to pay salaries. Border Intelligence Brigades, July 2012, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), p.2

2013, seeking greater recognition from their northern Darfur Rizeigat cousins and claiming a special relationship to Mile 14 as an ethnic Dinka territory.

3.2 Misseriya

The Misseriya Ajaira now appear relatively unified in resisting mobilization into paramilitary attacks on Northern Bahr al Ghazal and Unity State. However, in 2012-2013, Misseriya engaging with South Sudan have been successful in delinking cooperation from the question of territorial claims, and this short-term strategy explicitly does not imply acceptance of an unfavorable border delineation outcome.

The Misseriya Fayareen and Awlad Omran do have specific interests as border peoples. They disproportionately paid the price of the last war and would be particularly affected by any new one. The two communities also have distinct histories, however imperfect, of cooperation with southern populations, both in historical terms and throughout recent conflict periods (see Section 4 on historical explanations below) and of marginalization from the benefits of membership of the Sudanese state. The issue of Abyei is more immediately explosive and the Awlad Kamil and Mezagna leaders (whose people predominantly migrate into the area) are driving a very hard bargain. They have threatened an open return to violent strategies if negotiations do not proceed on their terms.

Tribe	Sub-division	Location	Structure	Route 2012-13	Position 2012-13
Rizeigat Maharia ¹¹	Um Dahiya • 5 major 'Houses'	• Abu Jabra	• Nazir (Um Dahiya)	• Aweil East (Jaac, Rum Aker)	• Divided at outset. • Became strong supporter of cooperation.
	Mohamed • 5 major 'Houses'	• Abu Matariq		• Aweil North • Aweil West • No migration	• Hanana and Ghayed against; most involved in security incidents. • Rizeigat families with Dinka heritage divided.
Misseriya Ajaira ¹²	Fayareen • 10 'Houses'	• Meiram	• Amir	• Aweil East	• NA did not publicly support PC. • Large degree of community support.
	Awlad Kamil • 14 'Houses'	• Siteib • Muglad	• Amir	• Abyei • Aweil East (low) • Mayom (low)	• NA did not publicly support PCS. • Some community participation in PC. • Abyei is main issue.
	Mezagna • 12 'Houses'	•	• Amir ¹³	• As above.	• As above.
	Awlad Omran • 10 'Houses'	• Debab • Kedama	• Amir	• Mayom	• NA did not publicly support PCS. • Strong community support.
	Fadliya • 8 'Houses'	• Debab		• Mayom	• As above.
Fellata ¹⁴	"Western" • 3 sub-	• Ferdab	• Nazir	• Abiemnom • Pariang	• Strong community support

¹¹ Only sub-divisions of Rizeigat which migrate to study areas of Northern Bahr al Ghazal state are included in the table. The Rizeigat includes 2 further major sections, the Nuwaiba and Mahamid, also under the same Nazir.

¹² Only sub-divisions of Misseriya which migrate to study areas of South Sudan are included in the table.

¹³ Mezagna recently established a distinct Amara. Previously, Mezagna were under the Awlad Kamil Amir.

¹⁴ Not to be confused with Misseriya Fallaita, Fellata is a catch-all term for non-Arab groups speaking Fulbe/Fulani. Fellata may be nomadic, farmers or urbanised, illiterate or in high office and are found in some concentration in Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon. Fellata groups were particularly responsive to the NIF promise of modernisation and inclusivity – despite a presence in Sudan for centuries they were not granted citizenship before 1989[†]. Fellata groups coordinated closely with the Government of Sudan and Sudan Armed Forces during wartime though local alliances existed between certain Fellata and SPLA during the later stages of the war. Since the CPA, a number of Fellata/Mbororo have been transferred out of South Sudan to Sudan, particularly to Blue Nile State.

	tribes			
	“Eastern” • 2 sub-tribes	• Talodi • Blue Nile		• Abiemnom • Pariang • As above.

3.4 Limitations of Tribal Patterns to Decision-Making

Tribal patterns, lubricated by the client-patron relationship between government and Native Administration leaders, illuminate. They provide some entry points for engagement with key actors but they have important limitations. Although political objectives may be important for the few, engagement with the Sudanese security forces is a straightforward economic choice for the many. Recruits receive a much-needed salary, or are given one off payments and impunity to loot.¹⁵ As the Dinka Chair of the Gok Machar peace committee put it: “out of two brothers, the poor one can go to the government [to fight] and the one with cows can come here [in peace]”¹⁶. Members of all tribal groups are therefore represented in the ranks of the Sudanese security and paramilitary forces. For example, the chair of the Rizeigat Peace Committee and first cousin of the Nazir escaped punishment by the Haras al Odud (border guards) in March 2013 due to the presence of members of his house (Mohimid) in the contingent. The same is true at the officer level. For example, Hamid Messir (SAF commander of the buffer zone) and Fadil Mohamed Rohuma (Misseriya leader of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement) both come from the Um Jodd house of Awlad Omran.



Misseriya herder Ali Sharif took part in fighting last year at Majak Wuoi

4. Sphere 2: Historical Explanations

The second area that influences contemporary incentive structures in cooperation and conflict is the historical relationships between Sudanese pastoralists and host communities. At the community level, population groups with positive historical experiences find it easier to

¹⁵ For example, a Misseriya cattle herder said he was given a one off payment of 1000SSP, a motorbike and gun to participate in an attack on Majak Wuoi in 2012. Interview, Ali Sharif, Majak Wuoi, 1 April 2013

¹⁶ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013

cooperate in the present. The converse is also true. The starkest example of this is the case of Abiemnom, where the Misseriya displaced the entire Dinka population and occupied the area between 1984 and 2005. At the individual level, the nature of key inter-personal relationships can also help define contemporary cooperation possibility frontiers. For example, the Chairperson of the Awlad Omran peace committee in Mayom has a history of peacemaking with Nuer leaders that goes back to the late 1980s. These individual and community relationships help shape the position of local governments, host-communities and Sudanese pastoralists towards cooperation today.

	History of conflict and peace interactions	2012-2013
Aweil North Rizeigat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991: Peace market established at Maniel and then Manger Ater managed by joint peace committee of Rizeigat and Dinka. Cooperative inter-community relations persisted until the CPA period. • Joint Peace Committee also established in Jaac in 1991. Remained peaceful since then. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good with Um Dahiya • Poor with Mohamed • Good (Jaac)
Aweil East-Misseriya Fayareen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991: Misseriya peace committee and Dinka declared a peace in Warawar and members of both sides have died in protecting it. • 1993-4: Misseriya peace committee chairman returned to Meiram and attacked Warawar with a militia. • Middle of 1990s: New peace committee members re-declared peace and inter-communal cooperation until CPA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative but mistrust
Aweil-East-Rizeigat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991: Rizeigat members joined the peace of Warawar. The Rizeigat chairman remains in Warawar and inter-community cooperation remained until present day. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good
Mayom-Awlad Omran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1963-4: Misseriya Awlad Omran attacked and occupied Nourkur. • 1982-4: Awlad Omran column attacked Mayom and settled in northern parts. • 1985-7: 'Bytong War' involving further attacks by Awlad Omran and SAF into Mayom. • 1986: The Misseriya-Nuer peace at Rubh Ngai signed between current Chair of the Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom and Riek Machar. Awlad Omran fought with Nuer to defend the market from Fallaita and SAF attacks. • 1991: Misseriya also fought with Nuer in the Nuer-Dinka war. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative
Abiemnom-Awlad Omran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1963-4: Awlad Kamil attacked and occupied Dublod, southern Abiemnom. • 1982-4: Awlad Omran attacked Abiemnom, entirely displacing the population to northern Sudan or Mayom and killing the Paramount Chief Kamillo Kuot Kur. This led Dinka Alor youth to join SPLA. The entire Abiemnom was settled by Misseriya pastoralists, led by the current Awlad Omran member of the Misseriya Peace Committee responsible for cattle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very poor.
Abiemnom-Fellata	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1987: Fellata participated in PDF fighting with Government of Sudan • 2000-: Current Fellata leader responsible for all Fellata in Abiemnom, Osman Mohamed, smuggled goods to SPLA in Mayom. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good.
Pariang-Misseriya Fallaita	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1963/4: Misseriya Fallaita attacked and occupied parts of Pariang. • 1982-84: Fallaita displaced Pariang community from much of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very poor.

	Pariang. This led Dinka Ruweng youth to join SPLA.	
Pariang-Fellata	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1987: Fellata participated in PDF fighting with Government of Sudan • Late 1990s-: Current Fellata leaders responsible for all Fellata in Pariang, Musa Kabiir and Musa Saghiir, smuggled goods, medicine and ammunitions to SPLA commanders Dier and Athor. 	• Good.

5. Peace and Security Structures

The third area that influences decision-making is the robustness of the local peace structures which frame cooperation along the Sudan-South Sudan border. This is central to the incentive structure of Sudanese pastoralists and traders. Strong local peace structures generate confidence in the security environment; a necessary condition for exploitation of the economic gains of migration and cross-border trade.

5.1 Northern Bahr al Ghazal

Overarching Rizeigat and Misseriya peace committees, comprised of members of each house in Maharia and Fayareen respectively and formed in the absence of a strong community led Native Administration, manage relations with the state government. Their members also join a state-wide system of Joint Dinka-Sudanese Peace Committees with their headquarters in Gok Machar (Rizeigat-Dinka) and Warawar (Misseriya-Dinka) with civilian memberships. The committees are tasked with mediating issues that arise between host communities and Misseriya/Rizeigat in South Sudan. First formed in 1991, the committees have a long history, from which contributes significantly to their current authority. Despite the long history of cooperation, host communities across Northern Bahr al Ghazal remained deeply skeptical of the wisdom of welcoming Sudanese pastoralists. It is only strong government direction, symbolized by the Governor's contributions to annual migration conferences, that wins community acceptance (or, acquiescence) of the idea and ultimately confers authority to the committees. The peace structure can be summarized by the following components:

OVERARCHING PEACE COMMITTEE + JOINT PEACE COMMITTEE/S + STATE SECURITY GUARANTEE + SECURITY DETERRENT

5.2 Unity State

The overarching Misseriya peace committee is formed of members of all houses of Misseriya Awlad Omran (and one representative of Awlad Kamil). Rather than through a system of civilian peace committees, this deals directly with the county commissioners on all matters. Cooperation is on the basis of a 4-counties agreement signed in April 2012 which gained the approval and signature of the state government. However, the agreement remains weak, in part because the state government has not expended the necessary political capital to ensure its enforcement. The agreement is the point of reference for Misseriya, but it carries less currency among government officials, especially following the replacement of the four signatory border-county commissioners in early 2013.

In 2012-2013, the commissioners of Mayom, Abiemnom and Pariang followed community sentiment and rejected Misseriya cattle migration, though Misseriya trade to Mayom is substantial. Insecurity on the road from the border crossing point to Mayom is a big issue and caused 11 Misseriya deaths through 2012-2013. The Misseriya committee has made some notable compensation payments in line with the 4-counties agreement but the issue of unpaid

diya by Nuer for roadside deaths threatens to undermine cooperative relations entirely.¹⁷ The key features of the system can be summarized by the following components:

OVERARCHING PEACE COMMITTEE + COMMISSIONER



SPLA received orders to protect any Arab in Northern Bahr al Ghazal State on pain of firing squad

¹⁷ Note that the Nuer argue they are due accumulated unpaid compensation claims from previous years.

Model	Parameters	Overarching PCs	Authority	People	Recent Activity	Challenges	
Aweil North	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overarching Rizeigat Committee deals with government. Joint Committee in Gok Machar Joint sub-committees in Achana, Jaac, Kiir Adem/Samaha, Rum Aker. JPC sit as Joint Courts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Around 50 members Authority from community. Representing families who use migration routes. Authority from Nazir (public or private support). Some support from NA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ultimate source of authority is Gov. of NBG. Strong security guarantee from Governor. Conference agreements also mandate JPCs. Community and history confer authority. Track record on facilitating migration and trade. Key members (Sultan Deng, Luol in Aweil East) Peace centers Act a joint courts backed up by police. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gok Machar (5D Civilians, 3R Elders) Achana (10D officials, JPCs in markets) Jaac (4D chiefs, 3R Sheikhs and elders) Rum Aker (4D civilians, 15R youth) Makuei (5D civilians, 5R inc. some NA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dinka active alone dealing with Makuei sub-committee. Returned lost Rizeigat cows (Mar '13) Payment of diya by Rizeigat (May '12) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mistrust due to conflict with Mohamed Rizeigat at Kiir Adem. Community mistrust due to lack of NA support. 	JOINT PEACE COMMITTEE MODEL
Aweil East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overarching Misseriya Committee deals with government. JPC in Warawar Joint sub-committees in Majok, Rum Aker, Riang Awai, Machar Kuon and War Guet (each 5,5,). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not defined. 16 Core members (1 or 2 from each "house") Network of supporters and beneficiaries called the 'committee'. Less organized. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JPC (Bul Nuer Executive Chiefs, Misseriya, officials) not active. No history of JPC. Mandated by the 4 counties agreement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warawar (3D, 3M, 2R) Majok Yin Thiou (3D, 3M) Others not really formed as cattle migration is low. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Petty cases Resolution of outstanding Misseriya PC-Governor Malong cases involving money and vehicle loss. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community mistrust due to attacks last year. Community mistrust due to lack of NA support. 	
Mayom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overarching Misseriya committee works with Commissioner of Mayom on all issues. Misseriya in Chamber of Commerce to resolve trading issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 37 Members At least 2 Members from each 'House' 4 sub-committees (Mediation, Cattle, Services, Information) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JPC (Bul Nuer Executive Chiefs, Misseriya, officials) not active. No history of JPC. Mandated by the 4 counties agreement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya Chairman Khiir, a veteran peacemaker with Nuer. Cattle Chairman, veteran cattle leader in Mayom, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya paid compensation for a raid (130 heads) and a killing (31 heads and gun) No compensation from Nuer to date. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compensation of deaths on road Youth/small arms. Government inability or unwillingness to provide security 	COMMITTEE-GOVERNMENT
Abiemno m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fellata leader works with commissioner and Executive Director. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committee of 6 Fellata (From Male) 1 member in each cattle location, 3 moving. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner's sanction to the peace and guarantee security. Fellata leaders have strong community support; history of support to SPLA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fellata chief Osman Mohamed heads all relations with government for all Fellata. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arranged vaccination, grazing locations and tax collection. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water Price of goods 	
Pariang	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two Fellata leaders work with committee of 10 county officials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two leaders manage peace affairs; using ad hoc manadeeb. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner's sanction to the peace and guarantee security. Fellata leaders have strong community support; history of support to SPLA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two Fellata leaders manage all interactions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Theft of Fellata property. SSPS and SPLA secured return of largest part. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Host community and officials mistrust and aggression. 	

5.3 Security Guarantee and the Role of the Deterrent

If the security guarantee is the lynchpin of cooperation agreements, its corollary is the deterrent. Economic and security incentives are deeply intertwined. The competing incentives offered by the economics of peace must outweigh those from the economy of war. The security guarantee and deterrent are two sides to the same strategy. The former enables Sudanese pastoralists and traders to achieve their key interests at a lower cost. The latter increases that cost relative to the short-term incentives to participate in conflict, as offered by the Government of Sudan.

	Incentive to Fight	Disincentive	Security Guarantee	Result
Aweil North/Rizeigat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual (salary, loot from battles) Local strategic (access to grazing and water, fear south will close border in future) Socio-cultural (Rizeigat with Dinka heritage seeking acceptance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Heavy defeat at Kiir Adem in Dec '12 (note, short term incentivizes revenge). SPLA repelled Rizeigat militia and SAF from SPLA barracks. GoS failure to compensate losses. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Governor guarantee through private communications Governor public guarantee through migration conferences. . Div. 3 commander known to have disseminated strict order. Government command and control on army is strong. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some Rizeigat still oppose peace but delegation of NA arriving to discuss a change of position.
Aweil East/Misseriya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leaders (position, high level visits, cars, money, health care, education offered by Gov) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mar 2012, large SPLA response to Misseriya raid (in the short term this incentivized Misseriya to join militia) April 2012, SPLA response up to Meiram. April 2012, heavy defeat of poorly equipped Misseriya at Majak Wuoi. GoS bombing of border 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Governor control of civilians is similar to military hierarchy. Payment of diya by government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cattle herders say they “learned the lesson” in 2012. NA not supporting militia mobilization.
Mayom/ Miss	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visits by high level Misseriya politicians. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clashes in Awarpinny 2012 Heglig conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mayom agreement signed by governor Jan '12; 4 counties signed Apr '12 by county, State, and UNMISS. Change of commissioners weakened agreement. Community distanced themselves from agreement. County says we ‘can’t guarantee security of Misseriya traders or cattle. Strong guarantee offered Fellata in Pariang backed up with movement of troops. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No cattle migration Trade affected during insecure periods. Significant risk of revenge attacks. Fellata migration
Abiemnom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA refusing to assist mobilization. 			
Pariang	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual (salary, loot from battles) 			

6. Economics and “The Road”

The fourth main sphere of factors influencing decision-making is economic. Four main areas of economic decision-making affect the incentive structure of Sudanese border communities, Sudanese local government, host communities and host governments: 1) Trade; 2) Livestock; 3)

Other activities such as fishing, hunting, grass-cutting; and 4) the economics of clientelism. For Misseriya and Rizeigat, the benefits of trade and livestock migration should outweigh the economic benefits associated with enforcing government policy and the cost of securing alternative access to water, grazing and markets. In those places where trade proceeded in 2012-2013 the interests of all major local spoilers were to some degree accommodated in the complex of cross-border trade, whether 'formal' or informal, just or unjust. "The road" therefore represents a significant opportunity for the building of cooperative cross-border relations between both communities and governments, especially if its umbrella can extend to more fully include Sudanese local government and potential and active individual spoilers such as unemployed youth.

Trade and cattle migration go together. First, the economic organisation of Misseriya and Rizeigat families has diversified but not divided and traders generally own at least some cattle, which will be looked after by another family member. Second, livestock remain central to the future vision of even the most educated and progressive Rizeigat and Misseriya, for social, cultural and economic reasons. Third, families following a purely nomadic life and most dependent on cattle migration are well armed after years of government exploitation and the security of the road is dependent upon their cooperation. Where it functions, a safe and secure "road" improves general security for pastoralism and is an instrumental strategy that moves cross-border relations towards a situation conducive to peaceful livestock migration.¹⁸ Host communities and governments have less to gain from livestock migration¹⁹ (and much to lose), but if this potential is denied then support to cooperative strategies from purely pastoralist interests – and a wider section of Misseriya and Rizeigat society – will be significantly weakened.

¹⁸ It is very important to note that the livestock migration proceeds in order to secure both water *and* grass. The provision of water facilities in strategic locations in Sudan or along the Sudan-South Sudan border will reduce the migratory pressure but not relieve it.

¹⁹ Host governments benefit from camp fees. In Aweil North, the fee was set at 530SSP per camp during 2012-2013 in Northern Bahr al Ghazal. The commissioner of Aweil North estimated that 100 camps were present in the county (thus yielding around \$16000). This is an important source of local revenue, but it pales in comparison with potential tax revenues from trade. For example, based on figures for taxation rates and trade volumes given by Misseriya traders, Dinka peace committee members and the military police in Majok Yin Thiou, tax revenues from trade may reach \$800,000 per month in Aweil East. This crude calculation is based on 20 trucks arriving per day, each carrying 200 sacks of sugar worth 200SSP per sack (20x200x200x30days yields a trade volume of 24,000,000SSP per month. A cumulative tax rate of 10% yields tax revenues of 2,400,000, or roughly \$800,000 using a close to official exchange rate of 3:1).



Large trucks arrive in Makuei, Jaac, Majak Wuoi and Mayom


Road	Security	Host Community	Host Government	Cattle Keepers	Traders	Peace Committee	NA/Locality	Other Sudanese
Daein-Gok Machar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SAF and 'militia' closed road SPLA mines Road via Makuei open 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability and prices. E.g. Sugar 330->250SSP Jobs for youth at Kiir Adem Access for fishing etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taxation of commodities at around 4% 10 trucks per day with 200 sacks of sugar (250SSP). \$180000 pcm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insecurity on road leads reprisal and cattle loss. A working road reduces this risk. Long term interest is peace. Road provides mutual benefit. Cattle keepers are armed and 'using road' to leverage for cattle migration. Cattle keepers and traders have shared interests. Variations in extent is potential source of division. Cattle keepers armed so can disrupt road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Profit Note, trade primarily benefits Rizeigat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political position and benefits from government outweighing benefit of cooperation to cattle and their community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political positions and gov benefits outweigh benefit of cooperation to cattle and their community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit
Daein-Abu Jabra-Jaac	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rizeigat families provide security on road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability and prices of commodities and meat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taxation of commodities 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> E.g. 2000SSP profit from small lorry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status and stakeholders in peace and trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders in trade. Benefit to and respect from community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit
Meiram-Majok-Aweil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 'Thieves' from the town and 'militia' roadblocks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability commodities E.g. Sorghum 280-150SSP Returnees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taxation (potentially \$800000 pcm) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> E.g. 120SSP profit from motorbike Almost exclusively Fayareen/Kamil. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taxation (400SSP per member per week). Status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders in trade. Benefit to and respect from community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit Harassment on road.
Muglad-Mayom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 'Thieves on road in north SPLA and thieves south 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability of goods. Sorghum 500SPP->170 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tax : potentially \$700,000 pcm + rents of \$160000 pcm 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost exclusively benefits Omran and Kamil. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders Potentially control of large revenues (~\$200,000-\$400,000) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders Benefit to and respect from community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit. Harassment on road.
Muglad-Abiemnom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abiemnom county refusing entry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need for commodities does not outweigh distrust. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some taxation 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local Dinka traders benefit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status Benefit to community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders in trade. Benefit/respect from community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit.
Heglig-Bentiu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SAF and SPLA closed road Preparing to open 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability of commodities Soda 8SSP in Alinny. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Road closed but strong potential. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not operating 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status Benefit to community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not benefit
Talodi-Pariang	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> County closed road to trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability and prices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Road closed but strong potential. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong pressure from Fellata traders to open 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status Benefit to community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholders Security Respect 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fellata traders expected.

7. National Politics

The trajectory of national and international politics is the fifth sphere that deeply affects Misseriya and Rizeigat incentive structures. At the country-strategic level, there is competition between Khartoum and Juba for influence over border constituencies. Misseriya and Rizeigat were strong supporters of the National Congress Party (NCP) but discontent has been steadily growing among former fighters and disillusioned Islamist leaders alike. Certain members of the Rizeigat and Misseriya peace committees in Aweil North, Aweil East and Mayom are outspoken, and at times vehement, critics of President Beshir and the NCP. Some members of the Awlad Omran, particularly from Um Jodd and Um Samaheen houses, have joined JEM (an *Omrani*, Adam Koushoum, is also deputy to SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al Hilu). Misseriya Fayareen and Rizeigat peace committee members and traders also say that they want a change of leadership in Sudan. The majority stress however, that even if armed struggle helps precipitates it, the next generation of leaders should come from within the Islamic Movement.

Facing an internal power struggle and an apparently increasingly organized alliance of rebel movements, the NCP is unable to risk losing the support of the Misseriya and Rizeigat entirely. The creation of East Darfur and eventual appointment of Abdel Hamid Kasha as Governor should be seen in this light. Likewise, the Government of Sudan's hardline position on Abyei has a lot to do with maintaining some NCP added-value for the Misseriya. And the government's hand remains relatively strong; the party still controls the country's wealth and political space through which to divide, rule and incentivize obedience from the poor and powerless. This centripetal force should not be over-estimated. A thawing of relations between Sudan and South Sudan –and the prospects of the re-establishment of West Kordofan State - will also further diffuse immediate incentives amongst many Misseriya and Rizeigat to consider armed resistance or otherwise push for political upheaval. Meanwhile, Rizeigat and Misseriya cannot be sure whether the current courting by South Sudan will outlive negotiations over border delineation, particularly if its results are not favorable to South Sudan's position.

Caught between two governments, many of the Sudanese border communities have one foot in each camp. Native Administration and Local Government officials are not overtly challenging government policies whilst they turn a blind eye or give tacit or private support to cross border cooperation. Community leaders will not openly support cross-border cooperation until the national government, with its monopoly of money and political position, says so. The tide may be turning in East Darfur with the appointment of Kasha and an official delegation visiting Aweil, but it is yet to take root in South Kordofan, where local community leaders from Fayareen and Awlad Omran remain unable to publicly advocate cooperative cross-border strategies for fear of reprisals from the security services. Nevertheless, national pronouncements lend some political cover to local government and community representatives and are reducing the costs of promoting cooperative initiatives. For example, in the wake of April's high-level agreements the commissioner of Meiram has reportedly established secret committees to promote peaceful coexistence with South Sudan among the Fayareen, and the commissioners of Pariang in Unity State and Talodi in South Kordofan are planning an exchange visit. If capitalized upon, this limited opening of local political space in Sudan for cooperation could help reinforce the South Sudan-Sudanese community initiatives already in place.



Map sketching location of key Rizeigat and Misseriya communities, migration routes and trading route

BACKGROUND: Government of NBG²⁰

The Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal commands strong authority in the state. This is a critical factor defining current cooperation between Misseriya and Rizeigat.

Over the last few years, a split has re-emerged in state politics, symbolized by relations between the Governor and his former Director General of Finance (DG). Since 2008, the latter reportedly pushed for financial accountability in the state and repeatedly demanded that the Governor prepare and agree to a budget. The Governor's response was to promote a junior to the position of State Minister for Finance, a move which led the Director General to resign in protest. The former DG joined the parliament as an MP and, along with 5 other colleagues, forced the Governor to accept a budget. In response, the Governor has labeled them troublemakers, called internal SPLA meetings and did not inform them, and took the opportunity to expel them from the party (and hence their parliamentary seats) for a "lack of commitment". The Governor also targeted the Speaker responsible for having given time and space to the troublemakers, even if he was not involved in their political aspirations and, through a system of special committees in the parliament, navigated his removal. The 6 individuals continued to raise public concern about the way the state was being run, and following death threats, they fled to Juba to continue their campaign. The State Legislature is now split between these "Yes men" and "Reformers".

The split is linked to historical relationships in the State, primarily between supporters of Dau Aturjong and Paul Malong (open conflict following the announcement of Malong's gubernatorial victory in 2008 was only avoided when Dau publicly agreed to accept the decision and left the state). Dau's supporters have mostly been relieved of their positions but many still feel that he won the popular vote. Dau Aturjong's name remains an extremely sensitive topic and is not to be spoken about freely in Aweil's public spaces.

Despite persistent evidence of a potential political cleavage, the political and security situation is very stable. However, Governor Malong's legitimacy and authority stems from his historical protection of Dinka Malual territory and he cannot afford for Mile 14 to be handed to Sudan²¹. On the other hand, he is unable to stand up to the entire SPLM on the issue, which could sanction his removal from position in Northern Bahr al Ghazal or jeopardize his national political ambitions. One international observer described Malong as "confused", with one eye on his local constituency and one on his position in the national government.²² At a recent political rally in the state, he reportedly announced, "I am with you but I do not belong to you. My place is in the national government and I may go at any time". Salva Kiir is treading carefully with the relationship, knowing first hand Governor Malong's killing instinct.

Peace with the Rizeigat and Misseriya is the Governor's project. Dinka Malual elites are unified in admiring his take on the issue, regardless of their differences on other matters. Without the current Governor's absolute control of the army and his commitment to use this to enforce his policy of coexistence, future relations with Rizeigat and Misseriya would be substantially more uncertain.

²⁰ This box is heavily dependent on the contents of one interview with a senior government advisor working in Aweil, 3 April 2013

²¹ This would be an extremely unpopular move, as one young person from Nyamlell said of the JBVM, "even my Grandma was crying out loud when she heard the news [withdrawal of SPLA] on the radio".

CONTEXT 1: AWEIL NORTH AND WEST

1. Overarching Structures: Rizeigat

The Rizeigat are a large tribal group living in all 5 states of Darfur. Peace committee members estimate that 60% are pastoralist, 40% traders, farmers, urbanites and other. The distinction between pastoralist and trader interests, however, is misleading as most traders, except those larger businessmen, will continue to keep, or at least own, some cattle.

Rizeigat are members of Sufi Tariqas; some membership patterns occur by house such as those in Abu Selama (members of the Saliyah sect) and Awlad Zeit (Tajaniin sect). Others are members of Samaniya, Khadriya and others, but the majority are with the Ansar sect of the Mahdhi family. Wahhabism does not have a substantial foothold among Rizeigat populations but is a growing influence.

Rizeigat			
Nuwaiba	Maharia		Mahamid
↓	↙	↘	↓
Into two big groups: Samra and Jamoul (fighting with Malia/Mali)	Mohamed	Um Dahiya	In Assalaya
	↓	↓	(Musa Hilal is head of Mahamid)
	Mohmed/Um Ahmed	Awlad Mohimid (family of Nazir and of Mohamed Ali – first cousins)	
	Awlad Hanana	Awlad Ghadyania	
	Awlad Ahruj	Abu Selama	
	Naas Atom	Awlad Zeit	
	Awlad Ghayed	Awlad Hassan	

1.1 Fariq: Fariqs can be composed of up to 5 families and it is very rare that members of different houses will establish a fariq together. In the dry season, women and children remain and men and boys move with cattle or obtain seasonal work. A fariq may have anywhere from 100 cattle up to 2000 heads of cattle and 400 bulls (a large camp may also have a small number of camels to assist with the loading and carrying).

1.2 Authority: Local Government in East Darfur is representative of ethnic groups in the state. The Governor and commissioners of Ad-Daein and Abu Jabra are Rizeigat but other officials come from the Tergem, Maalia or Bornu peoples. The Native Administration is headed by a Nazir who chairs a council of 62 Omdas (63 including himself) who implement the Auorf.²³ The table above shows most of the divisions though there are a few additional smaller houses. Most of the bigger divisions (houses) have one Omda, some have two, three, or four. Rizeigat interviewees in Aweil and Gok Machar said that the Nazir has great influence among the population, arguing, “if he says rise against the government, the Rizeigat will” and giving as evidence the Nazir’s influence in the opening of trade to South Sudan in 2012.²⁴ The Nazir has always come from the Mohimid Khashm al Bayt of Um Dahiya Rizeigat. There is some discussion amongst wider Rizeigat of the need to change this hereditary monopoly and proffer stronger leaders among the sub-tribes, but the lesson of the Misseriya has served as a

²³ The Nazir splits his time between Ad-Daein, where he has two wives and Abu Jabra, where he has one.

²⁴ This should be contrasted with the views of other close participant-observers, such as the commissioner of Aweil North, who said that Rizeigat leaders failed to influence and control their populations during 2012-2013.

warning: “We have seen the Misseriya. We have seen that when you are divided you become weaker”.²⁵

The 63 Omdas gather approximately annually in Ad-Daein to discuss critical issues (although, as of March 2013, a ban was in place on an all-Rizeigat conference for fear that it represents a security risk for the government). These meetings are announced in response to a specific challenge or agenda item decided upon by the Nazir and from which the specific gathering will take its name.

The Omdas also implement customary law within the community and undertake dispute resolution with neighboring tribes. Ajaweed, ad hoc committees mediating conflicts, are performed by elders, though they usually also involve Omda. The tradition of Baramka is not practiced.²⁶ If a Rizeigat kills a Rizeigat, for example, the Omda of the killer will be responsible for mobilizing the diya. However if a Rizeigat kills a non-Rizeigat the entire Rizeigat community will contribute. Social organization as a mutual support structure remains strong. In a case involving the death of an outsider, a killer may expect around 25 cows of the 31 required to be paid by the community. If problems are not resolved then they are referred upwards until they reach the Nazir. Normally, however, the death of a Dinka may be resolved with the involvement of only 2 Omdas. Similarly, if cows are stolen or disease is an issue, then compensation and quarantine can be resolved by the relevant Omdas. Major differences between different Rizeigat houses or those involving other tribes will be settled by the Nazir. Taxes are also paid to Omdas and delivered to the Nazir, whereas Zakat is given to the government.

1.3 Relations with Neighbors

- *Habbaniya*: Relations are historically poor but have been recently bolstered with a peace agreement between Rizeigat and Habbaniya.
- *Misseriya*: Relations with Misseriya are fraught. The administration of South Kordofan has encouraged tension between the two groups over Shegedi, an area between East Darfur and South Kordofan. Governor Haroun supported Misseriya Fayareen claims to the area, which includes a strategic and celebrated historic dry season water point. At the height of tension, armed Rizeigat killed 120 Misseriya before the government sent a Misseriya based Abu Tira militia to fight against them. The Rizeigat tribal militia defeated Abu Tira using the weapons distributed to them as border guards in 2008/9.²⁷ Enmity is widespread: At the Wanyjok peaceful migration conference 2013, three Rizeigat who had travelled from Rum Aker to observe were refused access by Misseriya. At the same time, blood relations are strong and numerous between the Um Dahiya and Misseriya Fayareen; indeed, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay's²⁸ mother is Misseriya Fayareen.
- *Maalia-Rizeigat-Misseriya conflict*: The Maalia are the people of Adila in northern East Darfur State. The conflict between Ma'alia, Rizeigat is long ongoing and has drawn in Misseriya, supported by the government, on the Ma'alia side.

1.4 Attitudes and National Politics

The political system demonstrably rewards those who support the policies of the government. For example, the appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governor of South Darfur to Minister of Finance and Minister of Education respectively sent the

²⁵ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

²⁶ Baramka networks are clubs of elders centered around tea-drinking, who meet, discuss and establish social expectations for the community. Baramka is a strong tradition among other Baggara groups, notably Hawazma.

²⁷ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

²⁸ Mohamed Ali Ghourshay is the Chairperson of an overarching committee of Rizeigat working to facilitate cross border cooperation with Dinka in Northern Bahr al Ghazal. He is a cousin of the Nazir from the Mohimid house of Rizeigat.

clear message that joining the government is the avenue to power and resources.²⁹ The appointment of the Governor (from Awlad Zeit), a committed pro-government security and military supporter, reinforced this message (though he is a Rizeigat from East Darfur and has some allegiance to the community). Meanwhile, Kasha, a popular politician from East Darfur refused the governorship until he received a significant development budget. Educated Rizeigat and GoS employees depend upon the state and their support to the GoS policy relating to the border is a pre-requisite for their positions and livelihoods. However, according to peace committee members “the majority, from the grassroots up to the Nazir” support the peaceful coexistence approach with Dinka in South Sudan.

For those not benefiting from the government, whether angry at corruption or in more principled disagreement, the situation is becoming unsustainable. Young people, angry and fed up with limited educational or employment prospects, and an increasing number of elders discuss the option of armed opposition. But three major constraints limit such a development: 1) the absence of an emerging leader; 2) uneasy relationships with Sudanese armed movements perceived to have ‘African’ character; and 3) lack of Rizeigat support for a secular agenda – “There is no single person in Rizeigat who is Almaniya. We all agree for an Islamic State. All”.³⁰ Further, the recent appointment of Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha – itself a response to the growing discontentment in discussion here - to the Governorship is likely to diffuse revolutionary fervor. Kasha has a large following in East Darfur, had been writing challenging articles and threatening to move to Egypt (where he would have produced a lot more articles). The security risk represented by him and Rizeigat discontentment at a time of government weakness proved too great a gamble for the Government of Sudan, who reportedly agreed a high price for the deal.³¹

1.5 Economic and Cultural Changes: Cultural variation exists mainly along an urban-pastoralist cleavage. In Ad-Daein, the population is drawn from all Rizeigat houses. According to some nomadic Rizeigat, those living in the towns, where 80% of households have access to satellite TV, “do not behave like Rizeigat”³². Government officials and other wealthy Rizeigat may invest in cattle, but they are likely to be modern *frisi* breeds and will be kept in Central Darfur or North Kordofan, using ‘donkeys’ (water yards supplying water using generators or other mechanical methods, often at a price). It “is only those people of the border who actually come down” to South Sudan.³³ Beyond a small number of large businessmen, all houses of Rizeigat have the same “ideology”; to love, protect and increase their cattle and many still follow a nomadic way of life, moving roughly every two weeks with the entire family. Cattle play a strong role in the vision of any future Rizeigat society even among economic radicals such as Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, who see excess cattle wealth as a source of investment for diversification but stress that this process need not challenge the fundamental values of society.³⁴

1.6 Historical interactions with South: Migration Routes

²⁹ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

³⁰ ‘Almaniya’ can be broadly translated to mean ‘secular’ and is a word particularly associated with Yassir Arman and Abdel Aziz al-Hilu of SPLM-N, Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 1 April 2013

³¹ According to Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Kasha’s conditions had always included a 3 billion SP budget for development of East Darfur.

³² Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

³³ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

³⁴ Mohamed Ali received his secondary school certificate in 1996 and soon after persuaded his father to sell a number of cattle. The decision has allowed Mohamed Ali Ghourshay to own a small shop and build a number of houses and he now sees this ‘diversification not replacement’ exercise as a model for the wider community to follow, Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

Rizeigat have four migration routes: 1) Western Route/Murhal as Gharbi through to Raja County of Western Bahr al-Ghazal; 2) Central Route/Murhal al Awsat through to Aweil North; and 3) the Eastern Route/Murhal al Shergi through to Aweil North/East (Jaac, Rum Aker). All those coming to Northern Bahr al Ghazal are Mohamed and Um Dahiya; 4) The migration route of Totaha clan of Assalaya who make their own route to Raja County.

Murhal as Gharbi	Totaha Murhal	Murhal al Shergi	Murhal al Awsat
<i>Nuwaiba and Mahamid</i>	<i>Totaha</i>	<i>Mohamed</i>	<i>Um Dahiya</i>
Raja County	Raja County	Kiir Adem	Jaac
		Jorbioc	Rum Aker
		Achana	About
		Gok Machar	

The Rizeigat who enter Northern Bahr al Ghazal State are from the Mohamed and Um Dahiya tribes of Maharia Rizeigat. During the dry season the Um Dahiya migrate southwards across the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab. In the rainy season, they migrate to the north of East Darfur state. These routes are well established and the rights of each group recognised. If one group wishes to use the murhal of another for a particular reason, they should approach their neighbors and ask but such requests are usually granted without question.

1.7 The Akech Jaali: Some of the families of Rizeigat at Abu Matariq have Dinka heritage and are known collectively as Akech Jaali. They are situated within the Awlad Hanana Khashm al Bayt of the Rizeigat Mohamed.

The Akech Jaali are likely to have assimilated into the Rizeigat by marriage. A traditional Dinka custom is that when a girl is properly married (meaning the dowry is paid in full). Her brothers may follow and live in the new village of their married sister.³⁵ The date of assimilation is not known but one interviewee, who clearly remembers the 1947 reconciliation conference between Rizeigat and Dinka at Kiir Adem, says the process of inter-marriage must have happened prior to that time due to their presence there. It is worth noting the correlation between the Dinka clans associated with the Akech Jaali (outlined in the table below) and those identified by Dinka historians as key players in the Mahdist movement of 1881. These specifically included “the Padhieu clan of people of great Aturjong Anyuon of Gok Machar in Aweil West... the Pariath clan of Deng Deng Akot .. and the Pagou clan people of great Kuac Kuac Mayieldit”.³⁶ Perhaps the brief military alliance begot a period of inter-marriage? Another version of the story speaks of a single Dinka man named Akech who assimilated into the Rizeigat, took the Arab name Jaali and from whom the Akech Jaali derive.

The more dominant ‘throwaway’ narrative on the street is that the Akech Jaali must have been captured or abducted during wartime (though the terms ‘capture’ and ‘enslavement’ are applied to any process of assimilation into an Arab or Islamic identity

³⁵ Interview, Sylvester Abraham Madut, Aweil, 2nd March 2013

³⁶ The Malual Dinka fought in large numbers alongside the Rizeigat, Ngok and Twic to reinforce the Ansars fighting front in Kordofan. They fought together in the ‘Black Flag Division’ who on 26th January 1885 precipitated the fall of Khartoum and famously a Giernyaang Dinka, slew General Gordon. The unit was reportedly led by officers mainly drawn from former slave traders of the Turkiyya. After the sudden succession of the Khalifa Adullahi (a Taisha Baggara) following the death of the Mahdi, the slave trade was once again expanded and the short lived Dinka-Baggara alliance ended. It is possible, however, that some links could have been forged at this time. See for example, Dinka History, Anei, Lewis, First Edition, 2012, p.336.

- an extension of the cultural contestation central to the conflict).³⁷ Alternatively, these populations represent the ‘cowards’ who ran to join the Arabs – those who decided to join the strong side”. Whatever their origin, consensus exists on the main connections between Dinka clans and the Rizeigat groups. These are summarized in the following table:

Clan Name	Relations
Pariath (scattered all over NBG the state but mostly around Gor Ayen and Malual in Aweil North)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clan with significant relations to ‘Akech Jaali’ Rizeigat. This is the clan of the NBG state commissioner of police (from Pawar-wend family). •
Padhieu (Presence in all counties but mainly in Aweil North, less so Aweil East)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clan with significant relations to ‘Akech Jaali’ Rizeigat. A ‘group’ of Rizeigat originated from this clan.
Pagou Pagien Pawan Pahol Payom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minor relations • ‘Pawan Rizeigat’ have a “village” in the north but few in number.

1.8 Informal Influencers

Parents: As the 2012-2013 dry season commenced, relations worsened between Dinka and Rizeigat youth. Young people from Gok Machar would cross the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab in order to gain employment, unloading trucks of Mohamed Rizeigat. This income was central to their livelihoods and rates of 100SSP per day could be earned (this reduced to as little as 20SSP per day when trade slowed to zero). However, in December 2012, Rizeigat attacked them as they arrived at Kiir Adem market in the morning. Dinka youth who were present said that: “We had friends among them... there is no way they could have done the things in Kiir Adem without the knowledge and approval of their parents and elders”. The Dinka youth say that the attackers emerged from inside the shops of their Rizeigat friends and therefore must have lain in wait through the night. This was taken by the youth as evidence of the complicity of a wider Rizeigat group. They telephoned their former Rizeigat contacts and said that: 1) the majority do not pick up or say that the South has invaded their land; or 2) a minority say that “it is because of our government that we have problems”.³⁸

Intellectuals and Diaspora: Rizeigat diaspora members who have studied in Europe or America occasionally travel to Ad-Daein and organize small lecture groups. These people disseminate information and ideas to local intellectuals and play a role in shaping attitudes towards political change.

Women and Authority: Women have no official role in Rizeigat or Dinka cattle camps. However, they have some informal influence, as one interviewee put it: “the cry of a woman is sometimes the cry for peace. In such cases, a man may listen to her”. In times of peace, women will also forge cooperative relations.

2. Tribal Patterns and Engagement in Conflictual Strategies

2.1 Divided: The Rizeigat are in need of a permanent solution to their demand for water and grazing. And this must be secured by peace or war; “Rizeigat don’t want to come and beg every year”.³⁹ At the onset of the dry season 2012-2013, the Rizeigat in general

³⁷ A usage echoed by international advocates. In an interview with Chairman of Counter Slavery International at Aweil airstrip, he described “the problem is [that] they have been brainwashed. They think they are muslims and Arabs and think they are northern Sudanese”, 14th March 2013

³⁸ Interview, Peter Atem Anei, Simon Cheir Bak, James Mayen Yong, Youth Committee, Gok Machar, 22 Feb 2013

³⁹ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, March 27, 2013

interpreted the September 2012 agreement and AU statements as confirming Mile 14 was part of Sudan. On December 20th, the Minister of Defense visited Ad Daein Government of Sudan to mobilize recruits for armed action. He argued that because 14 miles south of River Kiir/Bahr al Arab is part of the buffer zone, the Rizeigat should not require South Sudanese permissions or security guarantees. Rizeigat in the Government of Sudan such as Hassabo Abdel Rahman, Sadiq Mohamed Ali and Abdel Hamid Tarahi also visited Ad-Daein on multiple occasions through October 2012-March 2013 where they held public gatherings and assured the population of the strength of Sudan's claims to the area.⁴⁰ The resultant expectation of long-term benefit gained the government the support of a large constituency of Rizeigat.⁴¹

Between September 2012 and end of January 2013, the leadership of the Rizeigat were divided. After the 26th December attack some condemned the action whilst others advocated a "full ground sweep to take the area".⁴² One theory is that the choice broadly depends on what can be called national and local interests (there is no evidence of religious patterns of difference); with those in government and connected to political positions and resources partnering with former militia and those seeking short term economic gain (through spoils of battle) aligning with the Government of Sudan's policies, in a classic client-patron alliance.

Pastoralists and traders with interests independent of the state were more likely to oppose the policies. However, due to the monopoly of political power among the ruling party few leaders fall into this category. The Rizeigat Nazir Saeed Mahmoud Musa Ibrahim Madibo, normally seen as a staunch support of the peace, wavered in support of government policies -Rizeigat and Dinka interviewees alike suggest he received some immediate economic benefit. The Deputy Nazir, however, a blood relative, continued to seek peaceful coexistence.⁴³ Following a mid-February conference of Rizeigat leaders in Abu Matariq, the Nazir, along with others, reaffirmed his commitment to the peace. Officials in Gok Machar described the turnabout in the following terms: "They are hopeless, they have no roads, no education, no access to grazing, and [now] they have realized that the Dinka are strong now – even if Beshir went to Abu Matariq – the leaders would be skeptical".⁴⁴

2.2 Security Structures – Opportunity Structure

The perception in Gok Machar is that Rizeigat have been widely mobilized since September 2012 into the Abu Tira militia and have been involved in recent attacks on the Kiir Adem/Samaha area.⁴⁵ Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, however, says that the vast majority of militia recruitment took place 4-5 years ago when large numbers of

⁴⁰ At the same time, the Government of Northern Bahr al Ghazal had produced a map seen by the author showing its position regards border delineation. The map shows an undulating border running no less than 10-20km north of the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab and up to near Meiram in the East. In Aweil North, Dinka named places such as Makal Aturjong, Mathiang Deng, and Kot Ayac are far north of River Kiir, the latter very close to Abu Matariq.⁴⁰ And officials are keen to point out that the Rizeigat have no permanent settlements within "100 kilometers of Kiir Adem whereas we are settled between Gok Machar all the way to Kiir Adem". Border contestation is heightened by rumours that the area has potential oil reserves.

⁴¹ As Mohamed Ali Ghourshay put it, the Rizeigat said "Ok, we'll take it then. They were happy", Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, March 29, Aweil, 2013. This was in stark contrast to 2012, when on April 12, the Minister of Defense visited East Darfur with resources, weapons and motorcycles, and the community rejected mobilization. At that time SAF constructed a training base between Abu Matariq and Kiir Adem/Samaha, and the Rizeigat reportedly rejected it and forced it to be removed.⁴¹ Mohamed Ali Ghourshay says the key to mobilization is ignorance, "we are not educated so the government can use their tricks. If you ask us what the problem is we won't even know! We're just pushed to do things".

⁴² Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

⁴³ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay,.... ; Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

⁴⁴ Interview, Tobis Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, 14th March

⁴⁵ One government official claimed that a captured combatant, an Akech Jaali relative of the state police commissioner, after "torture" by the SPLA, admitted that the Government of Sudan had sponsored him to attack. The combatant is now released. Interview, Peter Jok, Director General, SMARF NBG, 1 April 2013

weapons were distributed to Rizeigat as border guards (Haras al Odud). The Abu Tira (“those of the bat”) sport a ‘bat’ insignia on their uniforms and are primarily viewed in Gok Machar and Jaac as “the Darfur militia currently terrorizing the area around Kiir Adem”.⁴⁶ The following table outlines “those armed groups of Rizeigat we know” according to the Commissioner, Executive Director of Aweil North and Chairman of the Rizeigat Peace Committee.

SAF	PDF	Abu Tira	Haras al-Odud/Border Guards	‘Janjaweed’	‘Rizeigat’
<p>Army</p> <p>From all over Sudan, many from Darfur</p> <p>Attack in the rear of militia</p>	<p>Former PDF have joined up with Haras al Odud (for salaries)</p> <p>Or able to resort to criminal opportunism as civilians.</p> <p>Paid in loot.</p> <p>Islamist</p>	<p>Primarily Rizeigat from East Darfur</p> <p>Many new recruits 2012-2013</p> <p>Told by GoS that Kiir Adem is within their border.</p> <p>Present in Al Adabi/Tiit Chok (kinsmen to conference delegates)</p>	<p>Told by GoS that Kiir Adem is within their border.</p> <p>Mixed army and civilian organisation but paid salary.</p> <p>From various tribes supporting government.</p> <p>Mixed ethnicities but dependent on section of border (here Rizeigat – under Hemeti).</p> <p>Not founded on Islamism</p>	<p>Janjaweed includes those Rizeigat from North Darfur.⁴⁷</p> <p>‘Bandits’ not controlled by anyone.</p> <p>Collection of armed groups who destroy even what they don’t take.</p> <p>Members drawn from Nyala, Ferdous, Muglad, Abu Jabra, Makaraja, Daein.⁴⁸</p>	<p>Can mobilize powerful tribal militia.</p> <p>Heavily defeated Abu Tira during battle of Shegedi. “Stronger than the army”.</p> <p>Found with news guns each year.</p> <p>No uniforms.</p> <p>Some are former PDF not disarmed.</p> <p>Commit crime on return migration.</p>

The mid-February Rizeigat conference in Abu Matariq left the Rizeigat divided. There are some tribal patterns to the division discussed below. These can be considered structural.

2.3 Mohamed/Um Dahiya Split

A first level division can be made between the Mohamed and Um Dahiya sections of Mahariya Rizeigat of South Darfur. The Mohamed migrate through Kiir Adem to Gok Machar. The Um Dahiya migrate to Jaac and to Rum Aker. Broadly speaking, the Um Dahiya were in strong support of peaceful relations whereas elements among the Mohamed were not.⁴⁹ In early March 2013, the Omda of Abu Jabra town called AECOM to request a separate peaceful migration conference to that with the Mohamed Rizeigat because “the Rizeigat of Ad-Daein are not treating us with respect”.⁵⁰ The Ministry of Local Government in Aweil also requested Concordis International to prepare for a separate migration conference in Rum Aker “because the Rizeigat who cross there are different ones to those crossing Kiir Adem”. The Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal also reportedly said that this conference was a matter of priority in order to maintain

⁴⁶ Interview, Maluei Geng, County Clerk, Gok Machar, 21st February 2013

⁴⁷ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

⁴⁸ Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013

⁴⁹ The commissioner of Aweil North spoke in mid-February with representatives of Mohamed Rizeigat who informed him they were “with the government”.⁴⁹

⁵⁰ Interview, Sylvester Abraham Madut, 11 March

good relations with Rizeigat.⁵¹ Regardless of whether it proved impossible to make a satisfactory peace with the Rizeigat of Abu Matariq, it was essential the peaceful allies from Abu Jabra would not be alienated.

There are at least three reasons for the demand for a separate conference for the Um Dahiya from Abu Jabra: 1) The Abu Jabra Rizeigat wanted to delink themselves from the conflicts at Kiir Adem and thus facilitate their trade and cattle interests; 2) The head of the Rizeigat Peace Committee, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, had spent the majority of his time working on accommodating Mohamed Rizeigat into the conference and thus had not communicated well with those in Abu Jabra⁵²; 3) the Um Dahiya Rizeigat of Abu Jabra are generally marginalized within the state and the peace process with South Sudan. They are far from the state capital and have overlooked in the “Dinka-Misseriya from Meiram” or the “Dinka-Rizeigat from Abu Matariq” peace agreements in recent years.

2.4 Awlad Ghayed and Awlad Hanana

The Awlad Ghayed and Awlad Hanana, who migrate through Kiir Adem/Samaha, have a much larger presence in North Darfur. They therefore live under a somewhat contested authority. The Awlad Ghayed and Hanana of North Darfur are Aballa pastoralists (though in East Darfur, they keep a mix of camels and cows). According to Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, these groups are theoretically under the authority of the Nazir but practically strict followers of Sheikh Musa Hilal of Darfur conflict fame.⁵³ The Ghayed and Hanana groups formed a core of PDF, and now Abu Tira. They were also deeply mobilized to join the charismatic Northern Mahariya Rizeigat Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo’s (“Hemeti”) Fut 8/Katiba battalion, described by Small Arms Survey as “the most active, best armed section of the Border Guards”.⁵⁴

The appointment of Governor Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha is an opportunity for peace. He is an Awlad Ghayed and his mother is from Awlad Hanana. Further, the conditions of his appointment reportedly included a 3 billion SSP budget for development, which, if implemented, could provide the incentives he needs to support peace at his borders. He is very supportive of the community peace with Dinka and has good relations with both Mohamed Ali Ghourshay and the Rizeigat Nazir. He has also been in communication with both the commissioner of Aweil North and the Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal and expressed an interest to work for peace (and even visit the state). The expectation of Mohamed Ali Ghourshay is that Kasha can use his position and resources as Governor to prevent Mohamed Rizeigat and government security forces from disrupting the migration and trade agreements.⁵⁵ Indeed, shortly after his appointment in April 2013 a visit of two Omdas, Mohamed Amir from Awlad Ahruj and Omda Haj Hamad Gadim from Awlad Hanana, both Mohamed Rizeigat who use the central route, was announced.

2.5 Akech Jaali

Contract to theories of common ancestry as a connector, the predominant view in Gok Machar is that the Akech Jaali exploit their Dinka ancestry as a political tool to gain their

⁵¹ Interview, Lino Adub, Minister of Local Government, NBG; Riakriak Garang, Concordis International, Aweil, Monday 15th February 2013

⁵² He said the reason for this was simply that the peace was so strong with Abu Jabra Rizeigat that the priority for his engagement was elsewhere.

⁵³ Any clash in directive between Musa Hilal and Nazir will be determined through a community negotiation, perhaps needing a community meeting of all Rizeigat.

⁵⁴ It is important to remember that Hemeti led several thousand border guards into opposition in late 2007 over government failure to pay salaries. Border Intelligence Brigades, July 2012, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), p.2

⁵⁵ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Aweil, 1 April, 2013

interests in the South. For example, at the peaceful migration conferences it is common for these groups to perform Dinka songs and the local response is that “they just do it to get support. There [in Abu Matariq] you will not hear them”.⁵⁶ Examples of antagonistic relations are offered to support this. For example, in 1999, a ‘Pagien’ Rizeigat called Doka led a Rizeigat militia in 1999 to attack his Pagien areas. At the same time, there is some evidence that the associations do have some value as connectors. On March 1st 2013, a Dinka man was reportedly arrested by Abu Tira at the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab and taken to El Adabi/Tiit Chok He was threatened with death but used his Pariath clan identity to navigate his release. On 21st February, the commissioner of Gok Machar said he had spoken with members of the Awlad Hanana khashm al bayt, including Lueth Ayac and Mathiang Akec families, and was informed that these groups had decided to support the peaceful migration. He strongly suggested that their support is precisely because of their Dinka ancestry. He also stressed that the common Dinka ancestry is a significant factor in explaining the resolve of Northern Bahr al Ghazal towards peaceful coexistence. Through the 2012-2013 dry season, the Akech Jaali were themselves split just as they have been throughout recent military history (some are still present in SPLA HQ in NBG whilst others were recruited by SAF).⁵⁷

Three main interests interact: 1) Rizeigat, particularly, North Darfur’s Awlad Hanana, do not respect the Akech Jaali as real Arabs. Fighting the South therefore offers a chance of gaining greater acceptance. Being “More Arab than the Arabs” can be seen as a natural response to a generation of media presentation of southerners as inferior, backward, and primitive; 2) Akech Jaali, who feel some connection to the contested land as Dinka territory, are particularly influenced by the Government’s rhetoric that emphasizes a message of ‘don’t let the South steal your land’⁵⁸; 3) Akech Jaali are primarily cattle herders and support the peace because a) it is in their interests and b) some share a genuine sense of brotherhood and neighborliness with the southern relatives.

⁵⁶ Interview, Tobis Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, 14th March

⁵⁷ Interview, Sylvester Abraham Madut, Aweil, 2nd March 2013

⁵⁸ According to Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, the argument originated from within the Hanana but became exploited by the government with money. This argument has replaced the previous emphasis on religious duty to mobilise militia along the border with South Sudan, Interview, Tobis Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, 14th March



Dinka ancestry is evident in this group of Rizeigat

2.6 Limitations of Tribal Approach

The tribal approach illuminates. But it is important to stress that all Rizeigat houses are represented in the ranks of security forces of Sudan. For example, on February 28th, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay travelled to Ad-Daein with a message from Governor Malong. He was arrested by Haras al Odud and threatened with death. His release was only arranged by a group of Mohimid who formed a majority in the contingent. According to the Rizeigat Peace Committee Chair, Rizeigat from all houses were indeed widely mobilized to the PDF, Haras and Abu Tira but he stressed, “It’s just for money. They are completely poor”. This applies equally to the Awlad Ghayed and Awlad Hanana who are “still just individuals from certain families, it’s not the tribe. They may be from that community but can not be seen as community”.⁵⁹

3. The Individual Choice

Rizeigat make a choice: 1) travel to South Sudan as a trader (or invest resources in this trade); 2) migrate cattle (or allow cattle to be taken) to South Sudan; 3) Do nothing; 4) Actively oppose cross-border relations. A necessary condition for cooperative choices is that the perceived risk of engagement is lower than a critical threshold. This section outlines factors relevant to an individual cost-benefit analysis (for example, risk of imprisonment versus risk of cattle loss due to lack of grazing and water).⁶⁰ The perceived security risk is a function of perceived host community positions, host government policies, an assessment of other symbolic information and of the peace structure in place.

$$S^{61}(\text{host community}) + S(\text{host government}) + S(\text{symbolic}) = \text{SECURITY RISK} < \text{Critical}$$

⁵⁹ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Aweil, March 27, 2013

⁶⁰ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

⁶¹ S = Security assessment as a function of host community/host government actions and communications.

3.1 Assessment of security risk in South

3.1.1 Assessment of Host Authority

The perception of host government and host community positions and behaviour is central to the decision of whether to enter South Sudan, as one Rizeigat leader put it “We will do anything the administration of South Sudan asks of us. We are completely at the mercy of the government. We have brought our women, children and cows, everything we have. We are not soldiers, we are nomads, you will not hear a gun shot. All we want is grass and water”.⁶²

The Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal’s direct communication to the Peaceful Migration conference is a key indicator used by Rizeigat to assess the security situation. For this reason, the organisation of the Gok Machar conference was built around the Governor’s schedule – he flew straight from the SPLM Political Convention in Juba, the highest body of the SPLM, to the community conference in Gok Machar. Fadlalla, leader of the Mohamed Rizeigat at Makuei in Aweil North, said Mohamed Ali Ghourshay had asked him to just go to the Gok Machar conference, to see the people from Abu Jabra and to hear what the people of South Sudan had to say. His comment, made while sitting deep within South Sudan by any definition, was that “the fact we are here is the decision of the Wali [Governor]. As long as the Governor is committed to this then we will stay in peace until death”.⁶³ The Governor’s seriousness was also communicated by the mission of Captain Akec Amuri, met in Makuei on 2 April 2013. Captain Amuri was delegated by Commander Major General Diing Wol to deliver the following messages to SPLA barracks: 1) Befriend all Arabs in South Sudan; 2) If you cause harm to an Arab you will be punished according to law; and 3) If you kill an Arab in South Sudan you will be sentenced to death by firing squad.

Contraventions of the agreement are dealt with harshly and with absolute conviction. Eyewitnesses to attacks at Kiir Adem say that as the attackers came on horseback in quite large numbers they were simply “mowed down”. The withdrawal of the SPLA did little to change matters;⁶⁴ police defended the situation as an army.⁶⁵ The completeness of the defense is one reason for the ongoing clashes as Rizeigat seek revenge for their losses.⁶⁶ However, the situation echoes the trajectory of conflict at Majak Wuoi and War Guet in 2011-2012, which represented a ‘lesson’ which communicated changed circumstances.

Just as the decision of migrating groups is shaped by recent experience, so is the position of the host communities. In Aweil North the Paramount Chief and Chairman of the Traditional Authorities Center in Gok Machar said, “other than those few who remained in our market they are all one with GoS and the PDF”.⁶⁷ The evidence offered by youth, chiefs and local government officials included:

Date	‘Evidence’
June 2012	Rizeigat killing of 30 people in Aweil North and burning of 3 homes in Makuil Rup. Families took refuge at Jaac.

⁶² Interview, Fadlalla, Makuei, 2 April 2013

⁶³ Interview, Fadlalla, Makuei, 2 April 2013

⁶⁴ The formally announced withdrawal of SPLA without the presence of any effective monitoring complicate the situation. It incentivized attack, reducing the perceived costs without having to face the SPLA.⁶⁴ According to local officials in Gok Machar, the SPLA also mined the area around Kiir Adem in order to prevent attacks down the road. This is complicating attempts to monitor security in the area and reduce distrust between communities.

⁶⁵ Of course the police were until recently all rebels. They are well armed and remember the tactics of wartime. They “still have the bitterness in their hearts so when they get the opportunity to attack they hit hard” [Sylvester Abraham Madut]

⁶⁶ Interview, Sylvester Abraham Madut, 3 April 2013

⁶⁷ Interview, Sultan Deng Nyuol, Paramount Chief of Malual North Payam, Chairman of Traditional Authorities Centre in Gok Machar, 21st February 2013.

December 21 2012	Attack at River Kiir
December 26 2012	Fighting at Kiir Adem
Mid-January 2013	Fighting at Kiir Adem
January 21 2013	Fighting at Kiir Adem with 'janjaweed', Abu Tira, SAF.
End of January 2013	Rizeigat attack at Tungabat near River Kiir/Bahr al Arab killed two Dinka. Dinka came to retrieve the bodies and buried them. Following this, the "Rizeigat dug up the bodies and cut out their hearts"
February 2 2013	Fighting west of Kiir Adem involving the militias and SAF.
December 2012-Feb 2013	Movement of "Rizeigat forces" drawing water in Achana, War Chuei, and Yur Dit.
March 6 th	Attacked some civilian populations southwest of bridge at Kiir Adem. SPLA engaged them and say it was Rizeigat Abu Matariq accompanied by cattle, with a few SAF inside.
March-April 2013	Attacked Aweilchok (east of Kiir Adem); Maletmir (13km west of Kiir Adem) and Kiir Adem/Samaha itself. ⁶⁸

Rizeigat not involved in fighting are deeply affected by these developments. The perceived participation of some Rizeigat in *inter alia* the December 26 ground attacks at Kiir Adem, created a reluctance on their part for fear of revenge or reprisals.⁶⁹ The Kiir Adem attacks and widely perceived Rizeigat involvement has therefore led all parties to caution, reduced opportunities for trust building and therefore affected Sudanese pastoralist assessment of security in the area.

3.1.2 De-linked Rizeigat Authority: Although the Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal had already instructed the SPLA and county commissioners to be friendly to those who choose to come to South Sudan in peace, there remained "strong resistance" to allowing migration from community members in Northern Bahr al Ghazal, only partly diluted by the benefits, which accrue from trade.⁷⁰ Dinka community members in Jaac, where inter-community peace is perhaps most strong, remain suspicious of the cooperation agreement; "This peace did not start here, it was designed somewhere else. These people are not good. When they leave they take our cows". Francis Anei Yoor Acien, Chair of the joint sub-committee in Jaac put it in a more nuanced fashion, "these people with us here are our real brothers. The problem is that those who live here say one thing and those who live there [Abu Jabra] don't accept the peace and are with the government".⁷¹

The problem is twofold: First, lack of communication about Rizeigat delegates to peace conferences and committees hinders host community confidence in inter-community relations. Traditional authorities in Aweil North say "the leaders who come are not the 'real ones'. We know the real ones and they are hiding". The delegates are considered to be "just cattle camp chiefs" so no one can be accountable for the peace agreement if challenges arise. The Traditional Authorities in Gok Machar have respect for the following Rizeigat leaders:⁷²

Leader	Location
Mahmoud Abdel Hamid Fadlallah	Abu Jabra
Saeed Mahmoud Musa Madibo	Ad Daein
Sadiq Yahyah	Adila
Mahmoud Kali	Ferdous

⁶⁸ These locations for the attacks were given by Peter Jok, Director General, SMARF, Northern Bahr al Ghazal.

⁶⁹ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

⁷⁰ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

⁷¹ Interview, Francis Anei Yoor Acien, Chair of Joint Peace Committee, Jaac, 30th March 2013

⁷² Interviews with Simon Garang Diang, Paramount Chief, Aweil West; Clerk Paul Anyuon Akech; Deng Dau Deng, Deputy Chief, Malual Centre Payam; Santo Deng Nyoul, Paramoung Chief, Malual North Payam and Chairman of TAC, 21st February 2013.

Without some explanation or connection of contemporary delegates to these traditional authorities of Rizeigat there will remain a challenge of legitimacy. At the least the problem is one of communication. At the most, it is an outward sign of the split that Francis Anei outlines and a real challenge to lasting peace.

3.1.3 Tax to Host Government: Lack of transparency around tax collection does not help convince host communities as to the benefit of the migration. In Gok Machar, the traditional authorities were adamant that Rizeigat cattle camps do not pay any tax to the government⁷³ whilst Joint Peace Committee members argued that both herders and traders pay tax to the sole benefit of the government.⁷⁴ The commissioner confirmed that “the community does not benefit at all from the [cattle] migration, [but that] frankly, the government alone benefits in terms of revenue”.⁷⁵ The Payam administrator of Jaac also confirmed that the migration is a ‘support to the government’ as cattle “brings big revenues” to the government.⁷⁶ The problem links to wider corruption in the state (the only Hummer in Northern Bahr al Ghazal belongs to Garang Achier, Head of the Tax Commission of Northern Bhar al Ghazal).

3.1.4 Benefit to Host Community: Benefit to host communities should be seen as a security issue. The higher the benefit the greater the incentive to make and honour security agreements. This is why the Executive Director of Aweil North said on 14th March that “the first reason for this conference is diesel and other commodities”⁷⁷. The benefit of a working peace to the population are large. Dinka in Gok Machar described the situation with the closed border as “worse than war” because of its impact on livelihoods: 1) Dinka are no longer able to fish at the river due to fear of bombing, “Janjaweed” and militia activity⁷⁸ – the price of fish had increased threefold (from around 8SSP for a ‘Larotto’ to 20-25SSP); 2) The cessation of trade meant the loss of lucrative jobs (youth from Gok Machar would earn up to 100SSP per day unloading trucks at Kiir Adem/Samaha); and 3) Basic commodities are unavailable or expensive.⁷⁹

In fact, though the availability of goods was reduced, commodity prices in Gok Machar were reported as unchanged by road closure; Sugar at 300SSP per sack and one Maluo (3.3.kg) of flour at 10SSP. Fuel, however, approximately doubled in price from 25SSP to 50SSP for a gallon (6 litres) with the border closure. In addition, the community was reporting a good local sorghum harvest, reducing its dependency on trade for survival (if not for a more comfortable existence) and the region boasts sufficient access to grazing and water for cows without the need to move to the river. In this respect it differs substantially from Unity State. There was also some concern also that Rizeigat herds were bringing disease and this led to some concern and opposition by the community⁸⁰. Despite these limitations on host community reliance on cross border relationsd, it is the most vulnerable people in Aweil North who suffered most from the

⁷³ Interviews with Simon Garang Diang, Paramount Chief, Aweil West; Clerk Paul Anyuon Akech; Deng Dau Deng, Deputy Chief, Malual Centre Payam; Santo Deng Nyoul, Paramoung Chief, Malual North Payam and Chairman of TAC, 21st February 2013

⁷⁴ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

⁷⁵ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

⁷⁶ Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013

⁷⁷ Interview, Tobias Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, March 14th 2013

⁷⁸ Indeed, villages along the River Kiir such as Kangibor, Kang Agak, Genadon, are now empty. The resettlement of these areas was due to begin last year before the Antonovs “disrupted the process”, Interview, Tobias Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, March 14th 2013

⁷⁹ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

⁸⁰ Silvestor Akot, Veterinary Consultant, AECOM, 22 March 2013

border closure – those dependent on the river for their livelihoods through fishing, grass cutting, or manual labor.⁸¹

3.2 Symbolic Information

The only information reaching Gok Machar from East Darfur is from people travelling discreetly. The information vacuum leads residents to rely on other symbolic languages, which can be ambiguous. Examples of such media are outlined below:

Silence: Local suspicions in Gok Machar were reinforced by the lack of communication from the Rizeigat peace committee. As of February 21st 2013, “there [had] been no communication from the Rizeigat this year. Our relations have broke down. Now they are incited by the government”. Host community suspicion reduces incentives to migrate, which in turn raises local suspicions in a reinforcing cycle.⁸² Lack of communication with the commissioner also represented to him a symbol of Rizeigat allegiance to GoS between September and mid-February. Rizeigat friends and employers in Kiir Adem market stopped picking up their phones in December 2012, also signifying betrayal to the Dinka youth.⁸³

Murder: Culturally a death is more significant than it might appear to an outsider accustomed to the ‘pointless murder’ of a western city. “Dinka Malual are like Rizeigat. We are different to others like the Dinka of Rumbek for example. We do not kill without real intention. We do not kill simply for theft”.⁸⁴ With this cultural lens, the one death in Malual West in June 2012 takes on an additional significance.

Battlefield Losses: The communication of power and authority in the region occurs on the battlefield. “It is only when they can’t get past the SPLA” that they realize it [fighting] is not a good choice, “they are confused and it’s affecting them negatively. They now want to bring their cows because they are dying and their attacks gain them nothing”.⁸⁵

Joint Positions: Joint statements are powerful indicators of strong relations. The Rizeigat-Dinka joint sub-committee in Jaac use this strategy of making joint public statements to counter challenges that are otherwise out of their hands.

Abductee Release and Returns: Rizeigat in Abu Jabra are facilitating ongoing returnees from Nyala to South Sudan. The Nazir has also worked to facilitate the return of some 23 Dinka women and children abducted from Aweil West or Balbala/Timsaha in Raja County. This demonstrates solidarity with the southern people and also indicates a level of commitment to peace, through actively undermining the Government of Sudan’s policy and offering a gesture, which is not absolutely mandated by the agreement in Gok Machar.⁸⁶ It is not clear what the financial benefits of such cooperation might be for those Rizeigat involved.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Interviews, various community members, youth and officials, Gok Machar, 14 March 2013

⁸² Interview, Sultan Deng Nyuol, Paramount Chief of Malual North Payam, Chairman of Traditional Authorities Centre in Gok Machar, 21st February 2013.

⁸³ Interview, Peter Atem Anei, Simon Cheir Bak, James Mayen Yong, Youth Committee, Gok Machar, 22 Feb 2013

⁸⁴ Interview, Tobias Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, March 14th 2013

⁸⁵ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

⁸⁶ The issue of returning abductees was discussed in the Gok Machar conference but returning them was not resolved in the final resolution

⁸⁷ It is possible the returnees pay a good price or international NGOs incentivize the practice. Counter Slavery International are also working with the Rizeigat of Abu Jabra to liberate and return ‘slaves’ held in Sudan. This is likely to involve financial payments.



A Rizeigat woman uses a water point near Makuei.

The Return of Spontaneous Cattle Migrations: The spontaneous migration of Rizeigat cows southwards is common as the dry season progresses. In early 2013, 300 cows escaped southwards from respected Rizeigat Zariq al Beshir's cattle camp and reached Makuei. They were reportedly gathered by an SPLA officer who knows Zariq well, and returned.⁸⁸

Timing of Conferences: In 2012-2013, the Ministry of Local Government insisted that the Misseriya Peaceful Migration Conference happened before the Rizeigat conference, despite messages from the Rizeigat that they were ready to come. Two theories present themselves as to why: 1) Logistical capacity and incompetence; and 2) To send a message to the Rizeigat that no one was coming whilst any of them were making problems, and potentially allowing pressure to build on the need for water and grazing as the dry season progressed.

Inter-marriage: Inter-cultural issues affect the relations between the communities and hence the assessment of personal security in South Sudan for Misseriya. Inter-marriage is a symbolic issue of great importance. Examples of Rizeigat marriage to Dinka women are given as an example of strong relations but the lack of reciprocal marriage is a constraint on building positive relations. A Dinka saying is that "If a lion wants to marry a girl, as long as he pays the dowry he can have her!" Inter-marriage is a part and parcel of inter-community respect and the concept of neighborliness. In the context of a

⁸⁸ Peter Jok, Director General, SMARF, Majok Yin Thiou, 30th March 2013

history of cultural contestation, the imbalance reinforces Dinka perceptions that Rizeigat (Arab) feel superior to them.⁸⁹

Names: The use of Arabic names for locations in South Sudan is considered divisive by Dinka populations. The issue is linked to fears around land claims and challenges deeply held relationships between Dinka and the land in which they live. For example, each Dinka clan in Aweil North has its own origin stories such as “our ancestor had a bull and from the bull two trees grew and from these two trees was given the entire forest”. The forest itself, to the clansman, is the forest of his ancestors. In the context of contested land claims and history of displacement and resettlement, alternative names are challenging and unacceptable.

4. Individual Economic Condition

Trade Profit(Tax, -Road) + Cattle Benefit(Grazing, -Tax, -Stress) > Cost(Grass, Water, Stress) + Alternative(Wage, Militia) + Cost(Strategic)

4.1 Trade

4.1.1 Benefits from Trade:

The tangible economic benefit of the peace varied by location in 2012-2013. Where the road was working, petty traders and large businessmen benefitted. In addition, the commissioner, the police, secret security and border guards all benefit by “sending their people to the road to tax it” or by engaging in trade – or both.⁹⁰ Additional factors, such as the presence of available shelters/shop space in markets can also increase the attractiveness of trading.

4.1.2 Roads Summary

- *Kiir Adem/Samaha:* Due to insecurity there was no trade across the Kiir Adem/Samaha since October 2012.
- *Jaac/Rum Aker:* The road from Abu Jabra is to Jaac/Majaac crossing River Kiir/Bahr al Arab at Kirriol. It is working well.
- *Makuei:* The border crossing point of Shugog opened following the Gok Machar peace conference. Trucks come to Moins, some 5-10 km west of Makuei before following the small road eastwards along the river and up to Gok Machar.

The Abu Jabra-Jaac road is protected by a network of Rizeigat families in Abu Jabra. The road is controlled by Rizeigat families, who taking responsibility for their areas. Mobile phones are used to communicate between zones and inform families down the line of the arrival of convoys. Drivers pay a small token fee to each family who provides them security. The system reportedly works well. On the southern side there are also no reported problems between Kirriol (on the river Kiir/Bahr al Arab) and Jaac. Goods also go to Rum Aker from Jaac (although Rum Aker also receives goods from Majok Yin Thiou). Border guards are invited to include goods in the trucks and therefore turn a blind eye - “this is how security can be arranged”.⁹¹

⁸⁹ The economic and political motivations for rebellion preceded mass displacement and insecurity along the border. The cultural dimension also played its role: “We fought because we did not hear our songs on the radio, or our languages on the television”, Interview, Mayuol Diing, Peace Trainer, Aweil, 13 March 2013

⁹⁰ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, March 29, Aweil, 2013,

⁹¹ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, March 29, Aweil, 2013,



Rizeigat traders after their arrival at Jaac

4.2 Cattle benefit

4.2.1 Cattle benefit: Cattle wealth is critical to both Rizeigat and Dinka communities: “Rizeigat and Dinka are poor. Our cows are all we have”. The impact of war on cattle herds unites some Rizeigat and Dinka, for example, at Jaac, where both groups claim that war obliterated their herds. On March 14th the Rizeigat had cattle in El Adabi/Tiit Chok (north of the River Kiir) and at Megedi (south of River Kiir). Water was running out in both places for cattle and humans and there was a huge pressure to continue southwards. The benefit of cattle migration for Rizeigat is offset by a one-off fee of 530SSP per fariq, paid to the county authorities. By May 1st 2013, over 100 cattle camps were in Makuei area. Others were in Achana. All were from the Mohimid house of Um Dahiya.

4.2.2 Price and availability of water

Availability of water in the home area affects the decision to migrate southwards. Pressure on those in Abu Jabra is most high due to that region’s low water table, as it has not proved profitable for companies to invest in boreholes or “donkey” services. This has created a strong incentive for peaceful relations between Um Dahiya and Dinka due to lack of any alternative water sources to them migration. On the other hand, Abu Matariq has a shallower water table and more donkeys.

The requirement that Sudanese pastoralist cattle are vaccinated in South Sudan is both a cost and an opportunity.⁹² Misseriya herders in Majak Wuoi said that the 1SSP fee per head of cattle could be avoided in Sudan because vaccination was not a mandatory there. They also said that the cost of vaccines in Sudan was 1SSP per two heads of cattle. However, the involvement of international doctors lends the exercise a gravity that ultimately attracted at least some Misseriya pastoralists. The quality and availability of vaccines in Sudan is also limited by poor cold-chain, the multiple re-sale of vaccines,

⁹² The vaccination of animal livestock offers a very rare example of persistent coordination between administrations on either side of the border. The Director General of SMARF in NGB was in email correspondence with counterparts in Meiram during November 2012, and information was shared about cattle condition and vaccination programming. Interview, Peter Jok, Director General, SMAR NGB, Majok Yin Thiou, 1 April 2013

limited understanding among nomads of the range of formal vaccines on offer, and the use of cheaper variants that remain effective for shorter periods (if have longer shelf lives).

4.2.3 Stress on animals south

The peaceful migration conferences took place later in the dry season in 2013 relative to 2012. The result is that cattle kept closer to home areas must undertake arduous journeys without water to reach grazing areas south of the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab. On 20th February a committee member of Aweil East Peace Committee reported that Tonyakuc toic was three days walk from Grinti/Aloof. Without water the risk of unacceptable animal stress was high.

4.3 Strategic Calculations

4.3 Strategic Calculations

4.3 .1 Leaders and strategic development: For leaders, the key choice is also economic; both in terms of short term economic gain but also through an assessment of potential strategic gains. Rizeigat Omdas reportedly told the commissioner of Aweil North by telephone that the Governor or East Darfur had purchased vehicles for loyal supporters, including for the Nazir. According to Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, the vast majority of Rizeigat do not favor government policies but doing so is simply the only way to access to resources. He noted incidents of the government handing leaders 50,000 Sudanese Pounds in cash, 6 cars, education for children, and treatment and surgery in good hospitals in order that they maintain a position of support or work with the government's mobilization campaigns. Political position is dependent on state sanction. The threat of removal from office strongly influences the Native Administration, to the point where they cannot advocate publicly against government policies. Money also works as a disincentive for influential people to work on the peace committees; not only will they fail to gain resources but they will endure hardship and pay for communications and transport from their pocket.

There is, however, a collective dimension to decision-making that lends native administrators and leaders some influence. On February 18th, a large meeting was convened of Mohamed Rizeigat in Abu Matariq. Their conclusion was that the investment being made in supporting the government was not paying off and leaders counseled against continuing on this course.⁹³ The expected impact was that community engagement with the militia activity would reduce, however, it became clear that key Mohamed leaders and community members continued to resist cooperative relations. This collective power is countered by government restrictions on large public meetings.

4.3.2 Individual Economics of Military Engagement: Rizeigat who join Abu Tira or the Haras al Odud receive economic rewards in two ways: 1) Salary; and 2) Impunity from the law to loot. Despite some structural patterns based on ethnic affiliation, Dinka peace committee members said Rizeigat mobilization by the GoS is “not a simple problem, such as according to tribe”. The problem is that “out of two brothers “the poor one can go to the government and the one with cows can come here”⁹⁴. This distinction was echoed by the payam administrator for Jaac: “people with cows come here peacefully, those without cows don’t come and those who come do so only on their own initiative”.⁹⁵ Youth in Gok Machar also had the same impressions: “Our understanding is

⁹³ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013; Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay

⁹⁴ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013

⁹⁵ Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013

it [the mobilized Rizeigat] is those Rizeigat who don't have anything".⁹⁶ And the Misseriya Peace Committee Chair said "as soon as they get anything to put them on their feet they will leave Abu Tira".⁹⁷ At the extreme, therefore, Rizeigat join militia for short-term economic benefit. In February 2013, the Minister of Defense visited Abu Matariq for a recruitment meeting. Some of those present said yes and some said no but "those who join the militia are actually thieves, who want to raid. These are the people without cows, who don't have anything to benefit from peace and a lot to lose"⁹⁸ for whom the war economy is their only access to resources.

5. Peace Committee/Conferences/Peace structure Analysis

Each Rizeigat will consider the cost benefit considerations above and combine them with an assessment of the peace structures in place, which aim to guarantee security, the resolution of disputes and otherwise minimize risk associated with migrating or trading in South Sudan.

5.1 Structure of Overall Rizeigat Committee

The overarching Rizeigat peace committee has branches for each major area in South Sudan. A number of members from each branch join with a number of Dinka counterparts to form Joint Peace Committees.⁹⁹ Numbers vary with place and year and some membership is ad hoc (for example, a roving member Idriss Hamedain Amal, who lives in Wanyjok in Aweil East), will be called to assist various sub-committees as required. The Rizeigat committee can broadly be understood as sitting within the Ajaweed tradition of elders and respected individuals who come together to resolve a conflict with neighbors. It departs from this, however, in its creation of laws through the peace conferences rather than simply resolutions to resolve specific incidents. The work of the peace committee is an ongoing process that goes beyond the formation of peace. "There is no need for more peace talks now. We have made peace. We should move forward to arranging games, sports, musical activities at the border. We can do this regardless of government".¹⁰⁰

5.2 Selection, Authority and Composition

Mohamed Ali Ghourshay visited each area prior to the dry season and informed families of the rationale for peaceful coexistence with South Sudanese communities. The peace committee is formed from those families who use the relevant migration routes. One person from each family is selected (each cattle camp or fariq also has its own internal committee which can take local authority in matters of peace). Each route will have around 5-6 camps and the selection is undertaken in each camp by family consensus. There are no elections but delegates are respected individuals, including possibly Sheikhs, chosen according to their cattle wealth and manner and power of speech. Names are given to the peace committee chair Mohamed Ali Ghourshay who assesses the choices for family balance before submitting to the Nazir for approval.

The representatives chosen are *Manadeeb* – delegates to the peace committee who help enforce its law. In Rizeigat society more generally, Manadeeb are those selected leaders in cattle camps who help enforce the customary law/Aourf and other demands of the Native Administration, for example, the collection of compensation, zakat or cattle taxes.

⁹⁶ Interview, Peter Atem Anei, Simon Cheir Bak, James Mayen Yong, Youth Committee, Gok Machar, 22 Feb 2013

⁹⁷ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

⁹⁸ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

⁹⁹ For example, the Rizeigat peace committee in Jaac is composed of 7: Hashim Zain al Din (Awlad Haniya), Aina Tarbo (Awlad Zeit), Hassan Atayeb Mohamdoun (Awlad Hassan), Abdulla Youssef (Awlad Zeit), Adud Osman Omer (Awlad Haniya), Addud Abubakr (Mohamed), Saddiq Yassin Omer (Abu Selama). From these, 3 are members of the Joint Peace Committee.

¹⁰⁰ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

The Manadeeb for the peace committee are different to this wider group, drawn only from those families who come to the Northern Bahr al Ghazal.

The peace committee works “without the approval of the commissioners or Omdas” and through a parallel structure. The problem of politicization of the Native Administration means an almost dual community structure must be developed to deal with issues of community peace building. Some Omdas are on board with the peace, for example, last year Abdel Rahsoul Al Thom, the town Omda of Abu Jabra, visited Wanyjok on business. At the same time the Nazir provides a degree of cover and authority to the Chairman of the peace committee and to the structure of the organization as an informal, if fallible, supporter. Mohamed Ali is first cousin to the Nazir and married to his daughter¹⁰¹ and claimed that the Nazir informed the commissioner about his assignment and warned him “I have sent my boy to the south. He is my boy”.¹⁰² However, the Nazir and Native Administration give authority to the peace committee in private, but not in public¹⁰³ and this makes it very difficult to evaluate the degree of Native Administration support.

Selection of the Rizeigat delegation to the Gok Machar Migration Conference reflected the migration routes to Northern Bahr al Ghazal, the majority coming from Abu Matariq and Abu Jabra.

Location in East Darfur	Number of Delegates
Assalaya	0
Abu Matariq	19 (including 3 Awlad Hanana and 1 Awlad Ghayed) ¹⁰⁴
El Fardous	1
Abu Jabra	17
Ad Daein	4

Those from Ad Daein include the Chairman and 3 traders, selected to provide commercially minded input if a problem arises involving trade. Key focal points, broadly corresponding to the position of *Delil*, were also selected for each agreed migration route. These were as follows:

Migration Route		Responsible Chief	
Abu Matariq	Gok-Machar	Santo Deng Nyuol	Abdel Wali Mohamed Ali (Awlad Hanana)
Abu Matariq	Makuei	John Atem Anei	Fadlalah Ali Saraj al-Din (Awlad Mohimid)
Abu Matariq	Achana	Uthum Saelh el Din	Yaqoub Umein Mohamed (Mohimid)
Abu Matariq	About	Deng Dau Deng	Dudu Mohamed Abakr (Gardanaia)
Abu Jabra	Jaac	Wal Achien Yor	Aina Terbu Bakhiet (Awlad Zeit)
Abu Jabra	Rum Aker	Deng Lual Angui	Mohamed Ennair Taha (Abu Selama)

5.3 Resources and Motivations

¹⁰¹ Mohamed Ali also made it clear he is attempting to marry a second of the Nazir’s daughters.

¹⁰² Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

¹⁰³ If the government asks him “he says he does not know anything about the peace committee. But then he will telephone me and say “keep going”, Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

¹⁰⁴ These were forced to cross via Shugog and were Abdul Wali Mohamed Ali, Mohamed Khamis Ahmed, Bekri Amaldiin – all influential elders from Awlad Hanana – and Ibrahim Assadiq Joda from Awlad Ghayed. Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, 4 April 2013

The communities pushing for peace are the most marginalized in Sudan. They receive no support or resources from the government of Sudan and self-support their involvement in the peace committees. Indeed, their greatest resource is the mutual benefit through cooperation and commitment of community members to peace. As Mohamed Ali Ghourshay put it “even if all the wealth of USA and UK came down upon us, it is for us to make the peace”.¹⁰⁵ There is a need for communications (thurayas) and transport (motorbikes).

The Rizeigat peace committee does not appear to benefit formally from trade in the way that the Misseriya do in Mayom or Warawar. The joint peace committees and the Rizeigat Chairman have requested from the Aweil North commissioner a similar system to that in effect in Aweil East (where a small stipend for each committee member is collected in the tax office of Majok Yin Thiou). The commissioner indicated that the request would be put to the Minister of Local Government but there has been no response (as of 29 March). In terms of political ambition, the chairmanship of the peace committee may become a political resource in the future. However, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay says that whilst he is well positioned to contend for the Nazirship in the future he is not interested in the job.

5.4 Communications: Although the commissioner and Governor had some direct channels of communication with the Nazir and other native administrators in East Darfur, preparation for the Gok Machar Peaceful Coexistence conference was facilitated by letter. On Monday 25th February, for example, in response to a letter of goodwill sent by the Rizeigat Nazir, Mohamed Ali Ghourshay carried a reply by motorbike confirming an invitation would shortly be made to a peaceful migration conference. Freedom of association and information in East Darfur is limited. For example, the peace committee would point blank refuse to carry and disseminate short films of the situation to their home areas because it would result in them “never coming back”.¹⁰⁶

USAID provided thuraya and motorcycles in 2012 but committee members say GoS confiscated them from Rizeigat members. Mohamed Ali Ghourshay said that a Rizeigat committee member sold at least one of the thurayas and at least one motorbike. Mohamed Ali Ghourshay, Head of the Rizeigat committee, was unable to contact East Darfur at a critical moment in the preparation of the conference due to lack of airtime and the fact he has vivacell and those in East Darfur only use Zain. USAID provided some credit.

5.5 Committee Communications

Where to	Communication and Coordination
Daein	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committee chairperson met with Governor of East Darfur and received poor reception
Abu Jabra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-conference communications with committee Chair were poor due to emphasis on Mohamed Rizeigat
Cattle Camps around Kiir River	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mohamed Ali held meeting with cattle camps at Megedi to prepare for conference (12 March).
Army/Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner arranges security for Mohamed Ali to move through SPLA areas
Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner direct communications with Mohamed Ali

¹⁰⁵ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 29th March 2013

¹⁰⁶ Interview, Mohamed Ali Ghoushay, Chair of Rizeigat Peace Committee, 1 April 2013

(county, payam)	<p>Ghourshay and Rizeigat leaders in East Darfur</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All other officials at county and payam level receive information about the Rizeigat Peace Committee through USAID.¹⁰⁷ • Executive Director (GM) had no information about vaccinations from any source (March 14) • Commissioner Aweil North donated 2 jerry cans of fuel to assist in Mohamed Ali's transport to Megedi (worth 400SSP) • Commissioner does not share his information with his community. • Direct lines to former colleagues and friends in Ad-Daein.
Dinka Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very limited. Only on necessary business interactions.

6. Joint Committees (Gok Machar, Rum Akech, Makuei, Jaac, Achana)

The overarching Joint Peace Committee at Gok Machar oversees the work of five subcommittees. This structure is outlined in the table below. As of May 3rd 2013, the Gok Machar Joint Committee had not formed due to the ongoing problems with Mohamed Rizeigat of Abu Matariq; instead its Dinka members liaised directly with Rizeigat in Makuei.

Gok Machar JPC				
Achana	Makuei	Samaha/Kiir Adem	Jaac	Rum Aker

6.1 Gok Machar

6.1.1 Composition and Authority: The Joint Peace Committee at Gok Machar is composed of 4 Dinka and 3 Rizeigat civilians. The original peace committee did not include SPLA and the current chair Michael Angui Lual Atak, known locally as 'hyena' and a 'pure citizen' (rather than military) was the original Chairperson in 1991. Last year, a USAID dissemination process led to 2 women being selected for each committee and for tripartite committees between Dinka, Rizeigat and Misseriya (2 women, 2 Rizeigat, 2 Dinka, 2 Misseriya). This year the locations have reverted to bipartite committees, excluding any women.

These represent the 4 payams of Aweil North County and 3 Localities from East Darfur (Abu Jabra, Ad Daein and Ferdous). The Chairman is Dinka and an Assistant Chairman is Rizeigat. All members are selected by their communities and approved by the commissioner.¹⁰⁸ The impression of Dinka peace committee members was that approval was at the level of Governor, however, it seems this approval is implicit from the peaceful migration conferences.

Michael Angui Lual Atak	Chair (Dinka)
Shan Ajak	Assistant Chair (Rizeigat)
Atak Ngong Athian	Secretary (Dinka)
Mohamed Ibrahim Lurup	Finance (Rizeigat)
Yei Nyang	Member (Dinka)
Gadim Bishar	Member (Rizeigat)
Bol Yor Bol	Member (Dinka)

¹⁰⁷ For example, the Executive Director of Aweil North said the only information he had received regarding the Rizeigat delegation to the Gok Machar was from AECOM, "AECOM is coordinating between the government and the Rizeigat", Interview, Executive Director, Aweil North, 11 March 2013

¹⁰⁸ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

6.1.2 Source of Authority: Although it lacks a statutory underpinning, the peace committee is part of the government. The commissioner is the point between the pastoralist groups, the community and the government in Aweil and is absolutely clear that the peace committee “gets its authority through me. I am in charge”.¹⁰⁹ In reality, issues are raised first to the commissioner and he delegates them to the peace committee if appropriate. For example, a pre-conference letter from the Nazir Madibo was brought to the commissioner before it could be dealt with by the peace committee and he approved their doing so.

6.1.3 Communication: The commissioner of Aweil North plays the central role in communication with Rizeigat leaders in advance of peace committee formation. He said that he has phone numbers for “all” the Rizeigat leaders and that long range-HF, thurayas and motorbikes have eased communication. During the period September 2012-February 2013, the “Rizeigat stopped talking to us but have recently change their mind”¹¹⁰. On February 16th, following the large meeting of Mohamed clansmen in Abu Matariq, the commissioner had spoken with the Nazir by Thuraya and by mobile phone with Omdas who attended. This communication informs his primary decision, together with the Governor, to approve the migration conference and represents de facto security negotiations. It is important to note that members of the peace committee say that during that same period, they had no information whatsoever about Rizeigat activity. On February 25th, the commissioner and Mohamed Ali Ghourshay travelled together to the border to jointly inform the Rizeigat that they could cross the river and the conference will follow shortly.

6.1.4 Authority Match

The Dinka members of the peace committee assess the authority of the Rizeigat members as “slightly below that of Omda” and dismissively as “they are just cattle keepers” though they also believe they to be selected in community meetings in their geographic cluster (Locality). In a January meeting with the Aweil State Peace Commission, the Aweil North traditional authorities reportedly said “unless their real leaders come there will be no peace this time” and this was echoed by the Executive Director of Aweil North. He encouraged AECOM to “open an office in Ad-Daein to try and make sure some influential people come – a brother or someone from the Nazir”¹¹¹. No one in Gok Machar (excepting the commissioner) appeared to know of Mohamed Ali’s connection to the Nazir. The communication of legitimacy is an imperative.

The (possibly outdated) views of the chiefs influence the rest of the community. Youth said that they knew the real leaders were not coming because they had heard the Paramount Chief say so publicly. However, the traditional authorities speak in terms of an archaic model pre-dating even the peace committee’s formation itself, to a time when the Omda would themselves migrate (pre-1980s). They recognize that those who come are not Omdas “because they fear their government”¹¹² but demand their involvement as a symbol of their commitment to peace. This criteria is too demanding – it requires a shift in relations between the two countries before the local crisis of legitimacy could be solved.

In operational terms, it is imperative that the appropriate protocol is observed. Officially, the Minister of Local Government Lino Adub says that there is no

¹⁰⁹ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

¹¹⁰ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

¹¹¹ Interview, Tobias Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, March 14th 2013

¹¹² Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

communication whatsoever between the government authorities and the Rizeigat Nazir because only community should speak with community.¹¹³ So it is that the Paramount Chief Deng Nyuol wrote the letter carried by Mohamed Ali Ghourshay which confirmed that an invitation to a conference would be forthcoming, but approval for that event could only come from the commissioner. In practice, a set of private communications establish the working parameters of the relationship to be played out by public, traditional and community communications.

The current composition of the committee in Gok Machar is a product of a time and place. Dinka members are not Traditional Authorities. This is because “Traditional Authorities may be busy with their responsibilities already so it’s convenient to have a group that can meet this need and follow up quickly”¹¹⁴ but also because Traditional Authorities did not want to be involved. Even in 1991, Rizeigat leaders had stopped coming south with their communities and chiefs “will not go to meet lower people”¹¹⁵ so they appointed representatives. The issue is accentuated by the slightly misleading equivalence of Paramount Chief to Nazir in common Dinka understanding, where it probably sits more comfortably somewhere between the Omda and Nazir levels (there are 5 executive chiefs in Northern Bahr al Ghazal and just 1 Nazir in East Darfur.

Paramount/Executive Chief (Dinka)	Nazir (Rizeigat)
Sub-chief	Omda
Camp leader	Sheikh

Nevertheless, the involvement and support of the chiefs is essential to the authority of the committee. Youth in public and private conversations present the case that in Aweil North, they are unlikely to engage in violent activity without the approval of their elders. They say that if they raid the Rizeigat then the presence of foreign cows will be quickly detected (they are noticeable by their colors and size). An investigation will be launched and chiefs will not hesitate to imprison offenders; “this is a very strong system”.¹¹⁶ Similarly, if a chief calls for a revenge attack youth “will not question it... unless it’s really ‘crazy’”.¹¹⁷

Other youth are more candid: “If a cattle camp is raided, we can’t go to the village to discuss with the chief! There is nothing to discuss. The chief cannot give you cows! If you have power – men and guns you just go!”. But this interviewee was quick to add “But we will never raid first, like you might see in Warrap”.¹¹⁸ Dinka may move out with the cattle in December and not return until June. They may not see the village or their chiefs in the entire period. They will not hear about the conference (the Executive Director of Aweil North said they were explicitly not invited¹¹⁹) and they will not receive guidelines on its implementation. Although the general consensus is that cattle camps fall under the Dhieth (used as if akin to administration) in reality the cattle leaders have a separate source of authority in the camps.

6.1.6 Resources and Authority: The expectation is that the peace center will improve the prestige of the peace committee and therefore inter-community relations as a result. In previous years, the committee would move to the locations of problems to deal with

¹¹³ Interview, Lino Adub, Minister for Local Government, 6th March 2013

¹¹⁴ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

¹¹⁵ Interview, Maluei Geng, County Clerk, Gok Machar, 21st February 2013

¹¹⁶ Interview, Maluei Geng, County Clerk, Gok Machar, 21st February 2013

¹¹⁷ Interview, Maluei Geng, County Clerk, Gok Machar, 21st February 2013

¹¹⁸ Interview, Abraham Chol and youth, Nyamllel, Aweil North, March 14th 2013

¹¹⁹ Dinka proposed participation in the Gok Machar conference was heavily orientated towards the traditional authorities. 35 chiefs from Aweil East, 5 from Aweil Centre, 10 from Aweil West, and 30 from Aweil North were invited. Youth were explicitly not invited. Interview, Tobias Dut, Executive Director, Aweil North, 14 March 2013

them. This year it is expected that the issues would be brought to the center. Resources and authority are linked in South Sudan, where politicians, executive chiefs, and committees are judged on what they bring to the area.¹²⁰

The impact of the peace center is not yet actualized but the impact of the traditional authorities center may be illustrative. The building of a traditional authorities center in Gok Machar has had a huge impact on the authority and respect by which the court is held by the community (only enhanced by the visit of the U.S. Ambassador to its opening), and upon the day-to-day management of cases: 1) It facilitates crowd management by providing a mechanism for “those who have no business to be kept away”; 2) It provides a safe store for documentation; 3) Provides for temporary detention; 4) Provides an all-weather location; 5) Empowered the authority of the court “beyond that even of the time of their grandfathers”; 6) Increased legitimacy and reduced arbitrariness by bringing Executive Chiefs together to rule as a group. As a result there has been enhanced cooperation with the government; police will guard proceedings and the court has “even been tasked to work with Military Police” on occasions.¹²¹

The Peace Center has also bolstered the authority of the peace committees. In Jaac, together with the motorbikes and Thurayas given to Rizeigat members, it has had a huge demonstration effect, commanding the respect of the Rizeigat and showing that “South Sudan that has a government now”. Unfortunately, not all these resources are being used for purpose (though this does not stop them having had the effect described here).

7. Joint Peace Committee Summary Tables

7.1 Gok Machar

The Gok Machar committee was established in 1991 by the current chair Michael Angui Lual Atak, know locally as ‘hyena’. It is a peace committee and a joint court. No written statement of mandate could be produced but there was general consensus that the peace committee “*solves issues arising from Dinka-Rizeigat (both trader and pastoralist) interactions including theft and killing*”.¹²²

The committee has not jointly formed in 2013 due to the security problems at Kiir Adem/Samaha and was described as dormant (2 April). The Awlad Hanana and Awlad Ghayed were largely unable to travel to the Gok Machar conference. Nevertheless, Dinka members have engaged in activities such as engaging with the Makuei sub-committee and returning spontaneous migrations of cattle to Rizeigat through Makuei.

History	<p>The committee was established in 1991 during the time 4 star Major Simon Wol Mawien was SPLA (Garang) commissioner of Aweil West county. The Rizeigat were suffering a severe food shortage and started bringing more cows to sell for sorghum. The original market was in Maniel in Aweil West (now Aweil North) and a second market was later shortly after at Manger Ater.</p> <p>The market in Gok Machar is actually “just an ‘ordinary market’”¹²³. Traders come from different locations come for business, including Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Habbaniya, Misseriya and Rizeigat). The peace committee deals solely with relationship with Rizeigat.</p>
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¹²¹ Interviews with Simon Garang Diang, Paramount Chief, Aweil West; Clerk Paul Anyuon Akech; Deng Dau Deng, Deputy Chief, Malual Centre Payam; Santo Deng Nyoul, Paramount Chief, Malual North Payam and Chairman of TAC, 21st February 2013.

¹²² Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

¹²³ Interview, Maluei Geng, County Clerk, Gok Machar, 21st February 2013

Mandate	No written statement but general consensus the peace committee: 1) To establish and manage peace between communities 2) "To solve issues arising from Dinka-Rizeigat (both trader and pastoralist) interactions including theft and killing". ¹²⁴ The limit is any issue involving the Government of Sudan or South Sudan (recent fighting not included).								
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Dinka • 3 Rizeigat 								
Core Values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace and benefit to the community 								
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To disseminate peace. • To function as a joint court. • To respond quickly. • To be mobile. • All crimes to be reported to the peace committee 								
Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to committee members: "the court is mandated and supported by the communities and empowered by the county authorities".¹²⁵ • According to the commissioner: "the court gains its authority from me".¹²⁶ • Court can request police to assist in implementation of its decisions. • Court can pronounce jail sentences. 								
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No contact between Rizeigat and Dinka members since a Rizeigat visit in September 2012 • No Thuraya • No motorbike • Contact informs AECOM of developments relating to the JPC 								
Coordination Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good coordination with Gok Machar Youth Committee who attend Joint Peace Committee meetings and request assistance and approval before engaging Rizeigat in activities (such as a Dinka-Rizeigat football match held in 2008).¹²⁷ • If case is too difficult for peace committee it is passed back to the commissioner. 								
Systems	UN Civil Affairs obtains its information from peace committee members and for dissemination of information to them. ¹²⁸								
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No salaries or compensation. Only court fees. • Transport difficulties • No means to feed or host visitors • Peace center 								
Recent Cases	<table border="0"> <thead> <tr> <th><i>Date</i></th> <th><i>Case</i></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>April 2012</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theft of 7 Rizeigat cattle by Dinka. • Cattle returned. </td> </tr> <tr> <td>May 2012</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Murder of Dinka man. • The payment of 41 cows. • Dinka frustrated that criminal was not also imprisoned. </td> </tr> <tr> <td>May 2012</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Murder of Dinka during <i>Rushash/Tadali</i> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Case</i>	April 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theft of 7 Rizeigat cattle by Dinka. • Cattle returned. 	May 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Murder of Dinka man. • The payment of 41 cows. • Dinka frustrated that criminal was not also imprisoned. 	May 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Murder of Dinka during <i>Rushash/Tadali</i>
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7.2 Jaac – Joint Sub-Committee

Community peace was made in 1991 and has been sustained continually at Jaac.¹²⁹ Jaac was also the first place to open a border crossing point in 2012, followed by Rum Aker and then Kiir Adem/Samaha.

¹²⁴ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

¹²⁵ Michael Angui Lual Atak, Peace Committee Chair; Paul Matong Gak, Peace Committee Member; Peter Mabel Deng, Youth Committee Finance; Aweil North Joint Peace Committee, 21st February 2013.

¹²⁶ Interview, Kuol Athuai, County Commissioner, Aweil North, 21st February 2013

¹²⁷ The Dinka youth won the game 2:0.

¹²⁸ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

¹²⁹ The Rizeigat Chair was keen to stress the contrast with an off-and-on peace in Warawar. Interview, Hassan Al Tire Hamdoun, Rizeigat Jaac Joint Peace Committee Chair, 30th March 2013

History	The joint peace committee has a long history but was reorganized and reconstituted in 2004.
Given Mandate	To solve issues between Rizeigat and Dinka relating to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cattle (water, grazing, animal health, crop damage, theft, raiding) • Trade (petty disputes and cross border deals) • Killing
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Rizeigat (Sultans)¹³⁰ from Jaac Rizeigat Committee of 7. All cattle keepers (Baggara). • 4 Dinka (including Paramount Chief; 1 from each boma in Jaac)
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Peace Committee – makes peace and disseminates it • Joint Court • To publicly voice and demonstrate brotherhood, especially in times of difficulty
Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Joint Peace Committee travels to areas of need as required and reports to the county Joint Peace Committee as required. There are no sub-peace committees in the bomas.
Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Peace Committee members are “not part of Local Government but are selected by the government”¹³¹ Ultimately, their activity is possible because it has the approval of the Governor. • The traditional leaders of Rizeigat are known, respected and in contact (even remotely). The Dinka Chair is the Paramount Chief of the area and is known to the Rizeigat Nazir. • No role for Joint Peace Committee in tax system. Tax is collected by a joint committee of payam and county Ministry of Finance officials.
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No phone network • Primary means of communication is letter. • Word of mouth. 4 hours walk to cattle camps. • Leaders of Rizeigat are known and remain in communication (Omda Yahyah Sidiq (Gardania), Hashim Zain al Bal (Gardania), Thom Adam (Awlad Zeit). • The payam administrator travels to Gok Machar on a weekly basis and brings news and instructions. • Communication with other payams is by H-F radio only. • Heard of the Gok Machar conference by radio. • Did not receive copies of the resolutions from the conference (March 30)
Coordination Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local government supports the Joint Peace Committee and provides police as required. • Local government works closely with the Joint Peace Committee on allocating grazing land. • Rizeigat must ensure judgments are implemented on the other side.
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bolstered by establishment of peace center in Gok Machar; require similar office – “we can’t discuss key issues with 50 people observing every meeting”¹³² • No problem but “if there is a big fire we may not be able to put it out without water”: need communications and transport. • “All of us we have no account in the bank”¹³³ • Motorbike and Thuraya provided last year was sold by ‘Chien’ a Rizeigat member of the Peace Committee. He never returned.¹³⁴
Operating Environment/Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some aspects of the situation simply “out of our hands” • December 26th fighting at Kiir Adem led to influx of 1333 people to Jaac.¹³⁵ • Concern for returnees safe passage to Jaac • Water is major challenge.¹³⁶ Last year, two Dinka were killed at a water point at About. IOM is providing one water point at Warei Chei for Rizeigat and one in Jaac for host community but solar pumps do not work. IOM also providing a market shed for Rizeigat and local government has approved land. PPF, ARC, Concern, NRC, WFP, Red

¹³⁰ A community of Rizeigat live permanently at Jaac. One [Dudu] has married two Dinka women.

¹³¹ Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013

¹³² Indeed, when this statement was made, a very large group made it impossible to have an interesting discussion that went beyond publicly acceptable comments, Jaac, 30th March 2013

¹³³ Interview, Chief Anei Garang, Member Joint Peace Committee, Jaac, 30th March 2013

¹³⁴ Interview, group discussion, Jaac joint peace committee, 30th March 2013

¹³⁵ Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013a

¹³⁶ According to local chiefs Jaac received no development since 1983 and there is a sense of underdevelopment that unites the Rizeigat and Dinka. One chief hoped that the recent interest of NGOs may lead to improvements: “When God handed out the genetalia, he gave to every animal but one. At the end he gathered all that was left and gave it to that donkey”, Chief Anei Garang, Member Joint Peace Committee, Jaac, 30th March 2013

	<p>Cross all providing various, water, health and nutrition). Rizeigat cows at War Chenei but the 'donkey' is broken, a major setback for cattle.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water is major limiting factor on herd growth.
Example Cases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The peace is currently strong because in May 2012, the joint peace committee resolved a key case. Two members of Dinka had been killed by members of the Gardanaia house who also stole their guns. The joint peace committee sent delegates to the Gardanaia Omdas. The victim's family was then escorted by a member of the committee (present at the discussion) to collect the diyas and guns at the river. The peace committee members are clear to stress the arrangement was sanctioned by the Governor and commissioner. • February 2013, 165 returnee households were assisted to cross the border by Rizeigat (75 households originally from Jaac area).¹³⁷ • 2011-2012 dry season: 23 cattle stolen from Dinka. JPC identified and returned the cattle.



Rizeigat members of the Joint Sub-Committee in in Rum Aker with Peter Jok from SMARF

7.3 Rum Aker – Joint Sub-Committee

History	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long history but re-established in 2004. A paper document establishing the Joint Sub-Committee was made on 25th February 2013. This was copied to the Payam Administrator, Military CPR Brigade, Police Inspector for Rum Aker Payam.
Given Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To promote peaceful coexistence • To implement all the resolutions of the Gok Machar conference
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 Rizeigat members • 4 Dinka members (from four Dinka clans "bordering the Rizeigat": Wun Anei, Maqueth, Apouth, Kunjuck) • Rizeigat are all from Abu Selama (this is the historical location for this group) and all are youth. All are pastoralists and 1 trader not with cows. However, all are involved in petty trade.
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No mobile phone network • Cows are 4 hours walk north (40 cattle camps around Jaac, Adol and Mgangdo)
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send messages by foot to cattle camps to come for vaccination
Competition	
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None

¹³⁷Interview, Peter Madul Atend, Jaac Payam Administrator, Jaac, 22nd February 2013

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occasional access to a motorbike
Operating Environment/Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack transport for communication with cattle camps Harassment of Rizeigat on entering towns. Request I.D cards (MoLG cancelled their provision last year at the last minute – possibly due to concern it could lead to claims for resources/salaries. Lack of water in Rum Aker. Hand pumps have dried up. Rizeigat come to market, sell goods and leave due to lack of water. Limited interaction results. Lack of water: The River Kiir/Bahr al Arab is drying up where the cattle camps are. Rizeigat have no shelters in the market and sell under trees. Rain would damage their goods.
Example Cases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Day to day disagreements resolved

7.4 Makuei – Joint Sub-Committee

Given Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manage relations between Rizeigat and Dinka. Currently 14 cattle camps with more expected (2 April)
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 Dinka 5 Rizeigat (led by Fadlalla. 1 from each Khashm al Bayt of Mohamed Rizeigat) Selected by meetings with families and nominated to Mohamed Ali Ghourshay.
Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sub-committee to Gok Machar 14 Cattle camp leaders¹³⁸ sit to discuss issues before the JPC delegates raise it at the joint committee.
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Makuei market day is Tuesday (Kouro is another market 2 hours west of Achana). This is good day for public announcements. Fadlalla brought photocopies of the Gok Machar back to his community and circulated them Fadlalla read the resolutions and discussed them with all Rizeigat at Makuei [40 or so Rizeigat at meeting said so] Poor communication with host officials in Makuei. The first meeting with local payam administrator was due to the consultant’s visit and the “fact we [payam administrator, official of SMARF and consultant visited in the bush makes the peace certain”]¹³⁹. USAID installed radio in Makuei No communication is possible with Mohamed Ali Ghourshay¹⁴⁰
Operating Environment/Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Host community respects the order to follow the peace. Militarized area. Community carry arms.

Achana – Joint sub-committee

People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10 member Dinka committee in Achana for county (government) Joint sub-committees in each payam with 7 Dinka members and combined with local Rizeigat who use the market. Chairperson at county is Boma Mangok Angara Sub-committee focal points can be traders (e.g. Aquen Aquen in Marial Baai), youth committee chairperson (e.g. Karlo Bak, in Achana), or officials (e.g. Assistant Payam Administrator Abraham Garang, also in Marial Baai). 												
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payams and Network <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Payam</th> <th>Network</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Achana</td> <td>X</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nyibole</td> <td>X</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mayen Akuong Riel</td> <td>X</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Shelko</td> <td>X</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Marial Baai</td> <td>√</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Payam	Network	Achana	X	Nyibole	X	Mayen Akuong Riel	X	Shelko	X	Marial Baai	√
Payam	Network												
Achana	X												
Nyibole	X												
Mayen Akuong Riel	X												
Shelko	X												
Marial Baai	√												

¹³⁸ This list represents the Rizeigat peace committee in this area. The Chairman held a paper list of names of the leaders of each camp. These were: Anei Mahadi Adin, Ahmed Mahdi Adin, Abraham Tharbo, Pachalla Ali Saracadin, Mohamed Asupi Mohamed, Rahama Mhamed Adam, Mahamid Kabat Asapanabi, Ahmed Banani Adam, Anei Jema Ahdan Jali, Padhalla Ali Saracrad, Gibril Dut Wadi, Abdalla Amid Banana (head chief), Thedek Omer, Abarham Al Padhel.

¹³⁹ Group discussion, Moins, Makuei, April 2 2013

¹⁴⁰ The consultant’s vehicle ferried messages between the two about an issue that was festering (the promised reimbursement by Mohamed Ali to Fadlalla of some several thousand pounds which Fadlalla had put up front for transport to Gok Machar).

	Nyamlell HQ	X
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COUNTY CONTEXT 2: AWEIL EAST/MISSERIYA FAYAREEN

1. Overarching Structures: Misseriya Fayareen

The Misseriya live in western Kordofan and part of western Nuba, in central Darfur and in Chad. The various Misseriya groups acknowledge common ancestry but their geographic divisions can now be considered as distinct tribal units. In West Kordofan the Misseriya are divided into Misseriya Zuruq (the dark ones) and Misseriya Humr (the red ones) according to nicknames lost in time. Although traditionally the Humr and Zuruq shared an overarching customary administration with an Amir from Humr and his deputy from Zuruq, this arrangement now carries limited import. The Misseriya have become increasingly segmentary, with most sub-tribes now led by their own Amir and only expressing a loose allegiance, if at all, towards the overarching office of Misseriya Amir held by the Amir of Awlad Kamil.¹⁴¹ Indeed, the *gabilla* or 'tribe' – the primary social and economic organisation – for Misseriya Ajaira is now what was previously a 'sub-tribal' level of Awlad Omran/Fayareen. The strongest identification of social belonging is even lower - at the level of *khashm al bayt*, at which compensation arrangements are made. The Humr are further divided into Ajaira and Fallaita. The former primarily migrate from Meiram, Muglad and Debab into Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Abyei and Unity State. The latter move from Al Fula and Keilak, primarily into Pariang County of Unity State. The overarching tribal structure of the Misseriya and their traditional migration routes are outlined in the table below. The primary sub-tribes that migrated into the study area in 2012-2013 are shaded in grey and form the focus of this inquiry.

Misseriya							
Zuruq 142	Humr						
↓	Fallaita	Ajaira					
7 KaB	↓	↓					
	Metanin Surur Ziyud Gubarat Salamat	Fadliya (HQ at Debab)	Fayareen (HQ at Meiram)	Omran (HQ at Debab)		Kamil (HQ at Muglad)	Mezagna (HQ at Muglad)
		↓	↓	↓		↓	↓
		8 KaB.	↙	↘	↙	↘	14 KaB
			Eissa	Aiman	'Addal	Menama	
			↓	↓	↓	↓	
			Hamra	Am Hani	Um Hamat	Um Jodd	
			Sedak	Awana	Um Gordaya	Rahama	
			Na'im	Ogula	Himeid	Dar Zebeli	
			Alanta	Kimeil	Ingaya	Shoroug	
					Nawazha	Dar Banat	
					Samaheen	Dar Habibella	

Misseriya Fayareen is one tribe within the Misseriya Ajaira. They say that their geographical base is Meiram but that they are not 'Meirami'; social organisation not

¹⁴¹ For example, with the appointment of a Mezagna Amir post-CPA, all the Ajaira sub-tribes except Fadliya now possess their own Amir. Fadliya shares an Amir with Awlad Omran.

¹⁴² The difference between the Zuruq and Humr was described by Misseriya as akin to that between Nuer and Dinka. Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

place still defines social 'belonging'. Similar sentiments were expressed by Awlad Kamil (as 'from' Siteib and Muglad) and Awlad Omran (as 'from' Debab'). The Fayareen are traditionally known for producing religious scholars but is no longer a distinctive characteristic of the group. The Fayareen is composed of two sections, Eissa (Left) and Aiman (Right). Aiman is considerably the larger of the two sections. Each section is composed of five Khashm al Biyut. All are Sufi Muslim.

1.1 Identity: The tribe or gabilla – a designation of primary social organisation - is seen by Fayareen involved in the peace committee as 'Fayareen', rather than 'Misseriya Humr' or 'Ajaira', or 'Misseriya as a whole'. Twenty years ago, an Amir called Babu Nimr was the acknowledged head of all Misseriya, but his son Mukhtar Babu is not viewed as such among the Fayareen today. The predominance of Babu Nimr is seen as having been orchestrated by the British, who empowered him and "even knighted him as Sir Babu Nimr".¹⁴³ Nevertheless, Siteib and Meraim are seen as places for both Awlad Kamil and Fayareen where the two groups sit together and enjoy a special relationship.¹⁴⁴

The historical attachment of all Baggara peoples to a common forefather (as Awlad Juneid), and of Hawazma, Misseriya and Rizeigat to the son of Al Juneid 'Attia' (as Awlad Attia) is not strongly felt by Misseriya Fayareen. These links are either deemed "myth", and "legend" or simply "are over".¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, interviewees did have some associations as Awlad Attia and it is not impossible that shared ancestries and histories (in particular the legendary mobilization of all Awlad Attia to defend an injustice experienced by a Rizeigat camel herder at the hands of a Chadian King in Darfur) may not be invoked one day as a tool for political mobilization.

Each khashm al Bayt has a history of its own; its own culture, traditions and reputation. For example, an Am Hani is traditionally viewed as being a generous, giving person. The differences between Khashm al Biyut are now slight, but each reportedly maintains a distinctive historical flavor. The Khashm al Bayt or 'House' is the key unit of social organisation around which reciprocal responsibilities are arranged, principally the payment of Diya, which is only paid by members of the Khashm al Bayt of the convicted, "if Ogula kill, then Ogula will pay diya. If Kimiel kill, only Kimeil will pay".¹⁴⁶ As one member said: "This [Khashm al Bayt/House] is where you go when you need help or protection. My people will help me even if I get a problem in the South, even if they did not come here. It doesn't matter". It is also the association that evokes most pride: "you can insult Fayareen but not my Khashm al Bayt".¹⁴⁷ Below the level of Khashm al Bayt is that of Surra (literally placenta), meaning extended family.¹⁴⁸

1.2 Relations with neighbors:

- Fairly unified Misseriya Ajaira.
- Relations between Fayareen and Rizeigat over land claims to Shegedi remain tense.
- The conflict between Awlad Heiban (Misseriya Zuruq) and Awlad Surur (Fellaita) over land which would benefit from an oil pipeline and a battle for leadership – both groups wanted an Omda – is now broadly resolved.

¹⁴³ Various Misseriya members of Misseriya Peace Committee. These quotes are taken from an interview with Mohamexd Hamid Mohamed, on 6th March 2013

¹⁴⁴ Mohamed Kashaba, Trader, Awlad Kamil, Dar Motor, Warawar, 9th March

¹⁴⁵ Various Misseriya members of Misseriya Peace Committee. These quotes are taken from an interview with Mohamexd Hamid Mohamed, on 6th March 2013

¹⁴⁶ Grop discussion Misseriya herders, Majak Wuoi, 1 April 2013

¹⁴⁷ Group discussion with members of Misseriya Peace Committee, vehicle ride Majok-Warawar, on 6th March 2013

¹⁴⁸ It is also the name given to the small number of cows, commonly 1 or 2, given to a child at birth.

1.3 Native Administration and organisation: The Fayareen have 1 Amir and 8 omdas (Ogula, Kimeil and Eissa section have 2 each). In addition there is 1 Sheikh for each Surra or collection of Surras. Roughly 7 Sheikhs will mandate a good case to have an Omda.

The Amir can call a tribal gathering of all Fayareen, ad hoc meetings named after the specific issues they address and he is head of the Native Administration for the tribe. The Amir of Fayareen is elected through a tribal gathering and the Acting Amir is currently from the Eissa branch. Every member of the tribe has the right to put himself forward for election. Purists would say it is the Sheikhs who should choose the Amir but in practice the delegates encompass a broader range of actors. A deliberative process is followed until consensus falls on one candidate. A leadership contest is underway following the recent death of Amir Musalem Abugadim, which ended 105 years of Ogula Amirates (Musalem's rule of 70 years and his father's of 35). Six of the eight Fayareen omdas have selected Mohowier from Awlad Kimeil to become Amir. The two Ogula Omdas object in favor of Musalem's son. The position of local government in Meiram is that whatever the community decides will be accepted, but that the decision must be unified, reflecting the deliberative traditions of the nomadic society.

The selection of Omdas is similarly deliberative and community based. Every member of the gabilla has a right to put himself forward publicly in front of the community. The decision is not made by an election, though it is called an election. The meeting as a whole elects the person and the decision is seen and 'felt' at the meeting. The Government will accept the nomination and according to Misseriya interviewed for this report will never place candidates into the process (note that the same Misseriya who said this are highly critical of the government). However, following the selection of a community representative at any level, the government registers them and maintains the right to strike them off. This is why "most end up being controlled by the government".¹⁴⁹ Omdas and government officials sit in a different balance between community and government. In order to maintain any influence or resources they must retain their political position.

1.4 Fariq and Azaba: Fariqs are camps composed of a collection of families who migrate together. Among Misseriya Fayareen, these can be composed from a mixture of families from different Khashm al Baiyut and the composition may change in any given year. Fariqs traditionally move around every two weeks. Each camp has a leader (*Raas al Fariq*). Each fariq contains a court where the elders sit (or the Omda if he is present). If problems cannot be resolved within the camp they may be referred to the Omda. Some fariqs may hire a Faki to come and spend time in the community, offering a number of children Islamic teachings. A group of fariqs will nominate a small committee to act on its behalf and resolve issues with neighbors, this group can call a group meeting of Fariqs; food and water is prepared and the community is invited to discuss an issue.

Cattle camps comprised of only men are called Azaba and typically may contain 3 or 4 people, including young boys, as well as the cattle, commonly 200-300 cows. They also have a camp leader, also called Rais al Fariq, generally an elder. All the Misseriya cattle camps south of the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab are Azaba. By April 2013, there were just 8 such camps south of River Kiir/Bahr al Arab east of the railway line, 3 Awlad Kimeil, 1 Awlad Ogula and 3 Awlad Kamil. At least one of the camps was composed of men from both Awlad Kamil and Awlad Kimeil. And at least one camp included a Dinka herdsman who had spent 10 years working with the Misseriya family, was paid in cows and

¹⁴⁹ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain and Sultan Deng Luol, Warawar, March 4th 2013

appeared confident and content. When the rains come, the men return to their fariqs and spend a period touring family members and relatives.

The camp leader is in control of decisions relating to the herd; if camp members do not agree with decisions relating to their cows and the issue cannot be resolved, they would ultimately have to leave the camp. The principle is that nobody can force you to do anything with your cows that you don't want to do, be that government, cattle camp leader of peace committee - "the peace committee cannot tell us what to do with our cattle, not at all! Each is in control of his property and we decide on our own if we will move south or not".¹⁵⁰ At the end of the day, "real pastoralists only know ourselves, not the peace committee, not the government".¹⁵¹ This hints at how far social segmentation has progressed.



Two Misseriya Fayareen south of Majak Wuoi, Aweil East

Justice is administered by the camp court, by an ad-hoc Ajaweed council or by Native Administration. Enforcement is through a system of warnings and fines outlined in traditional customary law – the Aourf.¹⁵² Fines can be temporarily taken and returned subject to good behavior. In the case of a killing, the elders immediately visit the location and the perpetrator and their family members are removed from the community to live far from the victims. After perhaps a year, subject to compensation payment, the families will meet, shake hands and continue with restored relations. Only in very extreme cases may a person go to prison. This differs from the treatment of murderers by South Sudanese communities, leading to challenges in the implementation of inter-community resolutions governing compensation and punishment for killings.

¹⁵⁰ Ali Sharif, Misseriya Herder, Majak Wuoi, 30th March 2013

¹⁵¹ Ali Sharif, Misseriya Herder, Majak Wuoi, 30th March 2013

¹⁵² Aourf is the customary law and the source of even official court law. This is the law implemented by the Amir, Omdas and Sheikhs and deeply respected.

Communication is mostly done through word of mouth: “there is no news unless some one comes to meet us”.¹⁵³ The Awlad Kimeil chief delegate on the Misseriya Peace Committee, Abdelrahman Abdalla, had visited the Awlad Kimeil camps on a number of occasions and informed them that there was peace, but did not appear to impart any more detailed information. The most important information source about the local situation is regular contact with traders carrying news from Meiram and Majok Yin Thiou. Fariqs and Azaba will also usually contain a SW/FM radio but this is not always the case.¹⁵⁴ For example, in one of the eight Azaba mentioned above, the single radio had been sent back to Meiram for repair. Two of the eight camps had a working mobile phone. The Sudani mobile network covers the entire territory of Meiram -> Kirkou Bridge over River Kiir/Bahr al Arab at Majak Wuoi. One Misseriya herder reported being able to receive Sudani network even south of the river, if he climbed a tree.¹⁵⁵ On occasions, members of the fariq will visit Meiram or another permanent settlement and access satellite television programs.

1.5 Power of Native Administration: The politicization of the Native Administration is a double-edged sword for the Government of Sudan. It both strengthens communities to fight its wars but also empowers them in their discontent. Weapons were disseminated to communities via the Native Administration and remain under community control. This strengthens the Native Administration’s hand vis a vis the commissioner in local negotiations. Large weapons are kept out of sight in the forest and small arms are hidden, buried in the bush. The community also possesses other weapons captured in active conflict, meaning “the Misseriya with them also know how to fight”. Misseriya committee members in Wawawar said that the Livestock Taxation issue is illustrative of local power relations. The Government of Sudan’s tax system provides for a tax on livestock by number rather than people (the tax is what the Misseriya call a Digniya, ‘small beard’). The cattle-owning Misseriya Fayareen have simply refused to pay the tax in recent years arguing that they do not benefit from it. The government, they say, is unwilling to quarrel because of the armed strength of the baggara/cattle Misseriya. The same Misseriya claim that Zakat is paid on herds over 30 cows as “this is from religion”. At the same time, the picture was clearly given that although Native Administration do attempt to pressure the government, for example, for better services, their dependence on government for position and resources undermines their attempts.

1.6 Historical relations and perception of south: Fayareen have unique interests that draw them to negotiate cooperative agreements with the South. They also have the most to lose from a border war: 1) trade; 2) pasture; 3) historical relations; 4) their people – “they are the real border people”.¹⁵⁶

Interaction between Fayareen and Dinka Malual/Abiem has a long history. Sultan Deng Luol, Chair of the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar, points out that, just as Misseriya migrate southwards in dry season, in his youth the Dinka would take their cattle further north than Meiram to avoid mosquitoes and flies in the rainy season. This built a sense of neighborliness that is not present between the Dinka Malwal and other Misseriya branches.¹⁵⁷

1.7 Indications of Attitudes to National Politics: Misseriya are present in national politics such as Doctor Besheri (currently Minister for Science and Communications and a

¹⁵³ Ali Sharif, Misseriya Herder, Majak Wuoi, 30th March

¹⁵⁵ Ali Sharif, Misseriya Herder, Majak Wuoi, 30th March 2013

¹⁵⁶ Dinka Youth, tea shop, Warawar, 9th March 2013

¹⁵⁷ Interview, Sultan Deng Luol, Chair, Joint Peace Committee, Warawar, 5th March 2013

former Deputy Governor of South Kordofan). According to peace committee members such national representatives have been fully co-opted to the government's agenda, which is "the extraction of resources from the regions to their positions". Misseriya are in a strong position to bargain because they are well armed and can present themselves as 'king-makers' (disarmament is currently not possible despite reports that Governor Haroun has tried through early 2013) but they currently lack leadership and parts of the Ajaira rely on the NCP to remain tough on Abyei.

President Beshir came to power enjoying the near full support of Misseriya communities (he had been commander in Mayom with the Misseriya). However, since 2005 the political landscape of Sudan has changed for Misseriya and this support is wavering. The politics of the Secretary General of the Misseriya Peace Committee Gubarra Nourrain reflects this change. For 20 years, he was a Chairman of the NCP committee for Meiram without promotion or reward, "they don't want people who demand their rights – just yes men". In 2010, he resigned his position and voted for Abdel Aziz al Hilu in the gubernatorial election for South Kordofan.

His reasons are those of disillusioned Islamists across the country. The 24 years since the Al-Ingaz regime took power have seen little development in Dar Misseriya; Oil money due to South Kordofan according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement disappeared without reaching the region; and the money was spent on wars from which Misseriya have paid the full price and received nothing in return. Less in-depth conversations with Misseriya traders and other Misseriya Peace Committee members suggest that his views, which may be more 'revolutionary' than average, are broadly held. Support for President Beshir was clearly dwindling among those in South Sudan during the study period. Gubarra says that the majority of Misseriya Amirs and Omdas hold similar views but that they keep silent to maintain their positions for the time being. His analysis is that "everybody is now united in one thing... not wanting Beshir" – or any Denagla and Shagiya alternatives. For Gubarra the wider process also reflects the tradition of national political change in the country – "like when Nimeiri left for a visit to Egypt and the next day the whole country was in the street.... [now] the whole Misseriya could turn".

The Misseriya formed a bedrock for the National Umma Party since its foundation in 1944 up to the mid-late 1980s, when it abandoned it in droves in favour of the National Islamic Front and its Al-Ingaz Revolution. No other traditional party has any traction with them. Misseriya interviewees said that whoever "comes next" must be a fresh face, none of the old guard; and secondly he must come from the Islamic Movement, even more so now that Sudan is more solidly a country of Muslims. This second criterion, expressed by Gubarra Nourrain and other Misseriya Peace Committee members – moderate, reformist, 'modern' Misseriya – can perhaps be taken as a fundamental principle for the more conservative at home. Other young former fighters are angry about the lack of compensation for their great loss, or any recognition or reward for their services. The government of Sudan has responded to this anger and frustration with a plan to reinstate West Kordofan state, but for staunch opponents such as Gubarra, this is just seen as "political work, division of the state is just to make it easier for the central government to control the oil and gold money. We don't want to be divided any more".¹⁵⁸

But with the lack of available political alternatives, opposition to President Beshir is producing strange bedfellows; disillusioned Islamists and frustrated former militia are turning to JEM and SPLM-N in the absence of any emerging Misseriya opposition

¹⁵⁸ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February

leader.¹⁵⁹ Gubarra for example, supports both what he calls Harakat as-Shemaliya (the opposition forces including SPLM-N, JEM and others) and the Harakat al-Islamiya, the Islamic Movement itself, from which he requires the new leader to emerge. Contrast this comment with that of a group of Darfurian traders in the market on the same day who agreed that “everyone wants change, that it must be a new person, but that he must be an Almaniya [secular] person”.¹⁶⁰ However, in the intermediate period, alliances that challenge the hegemony of the current governor are of priority to leaders like Gubarra – the question of what comes next is on hold.

At the same time, a mixed group of Awlad Omran and Awlad Kamil traders in Warawar market made the following assessment of Misseriya Humr relationship with the Government of Sudan.

Fayareen	Strongly with the Government of Sudan
Awlad Kamil	Divided
Fadliya	Divided
Awlad Omran	Strongly against the Government of Sudan
Mezagna	Divided

It is difficult to evaluate these perceptions beyond stating that the conversation was earnest, engaged and there seemed little doubt that the interviewees believed what they said. Further in favour, the pattern for Awlad Omran and Awlad Kamil appears to reinforce known facts at least to some degree. The description of Fayareen as “strongly with the Government of Sudan” is of most interest but is most difficult to evaluate. This could be skewed by the disproportionate numbers of Fayareen that would likely play a role in security forces along this section of the border; by the fact that interviewees were not from Fayareen; and by the presence of Fayareen ‘criminals’ and government militia along the road through their territory. At the same time, the organisers of the Fayareen peace committee clearly faced a huge challenge in recruiting members willing to attend the peace conference in Wanyjok; the Government of Sudan has relatively recently moved in favour of Fayareen in clashes with Rizeigat in 2008 and 2009; the Fayareen are traditionally a conservative group – supplying religious scholars to the Misseriya; and the territorial claims of the Government of Sudan on Mile 14 are perhaps more legitimate than its other demands along the Sudan-South Sudan border. These points may make alignment with the government relatively attractive.

1.8 Socio-economic Development

Development: Discontent is growing along with the population’s appetite for social development and peace. Demonstrations against the government are increasingly common in Dar Misseriya and Meiram. On February 28th, for example, during the Wanyjok conference, there was a demonstration by parents and teachers of youth arrested previously. The issue of the 19 youth arrested on the Governor’s visit for holding placards both exemplifies frustrations and exacerbates them. The brother of previous Peace Committee member Adam Dukshum is among the number. Education and opportunities for youth are not present and there are no services from Muglad to Majok Yin Thiou.¹⁶¹ A Misseriya cattle keeper interviewed in Majak Wuoi commented, “if my children were to live this life I live then I will not get married, and all of us feel like this”.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ The Misseriya lack a leader to either mobilize and win resources for a military alliance or articulate grievances and win gains politically. The Rizeigat also lack that military leader – though Hemeti from North Darfur Mahariya could count as a threat – but they have both Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha and the Nazir; two strong political leaders.

¹⁶⁰ Interviews, Darfurian traders, Warawar, 3 March 2013

¹⁶¹ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February

¹⁶² Interview, Ali Sharif, Misseriya pastoralist, Majok Yin Thiou, 1 April 2013

Cultural: Cultural and socio-economic change is taking place in Fayareen society at different speeds among different sections. Nomadic communities relying on cattle tend to be more conservative and traditional. Townspeople tend to be open to more progressive and ‘modern’ ideas yet may still own some cattle and be connected to their family. Nomadic people can read the stars,¹⁶³ townspeople the newspapers. The Misseriya are no longer ‘Baggara’. The word now refers to a sub-section of society who still live a fairly traditional, nomadic way of life, and have, to some extent different authority structures. Religious life remains staunchly guided by Sufi faith but SarSunna (Wahabbists) are beginning to develop roots among the population.¹⁶⁴

Education: Attitudes to education among Misseriya are traditionally dismissive. This conservative view is still common among the more nomadic Misseriya. However, growing interest in education has enchanted even traditional pastoralists like Misseriya Chairperson Al-Rashid Hamid, who has supported his son through university to become an engineer. Gubarra Nourrain (a townspeople) has a daughter in the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Fula (traditionally, women are ‘for the house’ but attitudes to female education are beginning to shift). There is a growing recognition about Misseriya that the role of education is central to building a stronger future. The idea is not to move away from cattle keeping but to diversify with “one brother can go to university and one can take the cattle”.

Intra-Misseriya Conflict: Conflict between Misseriya is relatively common. Three years ago a battle took place between Ogula family members in which many were killed using the machinery of war. The cause was a case of adultery involving members of the family. Adultery is a most inflammatory crime in Misseriya culture; unless the case reaches court quickly, it will be quickly taken into private hands.

1.9 Information sources - Misseriya

Committee Delegates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dissemination of information, for example, of the conference resolutions, is done by word of mouth and at mosques during Friday prayers in Meiram. As of mid-April 2013 only basic information was known by cattle keepers. 				
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Omdas Government visits 				
Word of mouth along road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most information known by cattle keepers was received ad hoc in gossip along the road from Meiram to Majok Yin Thiou. 				
Mobile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good Zain in Meiram and Sudani network now reaches right down to the bridge at Majak Wuoi. There is no network at Majok Yin Thiou. Youth traders increasingly share audio and video increasingly by Bluetooth. Videos are also shared via VCD. 				
Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya Fayareen have radios in their homes, fariqs and cattle camps. The most popular time for listening is 10pm at night but also 6am and 4pm. Cattle herders had not heard about the peace through the radio. <table border="1" data-bbox="427 1783 1353 1901"> <thead> <tr> <th>Radio</th> <th>Comments</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Radio Omdurman</td> <td>6.45pm: Radio al Din (religious program) 7.55pm: Nour ad-Dharab (religious program) hosted by Sheikh Mohamed al Hassan</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Radio	Comments	Radio Omdurman	6.45pm: Radio al Din (religious program) 7.55pm: Nour ad-Dharab (religious program) hosted by Sheikh Mohamed al Hassan
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¹⁶³ For example, some traders either did not know, or searched hard for the location of the constellation known locally as ‘Thuraya’ in the night sky, which has value as an indicator of the Rushash (the Dinka Malual also use the same constellation for the same purpose). Cattle keepers could immediately locate it at any moment.

¹⁶⁴ There groups oppose Sufi traditions such as Subha (prayer beads) or Rahama (food and drink at funerals).

		10pm: People and Events (society and community news)
	Tamazuj	Morning news – Trusted (especially youth)
	Dabanga	News – especially youth
	Miraya FM	News
	Shuruq (radio and TV)	News – Semi-Trusted
	London (BBC)	News – Trusted
	War Baai	Not aware of this station (Dinka language)
Satellite TV	In Meiram, SudanTV, As-Shuruq, Gezira, Blue Nile TV In Warawar traders may gather around a TV	

2. The Individual Choice

Each individual simply assesses his personal cost-benefit equation (for example, risk of imprisonment v. risk of cattle due to lack of grazing and water).¹⁶⁵ As a Misseriya trader said on 8th March, his Omdas and Amir are not interested in stopping trade. They just say turn a blind eye. The one question on which the decision was based was “do I need to feed my children and look after my mother?” A Dinka youth in Warawar who has spent time with Misseriya summed up the decision eloquently: “They come here when Khartoum says we have no budget for you – go and find it in the south by peace or war”. Misseriya Fellaita traders in Warawar also confirm this general impression of the primacy of individual choice for them; “it is not the Sheikh’s responsibility if I come here. It is only for family to decide. I asked my father and he said ok. The Omda is for resolving disputes there, but has nothing to do with here”.¹⁶⁶

Risk (North)+R(South)<Critical Threshold

2.1 Assessment of Host Authority

The de facto authority of South Sudan during the 2012-2013 dry season extended up to Grinti/War Rou, around 10km north of River Kiir/Bahr al Arab. SPLA sit on the south bank of the bridge at Majak Wuoi and SSPS patrol from the bridge up to Grinti/War Rou whilst SAF patrol from Meiram down to Grinti/War Rou. The Governor took the opportunity of the Wanyjok conference to speak at length. He made 3 important messages very clear: 1) Things have changed and the SPLA is strong, “you have seen our tanks at the border and more are coming, if we like we could bomb Meiram without moving from our positions. There are not many of you left and we could finish you”; 2) Misseriya are marginalized by the Government of Sudan, “When I went to Meiram in 2010, nothing had changed since I was there in 1996”; and 3) He confirmed that Misseriya are safe in South Sudan as long as they do not act on behalf of the Government of Sudan: the ‘nation’ can not attack the ‘tribe’. This message was perhaps the strongest factor informing the Misseriya delegate’s assessment of the security risk in South Sudan. The conference, as one news outlet reported it, was not a negotiation but a case of “Dinka Sets Rules for Arab Herders”.¹⁶⁷

The Governor is committed to the peace for strong economic and security reasons and has strong control of both military and civilian structures to enforce it. His “order” was received via HF radio in Majok Yin Thiou on Thursday 25th February to allow Misseriya cows to cross the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab. This was before the Peaceful Migration Conference in Wanyjok.¹⁶⁸ Following the Governor’s guarantees in the Wanyjok conference, large Misseriya trucks immediately started to arrive at Majok Yin Thiou, the drivers of which announced that SPLA and Dinka community checkpoints south of

¹⁶⁵ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

¹⁶⁶ Interview, Fellaita Traders from Fula (Awlad Ziyud and Metanin), Warawar, 9th March 2013

¹⁶⁷ Radio Tamazuj headline, <http://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/dinka-set-rules-arab-herders-n-bahr-el-ghazal>

¹⁶⁸ Interview, Athian Bol Athian, Payam Administrator, Majok Yin Thiou, Aweil East, 26th February 2013

the bridge had ceased entirely and suddenly. This reinforced the Misseriya assessment of the commitment and authority of the government of NBG.¹⁶⁹

2.2 Security, Evidence and Commitment

In addition to political communications, a number of incidents inform the Misseriya assessment of the strength of the host military authority. Following the Peaceful Migration Conference of 2012, the Misseriya Peace Committee say that Misseriya individuals violated the agreement first, through a cattle raid on the Murhal Yinh Pabol. The SPLA responded very vigorously, raiding 900 cattle, killing a group of Misseriya and capturing a young boy. Following this incident, the Misseriya returned to South Kordofan and accepted incentives to fight, including some at Heglig and War Guet, and there was no dialogue for 8 months.¹⁷⁰ According to Misseriya delegates, the War Guet fight also began when Misseriya had killed and hung an SPLA soldier. Following the incident, in April 2012, the SPLA retaliated very strongly, chasing Misseriya militia up to Meiram. The two attacks on War Guet were attempts at retaliation for this incursion. Sultan Deng Luol confirmed that when the Misseriya arrived in Warawar in December 2012, they acknowledged that they had been incited by the government and now did not want to fight.

Misseriya delegates seemed to get the message. One delegate's speech, comparing the Misseriya to dogs who need to be trained by a new master, was a particularly powerful public recognition of the host authority and the power relations involved. Other statements appealed to those present that "if anything happens between SAF and SPLA don't consider that us". The heavy handed approach can be seen as a failure on the side of SPLA to give conflict resolution mechanisms set out in conference resolutions a chance to function, or indeed a failure in command and control which allowed soldiers to act disproportionately. It can also, more properly, be seen as a communications device intended to show very clearly that the security realities have now changed and that the Misseriya should recalibrate their cost-benefit analyses accordingly. The Dinka chair of the Majok Yinh Thiou Peace Committee said "they have learned the faults of last year" and as a result the peace is much stronger.¹⁷¹ The message was iterated over and again during the conference. One Dinka chief from Aweil West put it very simply: "Now we have the power and are strong. If you come here and mess around, we will kill you".

2.3 Perception of Host Community

The community remains skeptical about the migration. This was indicated publicly, for example, in the request to remove "Arab Entrance" with "Pastoralist Entrance" from the minutes of the Peaceful Migration Conference in Wanyjok. The Dinka also pushed for an increase in the diya from 31000SSP to 41000SSP in an attempt to deter those criminals "who we know and among Misseriya".¹⁷² In private discussion, most Dinka express unease – even those working to facilitate the conferences. A youth delegate in Wanyjok put it as follows, "we people in the village don't understand why they are coming. They are all Arabs. We never heard of 'Misseriya' or 'Rizeigat' until now. The chiefs are all here only because we have been ordered and informed [by government] that this is a good plan".¹⁷³ Other signs of community distrust and fear are in evidence, such as the decision of most households to seek dry grazing in areas far from the traditional grazing and watering points at River Kiir, many to Arroyo in Aweil West, where no Rizeigat had

¹⁶⁹ Gathering of 'Big Traders', Warawar, 9th March

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Misseriya delegates, Peaceful Migration Conference, February 29th 2013

¹⁷¹ Madcok Alok Arol, Chair of Majok Yinh Thiou Joint Peace Committee, 6th March 2013

¹⁷² Dinka Sultan, Peaceful Migration Conference, February 29th 2013

¹⁷³ Youth Delegate from Majok Yin Thiou, Peaceful Migration Conference, 28th February 2013

arrived but were expected (as of 25th April).¹⁷⁴ The movement of Dinka community populations out of the area north of Majok Yin Thiou reduces contestation over limited water holes but should Misseriya move further south after vaccination such distrust, in the context of water scarcity, could easily lead to conflict.

2.4 Community Reliance on Trade

The benefit to host communities affect their assessment of the Misseriya migration and thus in turn Misseriya confidence in their security. Trade is the primary benefit. Prior to the December agreement the only goods arriving in Warawar from Sudan came via very limited smuggling along the Ad-Daein road. There were only a handful of Misseriya traders present from Al Muglad. Instead, all goods came from Uganda. Some young Dinka men said that at that time “Life was bleak. It was tough. It looked like the people were going to suffer a lot. The problem was sorghum”. It is also the case that Aweil East citizens want the products from Khartoum as “it is what they know, for them, they are the ‘originals’” and they simply prefer them.¹⁷⁵ Youth participants at the Dinka-Misseriya conference of 27th November held in Warawar, said the Misseriya leaders stated: “Mile 14 can not be eaten and can not be sold, so let’s get on with our relations”. The comment delinked the Misseriya from any border demarcation claims and made the economic case for peace and was “the reason we accepted the peace”.¹⁷⁶

Following the December agreement the price of a sack of sorghum fell from 270-300SSP to 150SSP. The price of fuel halved from 10SSP to 5SSP for 0.5 litres.¹⁷⁷ The price of soda dropped from 8SSP to 5SSP.¹⁷⁸ After the Wanyjok conference, large trucks began to arrive, and prices were expected to reduce further. This had the following effect on prices in Majok Yin Thiou.¹⁷⁹

Before Wanyjok Conference	Now
Onion sack 1000	400
Sugar (50kg) 500-600	330
Fuel (JC) 300	300

2.5 Positive Historical Stories

Positive historical relations go some way towards shaping assessments of today, however minimally. For example, following the outbreak of war in 1983, many thousands of Dinka fled northwards and were hosted in Meiram, where the area provided food and shelter, “10 to a house. There are still six Dinka people living at Saeed Hamedain’s house, all by choice”.¹⁸⁰ Such histories do not provide the necessary guarantees but they open windows and minds to discussion.

2.6 Symbolic/Informal Information

Daily stories: Quotidian stories of harassment or kindness shape individual Misseriya assessments of inter-community relations and the security situation. For example, on 25th February, numerous apparently unconnected people from both Dinka and Misseriya communities had heard that recently some Misseriya women had lost their way and stumbled into an SPLA area near Majok Yin Thiou. The SPLA welcomed them,

¹⁷⁴ Dinka who have few cows and other commitments may choose to place them within a ‘cow club’. This is cattle camp to which cow owners pay a portion of the costs of running the cattle camp. One interviewee pays around 25SSP a month plus a percentage of milk for 10 cows to be kept in a large herd.

¹⁷⁵ Darfurian Traders, Warawar, 10th March

¹⁷⁶ Discussion, Youth, Warawar, 9th March 2013

¹⁷⁷ Interview, Garang Wol, Foreign Relations Officer, Chamber of Commerce, Warawar, 8th March 2013

¹⁷⁸ Discussion, Youth, Warawar, 9th March 2013

¹⁷⁹ Market Survey, Interviews, Majok Yin Thiou, 30th March 2013

¹⁸⁰ Group Discussion, Mohamed Kashaba, Meiram, Pastoralist; Mohamed Waniss, Meiram, Pastoralist; Sharif Musa, Meiram, trader; Hamadan Kheir, Meiram, ex-government mechanic, Gubarra Nourrain, Secretary General Peace Committee; Al-Rashid Hamid, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee, 27th February 2013

offered them water, and helped them on the correct route. A mundane story but full of symbolic value; and one which can travel easily with the traders making their daily journeys from Majok Yin Thiou to Meiram.

Inter cultural relations: Misseriya men can marry Dinka women but will not accept their daughters to marry non-Muslims. This is a large symbolic inter-cultural issue where inter-marriage is seen as a sign of respect and neighborliness. Other information comes from southerners who live in Meiram – estimates of the southern population hover around 15% - also counters or feeds the assessment of inter-relations between the two communities.

Gunuss: The education of Gunuss, the little Misseriya girl to whom the Governor promised education until university, became a symbol of the failed peace of last year. The support to the girl stalled after the conflict broke out at Majak Wuoi and War Guet. Ultimately, the offer was linked to the former Peace Committee Chair Adam Dukshum, who was arrested on his return to Sudan (although his arrest was seen as indicative of the danger of the job, it is also possible he was carrying quite a large amount of Governor Malong's old Sudanese currency for exchanging into new currency).

Language: The use of Arabic names for locations perceived to be in South Sudan is a highly political issue. The Dinka insisted (again) at the Peaceful Migration conference that the Misseriya use Dinka names: "You name everything Arab, Bahr al Arab, Gum Arabic, and soon you will name the fish in our river as Samak [fish] al Arabi". The Misseriya agreed to the condition but said, "If our grandfathers had names for these places we will use those names among ourselves". Sultan Deng Luol mediated by asking the question "stand up if anyone knows how these places got their names?"¹⁸¹ The use of names is a highly symbolic issue because of its links to land claims (the first piece of evidence provided by Dinka for land claims north of River Kiir is nearly always the presence of Dinka names for the places).

Inter-cultural knowledge and Ignorance, Marking Trees: The marking of trees by Misseriya was also perceived by Dinka to contain a hidden agenda, which may also contribute to land claims, and the Misseriya were requested to refrain from this activity at the Peaceful Migration Conference. They explained that the practice is used for: 1) navigation and general sense of direction; 2) to communicate among themselves who is using a route and coordinate the correct use of the *murhals*. Likewise, a Misseriya delegate informed the conference (in perfect Dinka) that the Misseriya may move at night and this is simply if they have a long way to move, telling them this should not cause alarm. Dinka also expressed distrust at the reduction in the number of Misseriya cattle camps south of the River Kiir between mid and late March, saying that backwards movement means "preparation for war".¹⁸² However, Misseriya committee members said that this is a traditional mid-season movement among some families to travel north and greet and share resources with family members in the fariqs.

Public perception/Rumor and Propaganda in Meiram: A barrier to participation in the conference was fear of personal security in the South. This stemmed from political statements and the fear of reprisal following fighting last year and is widespread. According to Gubarra Nourrain, the families of members of the Misseriya Peace Committee persuaded a number of delegates not to come – "the real reason many people are not here is that they are afraid they will be killed". This is echoed by Misseriya cattle herders south of River Kiir/Bahr al Arab who say their parents tried to

¹⁸¹ Speeches, Peaceful Coexistence Conference, 28 February 2013

¹⁸² E.g. Interview, Peter Jok, Director General, SMARF, NBG, 1 April 2013

stop them saying “don’t go, you’ll be killed”.¹⁸³The conference was so important as unquestionable evidence back to Meiram that the situation was open and safe. These rumors are countered by the safe passage of trade and attendance at the conference.

Money Transfers: At the end of the Peaceful Migration Conference, money was distributed to Misseriya members to compensate them for their return travel to Meiram. Dinka participants observed this process as they left the event, leading to widespread rumor that the Misseriya had received incentives or had been paid by USAID to attend, and undermining trust.

International sanction and dignity: The presence of international actors provides a buffer zone of trust between Dinka and Misseriya. For example, Misseriya cattlemen were refusing to come for vaccination until a team reached them at the water hole, “I am coming now for vaccination because you people came to speak to us in the bush and we know that the real khowaja will bring real medicine”.¹⁸⁴

2.7 Assessment of Security Reprisal in Sudan

The policy of the government of Sudan was to oppose border crossings. The commissioner had said privately to community members to move as close to the border as necessary but not to cross it. The first people to cross the border were arrested (though later released under the pretense their visit was to bring back sick relatives).¹⁸⁵

3. Individual Economic Condition

$$\text{Trade Profit(Tax, -Road) + Cattle Benefit(Grazing, -Tax, -Stress) > Cost(Grass, Water, Stress) + Alternative(Wage, Militia) + Cost(Strategic)}$$

3.1 Trade

3.1.1 Market Access

The market in Majok, just a few kilometers south of River Kiir and directed by SPLA Military Intelligence, was full and bustling throughout the study period. In January 2013, small volumes of trade began, with motorbikes, rickshaws and pickups bringing petrol and other goods from Meiram through the forest. Following the conference in Wanyjok, large trucks immediately began to arrive, carrying sugar, sorghum, flour, tea, onions, coffee, utensils, soft drinks, cigarettes and spare parts. Most traders interviewed in Warawar and Majok Yinh Thiou also had at least small numbers of cows (10-20).

3.1.2 Benefits from Trade: Benefits from trade are accrued through the exchange rate differential between the Sudanese Pound and the South Sudan Pound. Sugar is 300SP in Meiram sells for 300SSP in Warawar, but around 4SSP will buy one \$1 whereas you need around 7SP to buy \$1. Others trade livestock at the livestock market in Majok Yinh Thiou, where a large cow may reach 1500-2000SSP. The price in Meiram is reported to be just 500SP, though this may well be misinformation. The division between cattle keepers and traders is arbitrary and many herders also do a petty trade. For example, Joint Peace Committee member Mohamed Hamid leaves his brother with the cows in Tigin or Grinti and “waits for his sacks of Dura in Warawar”.

3.1.3 Road conditions and road costs: The road from Meiram to Majok Yin Thiou takes between two and three hours by motorbike (traders estimated the distance to be 120km). In late February, the road had many checkpoints – one UN official interviewed

¹⁸³ Group Discussion, Misseriya herders, Majak Wuoi, 1 April 2013

¹⁸⁴ Various Misseriya herders, Majak Wuoi, 1 April 2013

¹⁸⁵ Interview, Ali Sharif, Majak Wuoi, 1 April 2013

said as many as 100. Traders were taking one of two routes: 1) leaving Meiram as if travelling to Darfur before cutting off South through forest; 2) going west, crossing the railway, and cutting down to War Guet. The impact on road conditions on trader choice can be observed by talking to non-Misseriya who face great problems on the road. One Zaghawa trader from Nyala says “Last time I went to Sudan I travelled by plane from Juba to Khartoum for fear of the road [he had been shot in the wrist on a previous occasion]. I just bring all my goods from Uganda”].

The Misseriya Peace Committee told the conference in Wanyjok that they could guarantee passage for Dinka on the road to Meiram, but that in the town the government may “come up with something different”. This is the presentation of control on the road – though it might be an exaggerated display of power. One of the central functions, if not the central function, of the Misseriya Peace Committee is to arrange security for the road to reduce the costs faced by Misseriya traders. The road condition is both a security and economic issue. The interest of peaceful cattle herders is to avoid any security incident that will lead to reprisals against them and their cattle, and a safe and secure road is seen as central to achieving this. As one pastoralist put it: “the peace committee has failed because it has not got rid of insecurity on the road. If there are wider problems then these come down on us and we lose everything”.¹⁸⁶

3.1.4 Loss of goods: The Minister of Defense reportedly visited Babanusa in January and informed SAF to confiscate goods from traders planning to move south. On 8th March a Misseriya trader said that 10 jerry cans of fuel were stolen from him in Meiram by the army. By April 1st, the same trader was speaking of a “perfect road”, a fact attributed by him to the work of the overarching Misseriya peace committee in forcing criminals to stop acting on the road and to thawing relations between the two countries.

3.1.5 Money transfer: Money transfer problems reduces the incentive to trade. It can reportedly cost up to 50% to transfer smaller balances to Khartoum from Warawar. For this reason, at the November 27th conference the community proposed a FOREX be established at the border crossing point. Traders instead realize their profits by sending money via a specialist agency to Aweil where it is banked. This agency will arrange for the money to be sent from Juba to Dubai electronically before a buyer in Dubai purchases fine clothes and jewelry for shipment and sale in Khartoum. Warawar has multiple ‘offices’ offering this service but it is expensive and not suitable for small traders.

Taxes reduce the incentive to trade. The tax office in Majok Yin Thiou is a lively place. Traders pay 2SSP on a jerry can of fuel (priced around 75SSP) and 4 or 5SSP for a sack of sugar (300SSP).

4. Cattle benefit

4.1 General security

In response to Dinka objections made during the Wanyjok conference that the “real leaders” were not involved and may be plotting conflictual strategies, a Misseriya delegate pointed out “those leaders who used to sign agreements with you are the owners of the cattle that will come”. By March 30th, there were reportedly 7 cattle camps at War Guet and 8 south of the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab at Majak Wuoi.¹⁸⁷ They were approximately 1 mile south of the River east and west of the road from Majok Yin Thiou. Local government officials in Majok Yin Thiou did not permit visits to the camps

¹⁸⁶ Ali Sharif, Misseriya herder, Majak Yin Thiou, 30th March 2013

¹⁸⁷ Interviews, Jaac Joint Peace Committee and Ali Sharif, Misseriya herder, Majak Yin Thiou, 30th March 2013

citing the presence of 'their militia'.¹⁸⁸ The Misseriya were moving every other day to waterholes along the road. SPLA officers at Majak Wuoi knew Misseriya members of the Majok Yin Thiou joint peace committee. They said "we have not seen them [Misseriya] with guns and we have no concerns about them". Although the army had not heard of the Wanyjok migration conference, they had received the direct order not to interfere with the 'Arabs'. Indeed, Major James Tut, commander at Majak Wuoi, was careful to separate the military and civilian (nation and tribal) spheres, saying "If anything needs our attention then the community chief should contact us. Otherwise we have no communications with the Arabs and do not ask any questions".¹⁸⁹

Spontaneous movement of Misseriya cattle southwards demonstrates the truth in the saying that Misseriya follow their cattle, rather than the other way round (this highlights the importance of their migration to their viability). For example, a Misseriya herder reported that 30 cattle from his herd of 187 left on their own accord to the south in February 2013. Some reached Majok Yin Thiou and some reached further south. The peace committee in Majok Yin Thiou arranged for their return and reassured the herdsmen somewhat that peace was arranged. As a result, Ali Sharif moved southwards and other Misseriya followed him. But a lot of fear remains following last year's April clashes and the majority of Misseriya are not willing to come southwards unless the situation of water and grazing absolutely demands it, for fear of attack.

4.2 Benefit to cows: Last year, estimates of herd loss as a result of failed migration fell between 30 and 100 cows in 400.¹⁹⁰ This contrasts with the price and availability of water in Sudan. At water points around Meiram, the cost is 0.5SP per day for one cow at a government water pipe. The decision of cattle keepers to come south appears to directly correlate to the provision of water in Sudan. The number of cattle camps at Majak Wuoi reportedly fell from 14 in mid-March after the promise by Government of Sudan to provide some water points between Meiram and Mugadama. In mid-March news came via radio and travellers that the Government of Sudan was building 10 boreholes in and around Mogadama and to the forest west of Al-Ain. This year, large numbers of Misseriya, fearing security in the south, made plans to go to these areas. It is very crowded there and people are paying for donkeys. More importantly there is no grass.¹⁹¹

The price of vaccine also affects the perception of benefit from coming south. The current policy framework – the migration agreement – requires Misseriya cattle to be vaccinated. The Government of Northern Bahr al Ghazal set the charge of 1SSP per cow to be paid in any currency (including in kind) in an attempt to establish the principle of cost recovery. This is to be compared with a) vaccine costs in Sudan (it is 2x the price); b) the absence of a legal imperative to vaccinate in Sudan and therefore avoid this cost; c) the freedom to vaccinate one's own cattle.¹⁹² Benefits of vaccination may be seen in time to outweigh the costs, the Misseriya cattle at Majak Wuoi suffer from CCP and needed treatment.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Interviews, Peter Jok and SMARF colleagues, 30th March 2013

¹⁸⁹ Major James Tut, SPLA Officer in Charge, Majak Wuoi, 30th March 2013

¹⁹⁰ Interview, Mohamed Hamedain, Joint Peace Committee member, Majok Yin Thiou, 25th February 2013

¹⁹¹ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain and Misseriya herders, Majok Yin Thiou, 3 April 2013

¹⁹² Interview, Ali Sharif, Misseriya pastoralist, Majok Yin Thiou, 1 April 2013

¹⁹³ Dr Adudu Battery, Veterinary Assistant, NBG SMARF, 3 April 2013



The vaccination of a Misseriya herd south of Majak Wuoi

4.3 Long Term Strategic Calculations

Misseriya cattle herders south of the river say that they will now seek access to the water and pasture through peaceful means. Ali Sharif says “in previous years we were mobilized into the militia but now this can not happen”. In the past, these recruitment drives were like mini-festivals. A government and SAF delegation would arrive, pitch a tent, provide music and refreshments and rally recruits. Fighters were given around 1000SP to fight and told you can keep anything looted in battle. The language of religion in mobilization is now limited, replaced arguments about short and long term strategic economic interest. It is common knowledge that Ali Sharif participated in the attack on Majak Wuoi in April 2012. He was shot in the leg on that occasion (and now walks with a limp). An eye witness who arrived on the scene shortly after the battle described the aftermath: “This was the first of all the attacks of 2012 and around 80 bodies lay about, these were only Misseriya wearing Jellabia not uniforms. Motorbikes and dead horses also lay about.¹⁹⁴ There were just very few bodies of SAF infantry soldiers in uniform who had come up the rear”.¹⁹⁵ 2011-2013 was a test year in which the SPLA asserted itself as a national army. It sent a strong message to Misseriya raiders and attackers alike. This set the tone for 2012-2013.

Ali Sharif’s story is illustrative of a shift in opinion among some Misseriya youth. During wartime until 2005, since early childhood he would move deep into the South with his cattle, through Northern Bahr al Ghazal State and into Warrap. He estimates that his cattle may have increased 7-fold from 2005-2013 should the situation not have changed. “We are suddenly left with a dry hopeless place – we can find water by digging or donkey, but the real problem is grazing. The problem is grazing and the answer is peace”.¹⁹⁶ The idea is that if this year goes smoothly then there could be peace and real migration next year.

Ali Sharif said that “we learned this answer ourselves. Nobody told us. We saw the answer ourselves. We fought and we died. The government pushed us and now there is

¹⁹⁴ Dinka Malual are noted as the best South Sudanese at dealing with horses in battle due to their position neighbouring Rizeigat and Misseriya.

¹⁹⁵ Interview, Sylvester Madut Abraham, 3 April 2013. Sylvester visited the area with the commissioner of Aweil East to assess the situation.

¹⁹⁶ Interview, Ali Sharif, Misseriya pastoralist, Majok Yinh Thiou, 1 April 2013

nothing. No compensation, nothing for the dead. Nothing for the wounded or the women. No one is supporting us. So we decided ourselves not to go to war”.¹⁹⁷ The speech of cattle camp members south of the river echoes this story, that the decision to come south in peace is not an obeyed order, but a learned response and rational strategy in the pursuit of basic livelihood requirements, “if the peace goes forwards, we will still have cows in 20 years. If not, then the cows will end”. A growing awareness of their exploitation is key to their decision and challenging for a proud people, most challenging and bitter tasting, says Gubarra, is “that the NCP have spoiled our relationship even with God – whose name is peace – by making us kill”.¹⁹⁸ This realization does not necessarily affect the position of Misseriya regarding Mile 14, “we know that the border at 1956 was up to War Ayen – south of Majok Yin Thiou – but now we are just preaching that nothing is worth fighting and dying for”.

5. Peace Committee/Conferences/Peace structure Analysis

Individuals look at the information above in light of an assessment of the peace structures in place to minimize risks.

Peace Structure Timeline 2012-2013

Development	Comments	Significance
October 2012	Governor condemns killing of 3 Misseriya and confiscation of two vehicles on road.	-Reassured nascent/latent Misseriya Peace Committee
September 2012- November 2012	Misseriya Peace Committee formation in and around Meiram	- Alignment and accommodation of interests to facilitate a migration deal
November 27th 2013	Inter-community Conference in Warawar	- Reduced host community and local authority distrust following last year. - Set tone for investigation of renewed peace.
Late December	Agreement between Misseriya Joint Peace Committee members, Sultan Deng Luol and the commissioner.	- The “peace was actually done in December” ¹⁹⁹ -Misseriya cows moved to areas with SPLA soldiers - Trade opened through Majok Yin Thiou
February 27th	Wanyjok Conference	- Public stamp of approval from Governor - Trade multiplies (large trucks) - Vaccinations nec. to facilitate cattle migration begin

5.1 Overarching Misseriya Peace Committee

5.1.1 Organisation

The Misseriya who made peace at Warawar in 1991 were a committee of 15. Today, the Misseriya Committee, or perhaps more properly, network, that works to help implement the Joint Committee’s decisions, and from which Misseriya members of the Joint Peace Committee are drawn. In 2013, the Misseriya Committee was stated to have 50 members, though the number is not fixed. For the Misseriya leaders at Wanyjok, the word for committee is synonymous with ‘the peace’ and ‘the conference’. It represents the pool of people who are available to call on to support the peace, and therefore should grow in time: “When we find someone interested to join the peace, we invite them [to join the committee]. Their tribes will follow”.²⁰⁰ The Misseriya Peace Committee claimed at the Wanyjok conference to represent all Misseriya from “here to Kadugli” though only three tribes/gabillas were directly represented Fayareen (28), Awlad Kamil (2) and Awlad Omran (1). This claim introduces the challenge of how to

¹⁹⁷ Interview, Ali Sharif, Misseriya pastoralist, Majok Yin Thiou, 1 April 2013

¹⁹⁸ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, 3 April 2013

¹⁹⁹ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, Chair of Misseriya Peace Committee, Majok Yin Thiou, 6th March


²⁰⁰ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013

enforce an agreement made by the few among the many. For example, Misseriya Fellaita in Warawar market from Al Fula do not feel included, saying “this agreement is between cattle keepers and traders of Fayareen of Meraim”.

Informally the committee’s claims grew further, to “representing all northern Sudanese who access South Sudan”.²⁰¹ His example was a 2012 case in which a Misseriya from Sennar State was assisted by the Joint Peace Committee. Note below, however, that whereas the Misseriya Peace Committee may assist any Sudanese, the mandate – in theory and practice – of the Joint Peace Committee is to resolve issues between Dinka and Misseriya alone and it is clear that non-Misseriya traders do not feel secure on the road through Dar Misseriya. Indeed, the agreement’s exclusivity is perhaps one of its central characteristics.

For Gubarra, the committee is part of a single opposition – the Haraka –, which contains both armed and civilian wings. He says that he was invited to join the central committee of the opposition in Kauda (where another Misseriya, Adam Koushom, is deputy to Abdel Aziz al-Hilu²⁰²) but that he declined in favor of organizing the peace with Dinka. Despite potential ideological clashes with SPLM-N over any future dispensation, he is supportive of both prongs of the Haraka, pointing out his frequent meetings with Ibrahim Aboul But, the SPLA office in charge of a secret Misseriya military camp just north-east of Majok Yin Thiou.²⁰³ The Misseriya peace committee is, to Gubarra, a civilian wing of the same movement. In reality, the committee is an instrument that allows ‘members’ to access a market or natural resource and does not require any ideological conviction whatsoever.

5.1.2 Composition: The composition is organized according to Khashm al Bayt, with nominated head representatives from each Aiman Khashm al Bayt and one for Eissa.



5.1.3 Cattle Keeper Organisation: The head of the Murhals are selected from the overarching committee according to their family and route. These are supposed to resolve issues locally with chiefs, such as crop damage and other petty disputes. Such issues will not be referred to the Joint Peace Committee unless they cannot be resolved at this level. A Misseriya head was nominated for each of the Murhals who is supposed to cooperate with a counterpart Dinka chief (essentially forming sub-committees of the Joint Peace Committee).

²⁰¹ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013

²⁰² Adam Koushoum and ‘Zamil’ are the two most senior Misseriya in the ‘civilian’ coordination at Kauda, though both have rank in SPLA-N.

²⁰³ The SPLA camp, formed in early 2012, is a training camp for Misseriya who travel to fight in Nuba with SPLM-A and who fought at War Guet and Majak Wuoi against Misseriya attackers last April. The majority is Awlad Omran but a few are from Awlad Kamil. Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, April 3 2013

5.1.4 Selection, Authority and Composition: Selection of committee members was affected by political pressure and interference. Governor Haroun, a Borgu, visited Meiram in February. One of his aims was to ‘capture’ the peace committee with alternative incentives and a split emerged among potential peace committee members within Fayareen. A first group refused to push ahead without the endorsement of the Governor, and chose to lobby hard for that. The second group went ahead. Broadly speaking, the Amir and Omdas advocated the former route, together with former Peace Committee chair Adam Dukshum.

The commissioner of Meiram is said to be secretly supportive of the peace committee and passed his blessings to them even after the visit of Governor Haroun in mid-late February, warning Gubarra that he may hear other things in the media. Since the conference in Wanyjok, Misseriya members of the Joint Peace Committee have safely visited Meiram. Further, Gubarra Nourrain said that the commissioner had told him, “it’s fine just don’t talk publicly about this and no public meetings”, but people were able to come to his house privately to discuss the matter.

5.1.5 Selection and Attendance: The process of selection of Misseriya members for the Peaceful Coexistence Conference is not clear. On the eve of their arrival at Majok Yin Thiou, the Majok Payam Administrator and the Dinka Chair of the Majok Joint Peace Sub-Committee “had no idea” about who was coming, from where or whether they were traders, pastoralists or otherwise – and this was a general consensus felt by all involved, including for Ministry of Local Government officials in Aweil, AECOM staff facilitating the arrangements for the conference, and possibly – beyond a core group - for the Misseriya organizers too.

There was, however, some reason in the rhyme. There was no public preparation conference in Meiram like last year as “people were not allowed to make a big meeting in Meiram, so we met in houses or by telephone.... After many meetings, 16 people were chosen [two from each Khashm al Bayt] but there was a lot of fear we would be killed here”.²⁰⁴ In September 2012, 3 individuals had come to Northern Bahr al Ghazal and were killed (including a relative of Gubarra Nourrain). Following the incident, the Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal apologized and agreed to pay back the cars (one Toyota Hilux and one tractor) and 31000SSP for each death. This communication from the government was central to reassure 8 of the 16 selected Misseriya Peace Committee members to come to the South. These 8 were not Omdas or Sheikhs but were “known influential characters in their communities”.

At the 12 December conference in Warawar, the President of the Cattle Committee from Awlad Kimeil strayed from the 5-point agenda prepared by Gubarra Nourrain. He stood up at the conference and said publicly that he was “not afraid of Beshir”. Unfortunately, the comments were [somehow] broadcast on Shurouq TV and security officers called him into their office on his return to Meiram. He was made to swear on the Qu’ran that he would not return to the South. Two other key cattle leaders, Abdoul Rahsoul and Mohamed Al Badil (from Awlad Kamil) faced the same treatment. Gubarra himself was also called by security but he refused to go to the office. The security officer, Mohamed Jaafar, was a good friend of the man who had married Gubarra’s daughter and this smoothed the situation. Gubarra’s ‘insider’ status plays an important role in his ability to navigate the challenges of his chosen office.

The eight became five (five Fayareen and one Awlad Kamil) in the weeks preceding the conference in Wanyjok. Governor Haroun visited Meiram one week before the

²⁰⁴ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain and Sultan Deng Luol, Warawar, 5th March 2013

conference and made a set of public threats to those who would contravene government directives. This led to strong family pressure on the eight not to proceed with their plan and the combination of formal directive and informal influence was a powerful one (central also to the modus operandi of the Misseriya Peace Committee in enforcing their decisions).

Misseriya participants at the conference said that there were only two selection criteria: 1) No delegates from the native administration; and 2) a conviction of “yes to peace, no to war”.²⁰⁵ And the first of these criteria appears to have originated from Local Government in Meiram, who it was that informed the Native Administration that they should not attend the conference. This can be understood as the result of a compromise between Local Government and the community. Local government do not incur the wrath of the state government, but at the same time give a tacit acceptance to the community to engage in the activity of the peace conference. This bargain is at the heart of viability of the peace agenda and explains how the Misseriya Peace Committee are both “with” and “against” the government. As one youth put it in Warawar “of course they are with the government, their families are there in Meiram!”. After the secretariat of the Peace Committee informed them of the forthcoming conference, each Fariq then held its own meeting to select somebody to come.

5.1.6 Cattle Camp Authority and Peace Committee: According to Misseriya in the cattle camps, all members of the peace committee have cattle without exception. Despite this, the committee appears to exert a limited authority over cattle camps. It was not active in bringing cattle for vaccination, and cattle camp members expressed distrust of the committee, including questioning whether the 1SSP per vaccination was going to their pockets. One cattle camp member said the “peace committee has failed because it had not removed the insecurity on the road from Meiram to Majok”. The personal authority of peace committee members is also questioned, for example Al Rashid is seen “as just making his name now here in South Sudan – there are others who are stronger and more respected than him”, including a number of Omdas who are not able to come because of the government’s position.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Group Discussion, Mohamed Kashaba, Meiram, Pastoralist; Mohamed Waniss, Meiram, Pastoralist; Sharif Musa, Meiram, trader; Hamadan Kheir, Meiram, ex-government mechanic, Gubarra Nourrain, Secretary General Peace Committee; Al-Rashid Hamid, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee, 27th February 2013

²⁰⁶ Interview, Misseriya cattle camp herders, Makaj Wuoi, 1 April 2013



Chair of the Misseriya Peace Committee Gubarra Nourrain

5.1.7 Political Economy of the Peace: The “road” as a political economy holds all the actors together. Indeed, Gubarra Nourrain sometimes introduces the peace committee as the “committee of the road”. The centrality of the road to the peace led the Misseriya peace committee in 2012-2013 to focus almost exclusively on attempts to ensure the road functions. If the road could be made to work in 2013, then next year there is a chance for a deeper peace, including cattle migration.

Solving Big Cases: In addition to its delegates’ roles on the Joint Peace Committee, Misseriya peace committee members resolve historical and strategic cases with the Government of Northern Bahr al Ghazal. These have been important for accommodating powerful elements into the peace deal. For example, the Misseriya spent a number of months negotiating the return of the 1 land cruiser and 1 tractor seized by the Government of South Sudan in September on the road and seeking compensation for the death of their driver. These cars were returned on 3 April and were escorted to the bridge by Gubarra and Al Rashid. This was an important victory for the Misseriya committee and helped to establish their authority and to appease a Misseriya family’s requirement for revenge.

The Misseriya peace committee has also been involved in separate negotiations with the government to resolve key higher level historical and strategic disputes. For example, in 2011-2012, former Joint Peace Committee members Ibrahim Mareeg and Adam Dukshum and Hamedain carried large sums of Government of Northern Bahr al Ghazal tax monies in Sudanese Pounds to Sudan to change into new currency. The border clashes of 2012 are cited as the reason this money did not return to South Sudan. According to Gubarra Nourrain, Ibrahim Mareeg carried 5 million (real millions) Sudanese Pounds from the Governor to Meiram and did not come back. Another man took 3 millions, and was reportedly captured at the border and the money was taken by the Army and the Government. The Peace Committee has successfully arranged for this man to begin paying back the money in installments, a process which has just begun. These critical issues are not public but represent crucial transactions for building working relations and involving the Governor of Northern Bahr al Ghazal himself.

Controlling violence: Although the Government of Sudan will not cooperate to implement justice according to the resolutions of the peaceful migration conference, the Misseriya are in a strong position to implement the agreement because they are armed. The primary strategy to apply pressure to those in the jurisdiction of the Government of Sudan is through, essentially, intimidation. The first step is to provide a request and warning to the family of the criminal; second, they will capture a relative to the criminal to force a resolution. For example, in May 2012, after 2 Dinka were killed in Aweil North, the Peace Committee successfully used this method to return 2 guns and 62000SSP from the culprits.²⁰⁷ At other times, the committee may set about raising money independently in order to satisfy the requirements of the resolutions. The question of matching concepts of justice becomes important. Members of the host community were not happy because they had not “seen the eyes of the criminal”; in Aweil a criminal both pays a diya and is imprisoned. In Dar Misseriya this is impossible to organized for the committee because “only the government can put someone in prison – we are just a committee”²⁰⁸ and because in Misseriya – and wider Baggara customary law – Aourf – the payment of diya is sufficient for reconciliation to begin.

5.1.8 Political Economy of the Road:

According to non-Fayareen traders in the market, the road benefits only those two groups through whose land it passes. Other Misseriya Humr, particularly Mezagna and Fadliya, are not happy either and do not bring goods to Majok Yinh Thiou or Warawar. Fayareen will pass all or most of the checkpoints without charge.

Indicators of the political economy of the road can be drawn from the experience of non-Misseriya traders. Darfurian traders tend to paint a picture of a tribal situation, in which Arabs do not allow any Fur, Zaghawa, or Masalit to move on the road, calling them ‘Tora Bora’. This experience of one Zaghawa trader is not atypical. From Omdurman to Fula was safe but problems begin at Muglad and Babanusa where the SAF confiscate goods and vehicles. Then from Meiram to Majok is controlled by Misseriya Fayareen and only they can trade along it. He showed what he said was a bullet on his wrist from an attack he had suffered along the road. He no longer takes the road and brings goods from Wau originating in East Africa. His analysis is that the Misseriya have the support or at least impunity from the government and if the government was to change its mind he says the road would shut once more for all.²⁰⁹ This fits to some extent with the assessment of general political persuasions among different Misseriya groups outlined above, in which Fayareen were identified as being most strongly aligned with the Government of Sudan.²¹⁰

Non-Misseriya Humr also face problems on the road from Meiram to Majok. Two Fellaita from Metanin and Awlad Ziyud said that they take issue with the ‘peace’ and refuse to disarm. Guns, they claim, were needed to protect themselves against the Baggara – that is, armed pastoralist Misseriya Fayareen. Following the Dinka-Misseriya peace, however, the Baggara said they refused to assist Governor Haroun. The Governor attempted to disarm them but after clashes was not successful. Since then he has been forced to employ Military Police to work to stop the trade, and guns are now required to protect against arrest by these forces. These young traders, despite having traded in Warawar since they were 6 years old, were bringing the majority of their goods from

²⁰⁷ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013

²⁰⁸ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013

²⁰⁹ Interview, Anon, Zaghawa Trader, Warawar, 9th March 2013

²¹⁰ Interview, Awlad Omran and Awlad Kamil traders, Warawar, March 2013

Wau (9th March 2013). It is difficult to assess the tax as so much is ad hoc, but it may reach 50% on a lorry.

By 3rd April, Misseriya traders in Majok Yin Thiou were celebrating that the situation had markedly improved. However, this was not true for all. A trader originally from Kosti, moving fuel from Meiram to Majok by motorbike, described his journey: “You make 120SSP profit per journey. If the thieves get you, they take 300SSP and you have to work twice to recoup the money. The thieves are townspeople from Meiram who just go out for days to the forest. They are youth from the town, all Misseriya. I have to leave Meiram at night without headlights, sleep at the bridge and then come to market early morning. I leave late at night, pay people at the bridge to show me the way and then arrive in Meiram before light. If you are from Fayareen or Kamil it’s their land so you don’t get taxed. They are a community there – if you go against one the whole tribe will be against you!”²¹¹ Members of the Misseriya committee denied that different treatment is experienced by people from other places in Sudan, arguing that such people have large trucks and gain attention. The story of the motorbike trader from Kosti and many others undermines this argument.

The road

Section	Situation
Omdurman ↓ Muglad	“Still inside” so tax may be around 5000 to government customs offices. On loading.
Muglad ↓ Meiram	“Out of the office now”. But it is still relatively cheap taxes. It is paid to the Army.
Meiram ↓ Majok	<p>Very difficult as goods forbidden. At least 30 checkpoints, though this has reduced a bit following the “peace talks”.</p> <p>The checkpoints are mostly armed Fayareen with a few Awlad Kamil. They are Baggara and control the area.</p> <p>Other checkpoints are armed SAF. Occasionally mixed.</p> <p>They just ask for whatever they want: commonly 1000, or 2000SSP. If you don’t pay they will report you to the army and your goods will be taken.</p> <p>The smuggling route is through the trees. There are no checkpoints but there is a cost for a guide.</p>

5.1.9 The Beneficiaries – A wide roof

The commissioner’s house, the Awlad Amani, manage money issues pertaining to the road. They do not steal but they are involved in money movement and exchange. The commissioner also has a car in the market at Majok Yin Thiou and “this is why he is ok with the peace and not making too much problems for the committee. The soldiers and members of Haras al Odud all have goods in the market and “this is why the road is working”.²¹² Omdas themselves have cattle interests and some trading interests – “even” an Awlad Kimeil Omda has a son with a shop in Warawar.

5.1.10 Nomads and Security and the Deal: Despite the importance of the road, both traders and cattle keepers are important for the deal to hold. But at this moment, the promise of future migrations can only come through the road. The majority of committee members describe themselves as nomads. These do not live in Meiram town but move from Fariq-Fariq outside. These are the groups demanding access to the land

²¹¹ Interview, Trader from Kosti, Majok Yin Thiou, 3 April 2013

²¹² Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, 3 April 2013

for grazing and water and as a result are the key to the strategy for success. These are also the groups who have weapons including 12mm mounted machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades and AK47s. "It is these people who can capture thieves and this is why we chose these nomads".²¹³ There is a deal between the organizing committee and the nomads, that the former will guarantee grazing if the latter can: 1) prevent insecurity on the road to facilitate trade; and 2) prevent incidents south of the River Kiir/Bahr al Arab. Practically speaking, the first step in the peace was the opening of the road as this gives the benefit to the host community. The Misseriya peace committee leaders are in a strange position, they are under pressure to deliver cattle migration and possess a genuine motivation to facilitate their and their family's cattle. But they know cattle migration contains the risks that could undermine the gains made so far, "the road is visible, we know what happens on it. The forest is invisible, something can happen and we won't know about it, so problems may come".²¹⁴

The problem is that the thieves derive from diverse households and do not respect authorities; they are not simply Baggara with guns. There is the sense that they are outside the sphere of any authority, though closest to that of their parents. Both Misseriya herders and peace committee members speak to the family members of Misseriya outlaws and request their influence but many appear to be 'excommunicated', falling outside family authority. There is a concept in Misseriya culture of Nefi. This means "isolated" in Arabic and will not be pronounced lightly. After a long process of warnings and second chances a family may declare a member Nefi. This means that the family is no longer responsible for that person, or any crimes he commits; they will not pay the diya and are therefore effectively no longer in the tribe.

Gubarra Nourrain says that although some thieves on the road may correspond to Nefi, this is not the central problem. Instead, some families are not influencing members that remain in their tribe. In this situation there are just 2 choices, to become a criminal or join the army. This makes it difficult to control. According to cattle camp members at Majak Wuoi, the peace committee is working to convince thieves and roadblocks to stop operating, or at least move closer to Meiram. As the Secretary General says "We need to stop thieves, there are just 20-30 of them now and we know them, mainly Awlad Kimeil, Awlad Na'im (from Eissa branch) and some Ogula from the Nil sub-family. We have told their families to stop them or to fear they would be captured by us or by Government of South Sudan".²¹⁵ The problem is that "it is just them on their own who decide to do this, poor guys who want to make some money, wherever they come from".²¹⁶

Following high level agreements between Khartoum and Juba, Misseriya peace committee members and traders complained that nothing had changed on the ground: "The government is still allowing thieves to attack traders". However, there was a noticeable improvement in Misseriya reports from the road around this time.

5.1.11 Resources and Motivations: The motivation of the committee is sincere. It is exemplified by the statement that: "If someone of us is arrested or they kill us, still more people will come from our community to continue this peace".²¹⁷ The fact that the

²¹³ Interview Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013'

²¹⁴ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, Mohamed Hamid, Majok Yin Thiou, 3 April 2013

²¹⁵ The committee say they had discussed with the authorities in South Sudan the possibility of using SSPS to capture criminals on the land they control north of the river, between Majak Wuoi and War Rou/Grinti. The authorities had not yet decided and were said to be cautious about such a move.

²¹⁶ Gubarra Nourrain, Secretary General, Misseriya Peace Committee, 3 April 2013

²¹⁷ Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013'

'peace', the history of neighborliness and cooperation, is recognized as bigger than individuals is key to giving cooperation a sense of inevitability, a permanence that transcends doubt on the Dinka side. More importantly, perhaps, the statement of apparent (if mitigated in certain ways) risk faced by those contravening the Government of Sudan's instruction builds a solidarity that almost verges on trust.

5.1.12 Ambition: The status conferred on peace committee members is an incentive. The benefit that the peace brings the community through trade and cattle migration is substantial. The Secretary General of the Misseriya Peace Committee Gubarra Nourrain is clear that his position confers on him status, "the Omda is selected for the affairs of the branch of his tribe only. Peace is a national thing. Even President Beshir knows who I am now. This is more important than being an Omda".²¹⁸ Gubarra was reportedly offered an Omara but refused. He has ties with the opposition movements based in the Nuba Mountains and says he has been promised a position when there is a change of government. His political gamble appears to be that: a) his community will lift him up as a result of the benefits his work has incurred for them; or b) that the Government of Sudan will negotiate a suitable deal with SPLM-N allowing the latter (Abdel Aziz-al Hilu calls him the 'Doctor' as a result of his work with MSF and with his independent clinic in his areas) to bring him to position, perhaps "one day I will be commissioner of Meiram". The position of commissioner appears to have a certain attraction for Gubarra Nourrain and he speaks in the language of political campaigners "all the graduates are mine". On another occasion, he rhetorically advised the Fayareen Omdas back home, "why not advise thy father politely – if you push for your rights firmly they may see you as strong and make you the commissioner!"²¹⁹

5.1.13 Payment/Salary: Misseriya members of the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar and in Majok Yinh Thiou each take a stipend of 400SSP per week as compensation for their work, to help cover costs and to help support families at home. It also serves to disincentivise the pursuit of financial reward above service to the peace. This money comes from Misseriya contributions to the tax office in Majok Yinh Thiou, in which a Misseriya member of the Majok Yinh Thiou Joint Peace Committee will be found to oversee the system. The arrangement was approved by the government of Northern Bahr al Ghazal and according to a number of traders with no apparent connection to the peace committee, was established with popular support. The trouble experienced by former Misseriya Peace Committee members caused in part due to their money making activities may have increased recognition for the need for some independent source of income for the committee. Misseriya Peace Committee members also benefit from trading. Approximately 20 lorries or cars arrive per day and the charges are as follows.

Type of Carrier	Tax for Misseriya Peace Committee
Lorry	20SSP
Tractor	15SSP
3 Wheeler or Car	15SSP
Motorbike	10SSP

5.1.14 Style: The Secretary General of the peace committee uses the language of political party building to describe its operations. He controls the language of those in the committee, strictly instructing them before speaking to outsiders to remember the 5-point agenda. He is "looking to attract members", "recruit members", hint at being an alternative authority, "we are like Omdas here", "we want to "revolutionize the tribe"

²¹⁸ Interview, Gubarra Nourrain, Warawar, 3rd March 2013

²¹⁹ All from Interview with Gubarra Nourrain and Al Rashid, 3rd March 2013

and “our community sees us as the government here”.²²⁰ The majority of members are more concerned with their shorter term and individual economic interests.

It is interesting that in de-linking the promises from politics, and asserting the committee as tribe and not nation, the committee has facilitated an agreement. But it also means that committee members have a ‘free vote’ on the key issue of border demarcation. That is, the peace made in 2012-2013 says nothing about the position of its members in 2013-2014 should conditions and incentive structure change sufficiently. This strategy makes it easy for members to join the peace – without any ideological conviction – but makes it easy for them to leave. As Sultan Deng Luol said in an interview on 1st March, “demarcation will [still] determine how we relate”.

The committee is a movement, ostensibly non-political but engaged in the political of acts, managing security and a lucrative trade route.

5.1.15 Communications and Information: A group of 7 Misseriya at the Wanyjok conference said that in 2012 a follow up conference was called by the Misseriya Peace Committee in Meiram at which the resolutions were read out, hard copies disseminated and open discussion took place. Only 2 members of those present in this group discussion attended the Peaceful Migration Conference in Northern Bahr al Ghazal last year, but all 7 had attended this dissemination conference last year in Meiram.²²¹ The Misseriya peace committee chair said in April 2013 that the commissioner of Meiram refused such a public meeting to take place following Wanyjok conference in 2013.

Communications with the Commissioner of Aweil East, Awet Kiir Awet, were poor as compared that between the Rizeigat committee and the commissioner of Aweil North. The commissioner failed to confirm with the committee the final date of the conference, for example, which was given as one reason for ‘low-turnout’ of 24 (another reason was the concurrent convening of the Awlad Heiban-Awlad Surur reconciliation event in Ad-Daein). Then when the date was communicated by the Officer in Charge of the Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the commissioner, the date was different to as agreed with the Ministry of Local Government in Aweil and with AECOM, and neither was informed of the change.

Poor communications between the Government of NBG and the Misseriya Committee, and the Misseriya committee and Misseriya cattle camps allowed a number of rumors to circulate. For example, with regards the vaccination of Misseriya cattle: 1) that the Misseriya Peace Committee was intending to benefit from the monies collecting; 2) that the SMARF veterinary assistant who visited War Guet, together with the Payam Administrator, was not an official and intended to damage the cows. This despite communications with Misseriya cattle camps south of River Kiir being relatively straightforward, and achievable with a 1 hour round trip by motorbike.

5.1.15 Committee communications

Where to	How communication?
Meiram and Muglad	Mobile phone (good Zain, Sudani and Safaricom networks).
Grinti	Communication is primarily by physical movement. Those in Meiram and Grinti were notified of the wanyjok conference via two delegates sent by Gubarra and

²²⁰ Interview Interview, Nourrain Gubarra, Secretary General of Misseriya Peace Committee, Mohamedain Hamdain, Member of Joint Peace Committee and other Misseriya delegates to Wanyjok conference, Warawar, Tuesday 26th February 2013`

²²¹ Group Discussion, Mohamed Kashaba, Meiram, Pastoralist; Mohamed Waniss, Meiram, Pastoralist; Sharif Musa, Meiram, trader; Hamadan Kheir, Meiram, ex-government mechanic, Gubarra Nourrain, Secretary General Peace Committee; Al-Rashid Hamid, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee, 27th February 2013

	Al-Rashid. Information can be delayed if the road is insecure.
Cattle Camps south of River Kiir/Bahr al Arab	In theory, following a decision of the Peace Committee (or Joint Peace Committee), the decision is relayed to the cattle camps and fariqs by delegates from the relevant families, as well as to the city. Members of three cattle camps south of Kiir/Bahr al Arab all knew their representative in the peace committee, had frequent visits from him, but new very little about the peace agreement. In practice, the Misseriya Joint Peace Committee have poor communications with the cattle camps.
Army/Security	No official direct communications
Dinka Youth	No direct contact. Misseriya youth interact with Dinka youth in the market but only for business. Some appetite for more interaction (e.g. a football match discussed at November 27 th conference) ²²²

6. Joint Committees

6.1 Structure

The Misseriya Peace Committee and the Dinka communities join together to form Joint Peace Committees, which act as Joint Courts. According to the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar, the current situation is theoretically as follows:²²³

Warawar Joint Peace Committee (5, 3, 2 ²²⁴)			
Majok Yinh Thiou Joint Peace Committee			
Rum Aker (5,5)	Riang Awai (5,5)	Machar Kuon (5,5)	War Guet (5,5)

The layers represent authority with Warawar as the highest Joint Court. The bottom four sub committees cover four migration routes. Although the membership is formally declared as five Dinka and five Misseriya in each location, it is the case that committees simply draw however many they need from their communities in order to resolve a case and “control” a situation. If issues are not resolved at the local level, they may be taken to either Majok Yinh Thiou or Warawar. If the issue cannot be resolved in Majok Yinh Thiou, the issue will be brought to the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar (or the Misseriya members of the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar will travel to Majok Yinh Thiou to try and support resolution of the issue).

6.2 Wawawar

6.2.1 History

The first Misseriya Peace Committee was formed in 1991 and was chaired by the current overarching Misseriya Peace Committee Chairman’s brother. The group of 15 met at Maniel on the railway line and signed the peace in Warawar with Sultan Deng Luol. A conference was held at which Dinka and Misseriya members of a Joint Peace Court were selected. The Joint Peace Committee/Court now sits in the same place, under a Mahogany (?) tree in Warawar. The Government of Sudan did not support the agreement. Dau Aturjong, who was the administrator for the area, Luca Alyual Diing, SPLA commander, and Daniel Kuot, administrator for the warfront, provided security

²²² Youth discussion, Warawar, 9th March

²²³ This information resulted from a discussion with all 6 members of the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar, on March 6th 2013

²²⁴ Two Rizeigat are also available to respond to issues involving Rizeigat in Rum Aker. The Rizeigat members have lived in Warawar since 1991, intermarried and allowed their daughters to marry non-muslim Dinkas.

guarantees (except along the railway line, where the SPLA would not be responsible for any Arab death). At that time, the journey from Meiram to Warawar was 6 days by camel and donkey.



Sultan Deng Luol, Chair of the Joint Peace Committee, at the tree under which he holds his court and the peace of 1991 was made.

In 1991, in the midst of war and hunger (especially among the Misseriya and Rizeigat), Mohamed Hamid Hameit, brother to the current Chairperson of the Misseriya Peace Committee Al Rashid Hamid, visited Sultan Deng Luol with the message “we can not be separated”. The peace was not easy and Warawar was attacked on multiple occasions by SAF, who penetrated using the railway line. The tree, always green, is a sign of peace. “After each attack the population, Misseriya and Dinka, would scatter far and wide, but we would return to this tree and make peace”. The tree also symbolizes the permanence of the peace and gives meaning to those who have died in building the peace – such as a relative of Gubarra Nourrain, Mohamed Utied, a member of the Joint Peace Committee who was killed in Warawar by Government of Sudan soldiers; a Misseriya from Awlad Kamil called ‘Sanussi’ who also died at the tree. A Dinka Joint Peace Committee member also died in the fighting. These deaths, and the wider experience of peacemaking in the context of war, bind the Joint Peace Committee together in a strong tradition that has a life of its own, independent of national politics or day-to-day security incidents.

6.2.2 Compositions and Authority: Members of the Joint Peace Committee were selected in a large conference in 1991 from all Aweil East. Each area chose a member and they are chosen forever. If the member is not deemed to be working well by the rest of the Joint Peace Committee then the area Sultans will be contacted and a replacement requested. Dinka members of Joint Peace Committee in Warawar:

Community	Payam	Current Member
Maquach	Bash (Rum Aker)	Sultan Deng Luol Acueil
Ajuong	Madol (War-ro/Grinti)	Deng Deng Yai
Wun Anei	Warawar (War Guet, Rieng Awai, Yinh Pabol)	Ajuo Akuei Yeun
Apuoth	Wung lang	Kuol Malong

Canjok	Yar Got	Ngor Magit
	Malual Baii (Yoot/Adama)	(no member)

Misseriya members of the Joint Peace Committee in Warawar:

Am Hani	Gubarra Nourrain
Awana	Mohamed Hamid
Ogula	Al Rashid Hamid

Sultan Deng Luol is a symbol of the inter-communal relationship and a key resource in its continuation. Coming from the Apatch clan “the Mahdis of Aweil East”, he plays a substantial role in holding the project together. His institutional, relational memory can bridge gaps that without him may remain treacherous. At the Peaceful Coexistence Conference in Wanyjok, Dinka delegates questioned the legitimacy of the Misseriya in attendance. Sultan Deng Luol said “some people say these Misseriya are just thieves. But I say I know these people. I used to camp with Gubarra by the Kiir River and I once made peace with his brother. I tell you I know them”.²²⁵ However, the authority of the Misseriya Chairperson is undermined by the actions of his brother, who made, but then broke the peace. Al-Rashid’s brother Mohamed Hamid Hameit is a symbol of the peace but also its converse. In 1993 or 1994, Mohamed Hamid Hameit is reported to have returned to Meiram, raised a militia and attacked and burned the area. The Dinka community only accepted him “because the Governor and the commissioner has said to”.²²⁶

6.2.3 Authority ‘Mismatch’ is Product of Time

The Dinka population complained at the Wanyjok conference that Misseriya Native Administration leaders were not present. However, from the Misseriya perspective, there is no change - “since the beginning, the people who drove this peace were like us... it’s never been between Omdas ... “it is only those with nothing to be afraid of who can come and make the peace.”²²⁷The Native Administration have always been tongue-tied by their relationship to the Government of Sudan, which has never at any point in the history of the peace supported the committee for fear of dismissal.

The peace committee is indeed a product of its time and historical circumstances, “We are only here because the border is not demarcated,” recognizes Sultan Deng Luol. It is the contestation that mandates the committee as the two governments should resolve mechanisms for management of the border. However, he went on stress that, in fact, the situation now is easier than in the past “Now is better than in 1991, now there is real peace here”.

6.2.4 Dinka Cattle Camp Authorities

Dinka cattle camp leaders have a de facto separate sphere of authority to the Paramount/Executive Chiefs. A paramount or Executive chief traditionally has authority over a cattle keeping community, the *wut*. The *wut*, sometimes defined as a Dinka sub-section, is a community made up of different clans who keep cattle together, migrate together and form cattle camps together (also called *wut*). However, the link between Paramount/Executive Chiefs and *wut* is weakening, due largely to the demands of individual clans for Paramount/Executive chiefs of their own (seen as a key way of

²²⁵ Speech, Sultan Deng Luol, Misseriya-Dinka Peaceful Coexistence Conference, Wanyjok, 27th February 2013.

²²⁶ Interview, Sylvester Abraham Madut, Wanyjok conference facilitator, 1 April 2013

²²⁷ Group Discussion, Mohamed Kashaba, Meiram, Pastoralist; Mohamed Waniss, Meiram, Pastoralist; Sharif Musa, Meiram, trader; Hamadan Kheir, Meiram, ex-government mechanic, Gubarra Nourrain, Secretary General Peace Committee; Al-Rashid Hamid, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee, 27th February 2013

accessing state resources and the attention of NGOs).²²⁸ Corrolary to this huge expansion in the number of Executive/Paramount chiefs is their association to specific clans and territory, rather than community, and the increasing importance of informal cattle camp leaders in the cattle camps. These cattle camp leaders accept or reject cattle to the collective herd; manage the community and hold a small court inside the camp. They take the decision of when to take a share of milk and to distribute a percentage of the collective product of the herd. It is therefore important that these people are involved in migration agreements. It is in this domain that problems with Sudanese pastoralists are most likely to occur, far from Executive Chiefs increasingly associated with only one clan among the cattle camp. Dinka Youth are clear that cattle camp heads do not necessarily consult with their chiefs before acting on an aggression, one saying, “if an issue reaches the chief it is probably too late.”²²⁹

6.2.5 Source of Authority: There is no statutory underpinning of the joint courts such as those special courts set up for inter-tribal issues in Lakes and Unity, established by letters from the Chief Justice. According to Sultan Deng Luol, the authority of the Joint Peace Committee derives directly from the community, though he acknowledges the government has “adopted it too”. The conference resolutions also clearly mandate and recognize the authority of Joint Peace Committees.

6.2.6 Coordination with other Courts/Authorities: Although courts operate like businesses, there does not appear to be any competition of note between the four main courts in Warawar. Jurisdictions are relatively clear and ‘customer choice’ is respected.

Courts/Authorities in Warawar

Court	Description	Comments
Sultan Deng Luol’s Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases involving money • Cases involving foreigners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10% Court fees or a fine. • Traders can choose to visit SDL or CoC.
Executive Chief Court (payam) Sub-Chief Court (boma)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cattle • Culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth disagree with elements of customary law (particularly women and marriage). • Recognize it will take generations to change.
Chamber of Commerce	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market and trade disputes • Two Sudanese members: Mamo Salid (Misseriya, Muglad); Sultan Haroum (Masalit, Darfur). They have been resident in Warawar in excess of 3 years.²³⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No apparent contest with Joint Peace Committee. • CoC passes cases to JPC and vice versa.
County Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An appeal court for all the above 	

6.2.7 Incentives/Salary: The Government of South Sudan does not pay the Joint Peace Committees in Aweil North. This is a point for contention. Peace Committee members discussed the issue with the Peace Coordinator in 2012 and a document was drawn up approving a payment system (either a salary or reward for resolving cases). However, the Peace Coordinator cited austerity as a reason it was not possible to implement at that time. Now Minister of Local Government, he appears to have parked the issue for

²²⁸ The terms Executive Chief and Paramount Chief are used interchangeably and represent the most senior traditional authority of a payam. However, due to the division of administrative units, the term ‘Paramount’ is usually reserved for elder chiefs who were leaders within large administrative or ethnic units in the past and thus may be the senior traditional authority in a county, or even state.

²²⁹ Interview, Silvestor Akot, Veterinary Consultant, 11th March 2013

²³⁰ Interview, Garang Wol, Foreign Relations Officer, Chamber of Commerce, Warawar, 8th March 2013

the time being. At the same time, the pressure from Joint Peace Committee members, who feel they provide a service to the government, is growing with time. Indeed, an AECOM employee who has spent time with the Joint Committees referred to them as “the eyes and ears of the government.. who will be needed even after demarcation”.²³¹

6.2.8 Dissemination: Dissemination of the agreement by participants in the period immediately following the conference was ad hoc. In Warawar, the given reason was that this would entail costs such as the provision of sodas or the distribution of money. In Meiram, the given reason was that the commissioner had given tacit acceptance on condition that there would be no public meetings. Lack of hard copies of the agreement was a factor, which could have been somewhat overcome by printing at the conference. The payam administrator of Majok Yin Thiou requested copies of the agreement with the following words: “We are administrators! But we need copies so we can administrate!”

Between mid-April and mid-June, USAID supported a comprehensive process of dissemination. Two large and joint teams of Misseriya-Dinka and Rizeigat-Dinka visited 20 locations in Aweil East and Aweil North respectively, where the full agreement was read in public meetings in each location. The impact of this dissemination exercise is beyond the scope of this report, but the scale and design of the dissemination effort was a notable testament to the commitment of both the signatories of the agreements and USAID to the principle of dissemination and the recognition of peace building as process. Unfortunately, further comments on dissemination below do not include reference to this important process due to the timing of fieldwork.

Mechanism	Details	Audience
Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The conference was reported on Radio Tamazuj, Radio Miraya, Radio Omdurman, widely on the Internet and in other media outlets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Misseriya head through Radio Omdurman presented as ‘community conference’
Public Announcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sultan Deng Luol announced the agreement at his court on market days. He could not call a gathering as “this would incur costs – sodas or money” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warawar residents and surrounding villages (direct) Aweil East (indirect)
Misseriya Peace Committee members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya Peace Committee members travelled back to Meiram and surrounding fariqs where they would inform people of their families by word of mouth and mobile phone. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya Fayareen (All)
Traders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Traders in Majok Yin Thiou gathered with returning Misseriya Peace Committee members. A Misseriya Peace Committee member said: “Traders are the ambassadors of the conference”. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Misseriya (All)

Dissemination of Resolution and Working Communications

Where to	How did they hear?	What did they hear?
Meiram	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobile phone (good Zain and Sudani networks). Returning delegates Traders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ?
Grinti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Returning delegates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic information.
Cattle Camps south of River	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delegates from relevant Khashm al Biyut visited camps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic information. Knew agreement made

²³¹ Note that since December the Misseriya Joint Peace Committee members have been accommodated at the house of General Deng Deng, Head of Security for Aweil East. Interview, Malual Kueth, AECOM, Aweil, 1st March 2013

Kiir/Bahr al Arab	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Got most information from traders on the road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knew some of the members of PC
Army/Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct order from military HQ • Misseriya Peace Committee visit SPLA at Majok Yinh Thiou and Majak Wuoi (nb/ visit took place due to consultant vehicle). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Order from HQ to facilitate unarmed Arab nomads. Had no further details.²³² • No other details known. JPC outlined migration routes
Local Government (payams)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From returning delegates. • Radio. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The resolutions
Dinka Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio • Word of mouth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A conference took place. Nothing further.

Word of mouth is a primary means of dissemination of information about the Peaceful Migration conference. Sultan Deng Luol told people at his court in Warawar, particularly on market day (Monday) when those from the surrounding villages were be in the town. He said he couldn't call a dissemination gathering, as you would need funds for that to provide sodas, or money.

Sultan Deng Luol has a Thuraya donated by USAID, which he uses to coordinate with military and police officials (his last calls were to Major General Akot Deng, the Commissioner of Police, and Major M.I. Maluac Lual). He also has used it during the rainy season to communicate with Ibrahim Mareeg who also has a Thuraya. However, the credit had run out in January.

7. Joint Peace Committee Summary Tables

7.1 Wawawar

History	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Founded 1991
Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Petty Trade Issues
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Dinka • 3 Misseriya
Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scribe (Wier Akot) keeps a record of every case. Gubarra sometimes enters details for Joint Peace Committee cases.
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thuraya (SDL) • Four motorcycles were provided by USAID in Warawar in 2011. Of these, Sultan Deng Luol was in possession of one. Anecdotally the others were given to local government officials and the market director but were in various states of disrepair. Sultan Deng Luol said the reason Misseriya did not receive motorbikes was that the delivery was made at a time when the Misseriya were not present in Warawar.
Challenges/Operating Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mistrust of Misseriya Chairman Al-Rashid due to his brother's attack on the area.
Example Cases	<p>3rd March 2013: In Meiram, an Islamic teacher (Dinka) had received a donation of sorghum and dates from a charitable organisation. He gave a Misseriya man some dates. The man later complained that they had made him impotent. Native Administration in Meiram refused to hear the case. But Council of Elders ruled the Dinka to pay 2900SP in compensation. Now both men are in Warawar and the case was reopened at the Joint Peace Committee. All 6 members ruled that the Misseriya man should return the fine. He was given 15 days to do so.</p>

²³² Colonel James Ayei, Commander/Director of Market, Majok Yinh Thiou, 6th March 2013

Majok – Sub-committee

History	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Established in 2005.
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Dinka 3 Misseriya
Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The committee appoints 6 people outside of Majok Yin Thiou. These regularly report what is going on by walking to Majok Yin Thiou. They assist the sultans in the areas of migration.
Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Dinka Chair Madcok Alok Arol was selected to be Chair due to having spent years working in Meiram. He worked with Gubarra Nourrain as an MSF translator from Dinka-Arabic.
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Word of mouth, letter, motorbike Lack of network
Coordination Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Working well with the Payam Administrator Good communication with SPLA and Military Checkpoint at Kirkou (which clearly respects peace committee authority on relations with Misseriya)
Style	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Dinka Chair basically fulfills most of the Dinka responsibilities for the Joint Peace Committee himself. The Misseriya members focus on facilitating the market.
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited Lack transport and communications
Operating Environment/Ch allenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No reported conflict at water points but water is very limited. Water holes along the road were drying by March 30th. Local community and cattle were bathing and drinking the same water. Problem is safe drinking water for humans.²³³ Large influx of IDPs expected (15000). Host community largely not present between Majok Yin Thiou and Majak Wuoi since April 2012 limiting challenge – but when cattle come further south issues could arise.

²³³ The price of water in Majok Yin Thiou is 3SSP per jerrycan or a 4 hour round trip walk. The corresponding price is 1SSP in Wanyjok and 0SSP in Aweil, as of March 30th 2013

COUNTY CONTEXTS 3: MAYOM AND ABIEMNOM

1. Overarching Structure: Misseriya Awlad Omran

Misseriya Committee members, local government and traders all say Awlad Omran have their villages in Abu Kedama (situated in the small triangle of contested area between Abiemnom and the PCA Abyei area on a UN map), Denga (along the border between Abiemnom and the contested area (on UN map); Dembaloya (in the UNISFA controlled PCA area); Nourkour (on the border between Mayom and the Misseriya – at border north of Mayom town on UN map) Debab (north of the PCA Abyei area); Diffra (PCA Abyei area); and Nyama (just north of PCA Abyei area). They therefore live, in at least some part, in the most strategically contested area of the Sudan-South Sudan border.

*Awlad Omran*²³⁴

		Awlad Omran		Amir: Ismail Hamedain
		↙	↘	
	'Addal		Menama	
	↓		↓	
1 Omda	Um Hamat		Um Jodd (may have 3 sub-divisions)	Misseriya JEM commander 1 Omda
1 Omda	Um Gordaya		Awlad Rahama	1 Omda
Share an Omda with Samaheen	Awlad Himeid		Dar Zebeli	1 Omda
1 Omda	Awlad Ingaya		Shoroug	1 Omda
1 Omda	Nawazha		Dar Banat	1 Omda
Heavily represented in JEM.	Um Samaheen		Dar Habibella	

²³⁴ This map was drawn by Hashrab, Awlad Omran Trader in Warawar market and participant in the Wanyjok conference, 12 March 2013; and verified in an interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

The division between 'Addal and Menama does not appear important. The strongest association appears to be with the Khashm al Bayt. Youth across the board are uneducated, unemployed, and penniless. They are not impervious to government and elders' influence but cannot be counted on following commands. There is "no leader who can influence all the youth". Gadeed Omara, leader of all cattle camps, is influential among the youth, but sometimes, they will do something without even informing him. Cattle camp leaders are needed to inform youth. The Baggara groups are well armed and can easily prevent traffic on the road if so minded.

1.2 Migration patterns (when and where): Historically, the Misseriya would enter from Abiemnom road through Bier and Ngop payams of Mayom. Now they enter through the border crossing point at Chakchak directly into Mayom County.

1.3 Native Administration and others Influences: The Awlad Omran and the Fadliya share 1 Amir. The two tribes live in the same places and select to continue with the status quo due to sharing the same interests (Mezagna split from Awlad Kamil two years ago to become an Amara of its own). The current Amir is Ismail Hamedain, from the much smaller Fadliya, though usually the bigger tribe will emerge with the position in such cases. Elections for native administration positions are undertaken as in other Misseriya groups, through general meetings in which deliberation is followed by a consensus decision of the conference.

The government and native administration disseminate policy decisions through the Amir, who passes the information to the Omda, who passes it to the Sheikhs who ensure that the community receives the information.

1.4 Annual Meeting: The Misseriya Humr HQ is in Muglad and all tribes will meet there approximately annually in response to major issues that arise. The head of the system is still Amir Babu Mukhtar, who is able to call a meeting of all Misseriya.²³⁵ Information about the meeting is disseminated via telephone, word of mouth, and physical messages. Often, the 4 Amirs may travel each with two deputies to inform others of the meeting. Each Khashm al Bayt will send 3 representatives (a leader, deputy and secretary) whose delegation is named after the chief representative. This is a big position among the tribe and people are selected through group meetings according to behavior, strength, influence and power of speech. Meetings may be called to discuss a development, trade or conflict related issue.

Understanding the Map: Borders and Names – Something to Consider

The map of Unity State's border counties may be inaccurate from the point of view of the administrative structures and known ethnic boundaries on the ground. At least two different meanings of the word 'border' are in use, interchangeably and neither of them appears to correlate to the UN official map. These are: 1) The ethnic border of Dinka and Nuer with Misseriya and Nuba pre-1964; 2) The ethnic border of Dinka and Nuer with Misseriya and Nuba today. The latter appears to correlates with the territory currently administered by Mayom County today.

In 1963/4 and 1983/4, Bul Nuer, Dinka Alor of Abiemnom, and Dinka Ruweng of Pariang were pushed southwards by Misseriya attacks. The Alor lived in present day Abiemnom but also further north and northeast in the territory known as Ngol. The Ruweng live in present day Pariang but also to the west. The Bul lived up to Nourkur, where Misseriya are now settled, but which was previously part of area (claimed by)

²³⁵ An analogy offered by Khiir Ismail Khiir is that of the US President (Amir Babu Mukhtar) and his Governors (Amirs of Awlad Omran, Fadliya, Mezagna and Fayareen), Mayom, 26th March 2013

Alor and Ruweng Dinka (part of the Panaru arc of migration from Upper Nile). Thus, traditional ethnic boundaries with Misseriya existed between the Dinka Alor and the Dinka Ruweng, but not with the Bul Nuer/Mayom (or of Rubkhona for that matter) – who were positioned to their south. This is why you will often hear the phrase that Mayom/Bul Nuer and Rubkhona have no border with the Misseriya.

However, a second reference of the word border is also in use for practical and it seems administrative purposes. Following the displacement of Alor and Ruweng south of the areas known as Ngol and the settlement of those areas by Misseriya, Mayom does share a border with the Misseriya. The road from Mayom to the border crossing point at Chakchak, passes through Kaikang Payam in Mayom County and does not pass through Abiemnom territory, as would be suggested strongly by any UN map of Unity State. As a result, the Misseriya do not have to pass through Abiemnom (whose people have strongly rejected their coming) to reach Mayom, despite this looking impossible on the official map of the area.

The names of places are also confused and make understanding the situation difficult. Many places were renamed during the wartime, either due to displacement or to mislead the enemy. For example, Riarch (southwest of Mayom), as strategic barrack of SPLA, was renamed to Tam and appears so on UN maps. However, in conversation Tam refers to the capital of Poop payam, which is to the north of Mayom.²³⁶

BACKGROUND: MISSERIYA-NUER-DINKA-FELLATA HISTORY

Contemporary feeling is shaped by historical experience. It is worth summarizing this conflictual history as collated by officials, chiefs and representatives of community based organizations in Abiemnom, Mayom and Pariang²³⁷, beginning with the time of Nimieri. In 1963/4, Misseriya Awlad Kamil attacked Dublod area in southern Abiemnom. Meanwhile Awlad Omran burned Benjadit/Nourkur. The Fallaita took parts of Pariang the same year. In 1982-1984, the Misseriya split into 3 columns to attack: 1) Kaljak (Rubkhona); 2) Mayom; and 3) Abiemnom. In 1984, the Executive Chief of Dinka Alor/Ruweng stood at his tree and refused to run saying “We have already moved too far”. He was killed by a group of Misseriya containing a young Gadeed Omara, now head of cattle committee in the Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom. Chief Kamillo Kuot Kur was an educated man who had been an MP in the National Assembly in Khartoum and was recalled by his community. Following the death, the community fled and the death was a primary reason people of Abiemnom joined the SPLA in numbers. The Misseriya then took the cows and burned the sorghum and that “fire is still in the heart of Alor today”. By mid-1984, Abiemnom was “a place for Arabs” with Misseriya living, grazing and planting the entire county.

1985-7 witnessed the Bytong War²³⁸ in which Nimieri continued his policy of support to Misseriya militia, to be continued into Mahdi’s tenure. A combined force of 500 Awlad Omran and SAF together attacked Bytong and 500 went into Mayom. During this period, the attackers killed SPLA Commander Bul Buth and Captain William Kom Gatkuoth in Taragea, Wankay. In 1988, Awlad Omran agreed with Riek Machar at Rubh Ngai and the “war between Arabs and Nuer finished at this time”. In 1990, the market at Rubh Ngai had grown, with Arabs bringing skins, ivory and medicines. The Government

²³⁶ Note also that in conversation people use the old name ‘Northern Bahr al Ghazal’ to refer to Twic County, Warrap State.

²³⁷ This box relies heavily on the following interviews: Marco, Director, Abiemnom Development Organisation (ADO), 26th March 2013; Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013; Simon Achut, Deputy Commissioner of Pariang, 16th April 2013; Interview, Kong Kong, UNMISS, 27th March 2013; Interview,

²³⁸ Bytong is about 3 km east of Bentiu

of Sudan attacked Rubh Ngai using Misseriya Fallaita militia headed by Omer Abdallahi and the SAF led by Colonel Waled Ingeit. During the exchange, Misseriya Awlad Omran fought with the Nuer against the SAF-Fallaita attack in an attempt to protect the joint market. Abdel Rahman Bakr led the Misseriya from these Awlad Omran who joined with the Nuer/SPLA to fight for the peace of Rubh Ngai. On 28th August 1991, Riek Machar defected, joined with Paulino Matieb and the war evolved into its Dinka-Nuer phase, with the Misseriya fighting with the Nuer.

In 2001, a split within the Bul Nuer occurred when Peter Gadet split to join the SPLA. There followed a tug of war between Government of Sudan forces and Paulino Matieb's SSDF, the former pushing Gadet back from Wankay, Mankien up as far as Riarch payam before counter offensives took the SPLA up to Mayom (though Mayom was never taken by SPLA up to the CPA). Mayom was split, with Wangbor, Mankien, Wankay and Riarch under the control of Gadet and the rest controlled by???. During this period, Paulino Matieb and SAF could convene Misseriya to fight for loot. However, Misseriya clans would also clash with SSDF forces and Bul Nuer as pastoralists, so conflicts could break out between Misseriya and Nuer even during this time. At the same time, Fellata had increased their support to the "Dinka" SPLA in Pariang, which had been under the control of George Athor since 2001.

Following the CPA, Misseriya Awlad Omran, still commanded by Abdel Rahman Bakr, joined the SPLA and convened at the oil compound in Kaikang in 2008. Subsequently half left to join SAF and half are now fighting with SPLM-N in Nuba Mountains. They are no longer in Mayom.

1.5 Livelihoods: Cattle remain central to both livelihoods and cultural identity. "We will never stop keeping cattle unless we are dead. And cows will never stop giving cows until Lake Victoria is finished". During rains Awlad Omran cattle keepers may move up as far as Babanusa to escape mosquitoes. If rains do not come until late May or June, they may remain around Kedama the whole year, or move up as far as Debab.

1.6 General Patterns in Attitudes to National Political Forces

There is a strong sense that the patience of the Misseriya with the Government of Sudan is running out, although some Misseriya from Al-Debab joined the SPLA immediately after the coup in 1989. For over two years, the entire Misseriya Native administration has refused to facilitate recruitment to the SAF or militia, however, recruitment into SPLM-N ranks is strong and the deputy to Abdel Aziz al-Hilu (Adam Koushoum) is an Omrani. Former SPLA and new recruits from all Khashm al Biyut, but particularly Sumaheen and Um Jodd from Awlad Omran have joined JEM under Fadil Mohamed Rohuma (from Um Jodd and moving with JEM since 2006)²³⁹ At the same time, tribal patterns should not be overstated; the commander of SAF at Jao and "Controller of the buffer zone for Sudan" is Hamid Messir, also from Um Jodd.

The chair of the overarching Awlad Omran Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom is Khiir Ismail Khiir. Khiir is a notable peace maker who signed the peace of Rubh Ngai with Riek Machar in the late 1980s. He is a staunchly anti-NCP democrat and all his politics reflect this.²⁴⁰ He is pro "rule of law" and anti-Sharia and he is firmly against the redivision of South Kordofan, which he sees as a divide and rule tactic to end cooperation between Misseriya and SPLM-N. Although notably less willing to discuss

²³⁹ Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

²⁴⁰ Khiir lives in Mayom with his family and does not shy from criticizing the Government of Sudan "Beshir's children and all Misseriya died because of guns. Better my children live here in Mayom than die there with Khartoum".

these issues in public, he did not shy from giving his opinions in front of Misseriya traders, officials and youth, freely quoting extensively from John Garang's speeches. He calls the idea of West Kordofan "political work to divide us once more and make it easier to steal the oil. We don't want to be split". Khiir goes further to advocate, that without an end to such tactics and without a departure of Omer al-Beshir (as the man who divided Sudan), a South Kordofan/Darfur nation may evolve and begin to claim its right to an independent state. Staying away from harder national politics, Misseriya traders from Muglad, Babanusa, Debab – from Awlad Kamil and Awlad Omran – all agreed on one thing, that the Misseriya Ajaira communities are, for the first time, now united in supporting a strategy of peaceful coexistence with the South, and that the Misseriya Fallaita have been working with the government to oppose it.

Khiir Ismail Khiir is vocal in his support for JEM "They are good. They want their rights. Misseriya respect this and allow them to move". He laments the lack of leadership and resources that prevent the Misseriya forming a viable movement of their own and insists that an anti-government Misseriya alliance is possible. Whether an anti-government alliance is possible is unclear but Khiir's description of a unified Misseriya fits with others. For example, a Nuer man in Mayom (who splits his time between Muglad and Mayom) was clear that, "the entire community in Muglad and all Misseriya are now supporting this peace".²⁴¹

At the same time, some members of Awlad Omran are also with the Government of Sudan. Misseriya are now present in Khartoum, the Minister for Infrastructure is Awlad Omran from Um Hamet ('Addal) and ex-Minister of Finance Dr. Abdul Hamdi (From Al-Ziyud, Fellaita) both have a lot of influence among local groups and they come every year to rally the people to support the government. Awlad Kamil do not have any Ministers in the national government. The consensus among Misseriya Peace Committee members is that the problem of Sudan was the domination of political power by Danagla, Shagiya and Jaali tribes. Those allowed to join in are able to do so only as far as they facilitate the flow of resources to the others.²⁴²

2. The Individual Choice

Each individual simply assesses his personal cost-benefit equation (for example, risk of imprisonment v. risk of cattle due to lack of grazing and water).²⁴³

Risk (North)+R(South)<Critical

2.1 Risk on Road South: The road from the border crossing point is plagued by insecurity. According to the Deputy Executive Director of Mayom, these are "criminals, youth who play with peace", despite there "being no SPLA to the east or south, all to the north with Heglig".²⁴⁴ The Misseriya Peace Committee and traders all leave their weapons in the government office at Kaikang and are vulnerable. 11 Misseriya have been killed on the road between Awarpinny and Mayom in the last 4 months. All were traders. Most recently, on 18th March, 3 Misseriya traders were attacked on the road from Chakchak to Mayom. 1 was killed and taken to Sudan, 1 was shot in the back and rushed to Bentiu and 1 was wounded (cut by a spear as he protected his head). The wounded man, from

²⁴¹ Interview, Con, Nuer married to Misseriya, living in Muglad, Mayom, March 25th 2013

²⁴² Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

²⁴³ Interview, Jacob Malek, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Aweil, 20th February 2013

²⁴⁴ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Mayom, 24th March 2013

Sennar, said the attackers were wearing SPLA uniforms and kept asking “How can we leave our guns?”.²⁴⁵

The road from Chakchak to Mayom is just 1 hour in a land cruiser and 2 hours with a lorry. According to the Misseriya Peace Committee members, armed bandits hide by the roadside and just shoot into the road. A local official suggested there could be 10 checkpoints and that the SPLA do not visit the area unless there has been an incident. Some are in partial uniform but “we don’t really know if they are cattle camp youth or SPLA”. As a result, traders are not coming as frequently and many are waiting for developments. No lorries arrived for three days during the writer’s visit, compared to an estimated 30 per day arriving at Majok Yin Thiou in Northern Bahr al Ghazal. The Deputy Chairperson of the Misseriya Peace Committee lays the blame squarely with the UN mission, “we blame the UN. They were at the signing of the peace but what is their voice in this peace?”. The problem appears so simple to solve – for example, by organizing a timetable of patrols – that the Deputy Chair became extremely angry. He is also broadly angry about all the organizations that come, talk and leave.

2.2 Risk of Cattle Raising/Loss of Life: The situation is not conducive for peaceful migration so the majority of cows remain in the cattle camps 6 hours north of Chakchak by foot; “they see no [benefit from this] peace”.²⁴⁶ Nuer claim a large number (estimated varied from 500-1000 heads) of cattle were raided last year at Bong, Kuirbone Payam and that this dry season, 150 heads were taken from Tumor, Wankay Payam, and are not welcoming the migration.²⁴⁷ The Executive Director acknowledged that the Misseriya Peace Committee has delivered some compensation but stressed that “they simply can’t come, they will immediately get raided”²⁴⁸ and said that despite a promise from the commissioner that cattle would be returned to Misseriya on a head to head basis, the government was “still working on this”. Other Nuer agreed, the county immigration officer saying that “Misseriya cows will not come this year. The community has rejected this”.²⁴⁹ The question of the commitment of local authorities to providing security along the road must also be questioned, as the Executive Director of Pariang said “if the commissioner of Mayom really wanted to make security along the road then there would be no problem – perhaps he wants: 1) a share of the spoils; or 2) is worried about his popularity.”²⁵⁰

The situation of raiding is exacerbated by three economic factors: 1) the disastrous sorghum and maize harvest of 2012 caused by flooding of the River Choul Pi/Bahr al Arab;²⁵¹ 2) a delay of well over two months for payment of army salaries, testing the patience and discipline of hungry armed soldiers within the militarized border zone;²⁵² and 3) the situation of general austerity which has reduced the cash flows into the area from Juba and elsewhere. It is obviously not helpful also that the Government of Sudan is not involved in the peace agreement, so it’s very difficult to manage the situation. The raiders at Tumor, for example, simply exited to the north where it becomes difficult to

²⁴⁵ Interview, Jang, Care Clinician who treated the wounded trader, 24th March 2013

²⁴⁶ Interview, Deputy Misseriya Peace Committee Chair, Abu Bakr, and Misseriya Peace Committee members Sheikh Ismail Hamid, Isiah Hamil, Trade Union member, and Sheikh Hamdoun, member, 25th March 2013

²⁴⁷ The administrative officer who typed the peace agreement said that this is not a problem for the committee since they brought their cows south following signature of the agreement last year, and they have remained in Mayom being looked after by Nuer. However, there is no other evidence for this.

²⁴⁸ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Mayom, 24th March 2013

²⁴⁹ Interview, Mayom Immigration Officer, Mayom, 25th March 2013

²⁵⁰ In Pariang, the former commissioner would receive up to 30 cows from every 100 raided. Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, Pariang, 16 April 2013

²⁵¹ Extreme flooding in Mayom, Mayendit and Panyijar led to complete sorghum failure. Traditionally, such situations correlate with spikes in cattle raiding activity.

²⁵² In February, the long serving commander and compatriot of Governor Taban Deng Gai, James Gatduel was replaced by direct presidential decree with Major General Gordon Kongchoul, a Lou Nuer from Nasir. It is not possible to assess what impact this may have had on command and control within division 4.

capture them (and even after President Beshir’s visit to Juba the Misseriya committee and traders say that nothing has changed yet on the ground – so far “just politics”).²⁵³

When an incident happens the Misseriya Peace Committee Chair Khiir Ismail Khiir and his Deputy Abu Bakr contact the commissioner but complain that there has been no follow up to any of the incidents of the last 4 months despite clarity in the peace agreement. At the same time, the Misseriya Peace Committee say that they have attempted to implement the word of the agreement and coordinated some compensation payments, confirmed by the host government. A major frustration for the Misseriya is that “there has not been one word of acknowledgement or appreciation from any Nuer for our efforts”.²⁵⁴ Local Government officials did not dispute this information.

Incidents 2012-2013

The following table outlines information given by the Misseriya Peace Committee and Mayom officials including the Executive Director and was cross checked with each side. Note that it does not include outstanding incidents and claims remaining from previous years.

Incident by Miss.	Compensation	Incident by Nuer/Dinka	Compensation
December: 179 cattle raided from near Chakchak	125 heads and 5 heads in cash paid 49 outstanding (1 March)	November: 1 trader killed on road (properties taken).	None
5 February: Killed soldier at Chakchak	Diya paid (30 heads) Gun returned	December: 2 traders killed (properties taken)	None
150 cattle raided at Tumor - Revenge for February raid of 180	Misseriya Peace Committee visited Tumor after the raid but unable to capture criminals or arrange compensation yet.	13 th December: Misseriya killed in Abiemnom	Yes – 75 cows paid by Abiemnom
Raid at Nyakong? Some people reported a raid at Nyakong and Tumor. Others suggested they are the same incident (Nyakong is close to Tumor).		December: 7 traders killed (properties taken)	None
		Feb: 180 cattle raided from their cattle areas.	None – but Commissioner appears to be collecting red cattle and keeping them by the police station for return
		March: 1 trader killed, 2 wounded	None

2.3 Government, Authority and Youth

Government authority: The Executive Director of Mayom County said that this issue of insecurity and compensation, affecting both the road and the cattle migration, was beyond government control, “youth have a problem with the government, and they don’t listen to government. They only listen to people who bring them cows”. Government authority is weak in the rural areas of Mayom, “If you talk in town, these things stay in town”.

²⁵³ The border and lack of cooperation with the authorities in Sudan makes it very difficult to manage the raiding, as Misseria can simply disappear. The political geography and security arrangements make it easier for SPLA to prevent cattle raiding from northern payams, if communication is good. The commissioner can reasonably effectively shut the area north of Mayom using the high SPLA presence in Wankay and Kaikang. This forces cattle raiders to take the ‘narrower’ route along the river through Bier to Abiemnom, which, again, is relatively easy to shut down.

²⁵⁴ Interview, Deputy Misseriya Peace Committee Chair, Abu Bakr, and Misseriya Peace Committee members Sheikh Ismail Hamid, Isiah Hamil, Trade Union member, and Sheikh Hamdoun, member, 25th March 2013

Traditional Authority: Traditional authorities also have limited control over sections of Bul youth. The headmen and chiefs are used by the government to collect heavy taxes, and are accused of taking excessive fines for petty crimes and have become unpopular. (clan elders are followed if they provide benefit to the youth, not the opposite). The situation is illustrated by the recent killings by youth of two executive chiefs in Wankay and Kueryik payams. For example, the Executive Chief of Kueryik attempted to return cattle stolen from Bahr el Ghazal by a local youth. In doing so he fined the youth two cows. The youth stole the cows back from the chief's compound and was put in prison. After the Executive Chief fined him a further two cows for this intransigence, the boy was released to pay the fine. As the chief was walking home that evening, the boy confronted him and shot him.²⁵⁵

Cattle camp authority: The structure of authority in Mayom affects the assessment of the Misseriya to their safety. Cattle camps have leaders, called Kuar Wech in Nuer (Banywut in Dinka). These are selected by members of the camp according to their strength, experience and or by their words. Gat Tourah is one such cattle camp leader, who controls the major cattle camp in Mayom involving many 1000s of cows including the commissioners and some of the Governors. These cattle camps are a mixing point of youth from many clans who come together to seek toic, usually all from the same age-set (the current age-set predominant and active in the camps is Liet, youth between 19-29)²⁵⁶. During the grazing period, "we are far from the commissioner, he is just around the town, and we can raid. Chiefs cannot say 'stop'. We will meet at night and just go to revenge".²⁵⁷

Disarmament/Small Arms: On 27th-28th February 2013 Unity State held a consultative conference on civilian disarmament. Discussion centered on Mayom as a special case due to the presence of arms. They can easily cross the border from Sudan and people are resistant to disarmament due to: 1) its strategic location; 2) high density of cattle is a target for raiders;²⁵⁸ 3) Rebels have supplied and sold guns to youth (without them necessarily supporting their movements)²⁵⁹ and youth have been able to walk – even to El Obeid – to purchase weapons or from Misseriya in Abyei. These are still active and have the potential to supply arms, "they move around from Kilo 23, to El-Obeid and up to Khartoum".²⁶⁰ Misseriya can contribute to controlling this area, and preventing their movement along that road, but not completely.

2.5 Authorities and Diya

All the above combine to create a sticky and dangerous situation. According to received wisdom and local government officials, if a killer is unknown then neither the community nor the government will stand up to pay the diya. Similarly, if a soldier

²⁵⁵ The sub-clan of the boy completed payment of 100 cows in compensation on 23rd March 2013. Technically, the diya should have reached 120 (120 for a chief killed by bullet, 100 without bullet and 80 if it's a non-chief with a spear), Interview, Jok Teyak Gatwich, Executive Chief, Wangbor Payam, 24th March 2013

²⁵⁶ Age-set names are given by Gat Tourah. Members of the same age-set will fight, raid and influence each other

²⁵⁷ Interview, Bul Youth, back from cattle camp, shopping for supplies, Mayom, 25th March 2013

²⁵⁸ Interview, Adolphus Wade, State Advisor, PAE

²⁵⁹ It is worth noting that the two continuing rebels from Mayom County come from Poop payam, which in the north of Mayom, bordering the Misseriya areas:

Colonel Pouljang	From Mayom	Sub-clan from Tam (Poop)
Col. Bapiny Mantuill	From Mayom	Sub-clan from Tam (Poop)
Lt. Gen. Peter Gadet	Mayom (now in Jonglei with SPLA)	Rodnibol Payam
Peter Gatluak Gai	Koch (deceased)	
Brig. Col. Chara	Rubhona (deceased)	
Maj. Gen. Gai Yuach	Koch	

²⁶⁰ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, 24 March 2013

commits a crime that was not under order then the army will not pay the diya. Equally, as an account of unpaid compensation mounts on one side, it becomes harder to raise diya on the other. Currently, both sides are claiming their revenging unpaid compensations.

This is a significant problem that demands a local response of some kind, even to simply clarify positions. Diya compensation is central to the communication and deepening of peace. The payment of compensation by Misseriya is greeted as a signal that the Misseriya are serious about the peace agreement. It “suggests that they like peace and [the presence of Misseriya compensation standing in the town square] has started a rumor in the community that they are seeking peace”.²⁶¹ Compensation, and especially diya, is a central communicator of a functioning peace and the intention of the parties to a peace. Indeed, as Sheikh Hamad put it, in a realistic, sad and non-threatening way, “if I return without compensation, do you think there will be a peace to keep?”

Background: Gat Tourah, Youth and Patronage

Spiritual leader based in Rodnibol payam, southwest of Mayom. He is an age-mate of Paulino Matieb, 72 years old, and among his rumored 80 wives includes one of Governor Malong’s (many) daughters. Youth fear him due to his miracles; he earns cows from every payam to bless the rains and youth will bring him a percentage of raided cattle. Youth also respect and follow him due to his great cattle wealth, which he has liberally used to support youth in troubled times or looking to marry. He has more influence than an Executive Chief, and his reach extends across all payams in Mayom and elsewhere in Unity State.

In 2012, the government attempted to use his influence over Bul youth to support a disarmament campaign. This was relatively successful but following the campaign, Dinka from Warrap raided his camp twice and the security services failed to provide security. Gat Tourah is now annoyed and has refused to speak out publicly to either youth or government (reportedly refusing to meet with the Governor who visited his house). Following the disarmament campaign and subsequent raids, he has lost a certain amount of authority among the youth. The youth from his clan (Chieng-Dok), who had previously refused to engage in any raiding to Bahr al Ghazal, have now been harder to control due to the unpaid compensations.²⁶²

Although Gat Tourah is far from the areas bordering with Misseriya, and his influence has declined somewhat, his influence among Bul youth is considerable. He played a substantial role in countering recruitment to the rebels in the northern payams and there are no comparable figures present in other clans.

2.6 Benefit to Host Community

Trade benefits the host community significantly. Last year, the traders stayed all year and “without these people, the community would not survive”.²⁶³ Prices dropped when the road reopened 4 months ago [due to the dry season rather than a new agreement]. The assessment of local government officials is that trade is likely to continue regardless of whether cattle migration proceeds. But it remains to be seen whether the frustration of well-armed cattle herders could grow into a discontent that ultimately

²⁶¹ Interview, Jok Teyak Gatwich, Executive Chief, Wangbor Payam, 24th March 2013

²⁶² Interview, Deputy Executive Director, 24 March 2013

²⁶³ ²⁶³ Interview, Barnardo, Local teacher who was present at the November ‘Joint Peace Committee’ trainings, 25th March 2013

compromises the transport of goods. Everything in the market comes from Sudan, except medicines and mobile phones that come from East Africa.²⁶⁴

The peace agreement of January 2012 opened the road. Prior to this everything came from Bentiu. According to a market survey of around 20 people, respondents recall commodity prices are now well over 50% lower than before the peace was signed (it is important to note that the road practically shuts during the rainy season but this has nothing to do with the peace, just the weather).²⁶⁵ It is also interesting to compare prices in Mayom to those in Bentiu, the alternative source of goods. For example, in late April 2013 a jerry can of fuel is 75SSP in Mayom and 150 in Bentiu.²⁶⁶

Item	KHT	Before peace (Jan 2012) in Mayom	Closed road (due to weather up to Jan 2013) in Mayom	Now in Mayom
Shirt	55	Not available	100	75
Flour (25kg)	55	350	250	130
Sorghum (50kg)	120	500	250	170
Onion (Sack)	500	No onions	1000	500
Mobile	180	210	210	200

Even with trading, the activity that brings basic commodities to market, suspicion runs to the top of senior ranks of local government. Executive Director of Mayom County, links the Misseriya traders to the history of how Mohamed Ali Pasha first entered the south before taking control.

2.7 Tax to Host Government

The trade enables a valuable non-federal fund to local government. Due to austerity and a poor harvest, Mayom County has stopped collecting head taxes and property/land taxes, so the government coffers are low.²⁶⁷ The trade union officer is managing shop rental for the new market²⁶⁸. There are 760 shops rented at a price of 690SSP per month (This makes a maximum of 524,400SSP/around \$155,000 per month).²⁶⁹

On arrival in Mayom, traders also pay 4% of the sale-value of their goods to the Taxation Board (20SSP on every 500SSP). In addition, 3% is paid to the Tax Chamber (15SSP on 500SSP). Based on a lorry containing 200 sacks of onions and 5-10 lorries arriving per day, this gives an unscientific but rough estimate of potential direct government revenues from trade at 105,000SSP/\$350,000 and 2,100,00SSP/\$700,000 (based on 5-10 lorries x 200 sacks x 500SSP per sack x 30 days x 7%).²⁷⁰ The Trade Union also charges a monthly fee for all businessmen for the provision of an I.D card.²⁷¹

However, it is important to note that the new commissioner has reduced prices by removing tax on sorghum to almost zero (a tiny levy is demanded to pay for the wages

²⁶⁴ The price of a mobile phone with Bluetooth and memory card capabilities is 270-300SSP but consistently reducing over time.

²⁶⁵ Survey taken on 26th March 2013 in Mayom Market

²⁶⁶ Interview, markets of Mayom and Bentiu, 18 April and 19 April 2013

²⁶⁷ Interview, Executive Director, Mayom, 18 April 2013

²⁶⁸ The market was relocated following a fire in February 2013 which destroyed about a third of the market.

²⁶⁹ The rate is 690 for the first shop rented with a reducing scale for each additional shop rented. Interview, Stephen Maker, Chairman, Trade Union, April 18th 2013

²⁷⁰ These figures are conservative interpretations of estimates given by Misseriya traders, local government officials and AECOM staff. A broad range of interviewees in Mayom agreed that 20 lorries would arrive per day. Later figures from AECOM staff given in early June 2013 suggest that the figure is closer to 10. Note, in addition that some of these lorries could be passing traffic and not subject to tax in Mayom, hence the given range of 5-10 lorries.

²⁷¹ This information was collected from traders in the market and from Kray Na Dong Mai Dong, Secretary, Trade Union, 18 April 2013

of unloaders). There is also a monthly shop rental tax that is coordinated by the Traders Union, and appears to be equally implemented for all. They also pay roughly 4% to the Misseriya Peace Committee, dealt with below.

2.8 Symbolic, Informal Information

Cultural signs: There are cultural challenges to building peace. Both Nuer and Misseriya both celebrate bravery in battle. Nuer respect those who have done something 'bad' and shown their power in some way in their past. Misseriya also celebrate those who kill through song and status.²⁷²

Intermarriage and different customs: Intermarriage between Nuer and Misseriya is not common. One Nuer man has a Misseriya wife from Muglad and has been living there for 5 years, he motorbikes back and forth. He was a Muslim prior to this. The Misseriya refusal of non-Muslim Nuer to marry their daughters is seen as an insult,²⁷³ as one local teacher put it "If the people from Rubkhona said no to intermarriage, do you think we would have good relations?"²⁷⁴ The issue extends to other inter-cultural issues, especially those pertaining to religion, "they call our ladies unclean, 'patis'" and they won't eat the food we prepare (non-Halal)". Some Nuer understand these positions as deeply offensive.

Customary Citizenship: Three well known cases exist of Misseriya 'registering as citizens' in Mayom. For example, a man called Siddiq from Kuirbone payam came with SAF, began trading and has remained. He now has three Nuer wives. The registration appears to be a ceremony conducted by an Executive chief. These examples promote the concept that peaceful coexistence is possible, though suspicions remain that it is a strategy "to bring more Arabs to settle and claim the land".

3. Individual Economic Condition

$$\text{Trade Profit(Tax, -Road) + Cattle Benefit(Grazing, -Tax, -Stress) > Cost(Grass, Water, Stress) + Alternative(Wage, Militia) + Cost(Strategic)}$$

3.1 Trade

Awlad Omran traders bring their goods from Keilak or Denga. The market is functioning and the government has accommodated them there.²⁷⁵ Profit is limited, sugar costs 250SP in Muglad (most traders purchase their goods in Muglad). According to a group of traders in Mayom market, after tax, car hire, and exchange rates, the profit will be just 10SSP per bag.

²⁷² Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Mayom, 24 March 2013

²⁷³ The Bul Nuer have only one limit on their policy of intermarriage beyond satisfactory payment of dowry; there is rumoured to be a Yirol clan renowned to be composed of shape-shifting wild animals with whom marriage is not possible.

²⁷⁴ Interview, Barnardo, Local teacher who was present at the November 'Joint Peace Committee' trainings, 25th March 2013

²⁷⁵ Though, following the fire of a section of the market, local government officials raised some barriers to allowing the Misseriya to set up in the new market, stating a police station would need to be built in the market before this would be allowed. This was likely just a performance to pressure AECOM to build one.



Goods arrive in Mayom following the 4 counties agreement of April 2012

3.2 Risk on road north

Governor Haroun publicly announced that the punishment for trading was 10 years prison. According to Misseriya traders in Mayom, this edict has been implemented but there are no official reports available. Governor Haroun is strongly against cross-border trade but was unable to assert control over armed Misseriya. According to a number of Misseriya interviewees, he unsuccessfully attempted some disarmament efforts which were rejected by communities.

The trade route is Khartoum to Muglad then to Nyama and onto Diffra. From Diffra, the area is controlled by UNISFA and this “takes you safely to the checkpoint at Chakchak”, the border crossing established following the Misseriya-Government of Mayom peace agreement. Others have a more difficult journey. According to non-Misseriya traders in the Mayom market, the trade route depends upon you belonging to Misseriya. The road from Muglad to Chak-chak is reportedly dangerous for anyone else. Muglad itself is to be avoided because the commissioner is implementing the Government of Sudan’s directive to prevent trade with South Sudan (as he is rumored by other traders to have specifically set out to stop non-Arab (“brown people”) traders. The trader felt that it was the commissioner’s clan who assisted in controlling the road but did not know any details.

One trader from Nyala in South Darfur said that the Misseriya community tax is a relatively organized business, with community members phoning ahead to inform others of the arrival of a truck. Traders did not see evidence of JEM or any other armed force along the road, only Misseriya. Every 10km or so, usually 2 people in civilian clothes or partial uniform come on motorbikes, asking for roughly 100SP each (if there are more people the tax increases). According to the trader, the ‘stops’ continued are all the way from Debab to Chak-chak, including through the forest of the “UNISFA area”.²⁷⁶ The ‘stops’ will also take mobile phones and goods, and necessitate hiring a guide to help dodge them. All this raises prices in Mayom and makes the journey uncompetitive. The ad hoc nature of the ‘stops’ also makes it difficult to plan. For example, water costs 150SP per 100 bottles in Muglad and sells for 300SP in Mayom. It is not possible to say how much profit will be made and therefore a very risky business.

The majority of Darfurians met in Mayom market bring goods such as cosmetics from Uganda (via Wau) saying “if you involve yourself in that road you will be threatened”²⁷⁷. A rare exception using the road from Khartoum is Adam Abdalla, a Darfuri trader from Kalma, near Nyala, says he pays a Misseriya to sit in his cab to facilitate the

²⁷⁶ Interview, Adam AbdelRahman Abdalla, Trader from Nyala, Mayom Market, 25th March 2013

²⁷⁷ Interview, Darfuri shop keeper, Mayom Market, 17th April 2013

journey. He hires them in Obeid or Muglad and pays 10000-15000SP from which the Misseriya aide draws his pay and negotiates all route payments along the way.²⁷⁸

Chairman Khiir Ismail Khiir denied these stories. He pointed out that traders are present from all over Sudan, and that these problems are simply untrue, and that only NCP supporters will not be found in the market. It is also true that Misseriya Awlad Omran do report difficulties, saying informal taxation is extracted by armed men wearing balaclavas, so it is not possible to determine who they are and that they are required to smuggle their goods through the forest. One man said that the thieves were members of pastoralist groups such as the Salamat, a Fallaita sub-tribe, who “don’t even know who Beshir is”.²⁷⁹

4. Benefit to Cattle

4.1 Grazing and Water

The need for grazing and water is large. As of March 26th, Awlad Omran (and other aligned groups) were at Abu Groun, not far from Abiemnom; and just “5 minutes” north of the crossing point at Chakshara (toic) of Wankay payam. There had been no herd loss (18 April) but the camps had been dependent on hand dug wells, going 3 days without water; others are inching closes to SPLA “one pond at a time”.²⁸⁰ As a result, many had now returned back to their home areas of Diffra and Dembaloya. If security could be guaranteed, the benefit of the good grazing and water in Wankay payam at Chatchara toic would be considerable. Bul cattle are not using the toic for fear of a repeat of a large Misseriya cattle raid that took place in 2011. Following the high level agreements between Sudan and South Sudan and detrimental conditions for the commissioner of Muglad’s cows , Misseriya traders in Mayom said that the commissioner of Muglad has changed his mind about allowing cattle to come south, having previously forbidden it.²⁸¹

4.2 Tax

In 2012, the Awlad Omran peace committee chaired by Khiir agreed with the government to pay 5SSP per head of cattle and 2SSP per goat as a grazing and water tax. At a November ‘Joint Peace Committee’ training facilitated by Concordis International the Misseriya delegation told the government that they would not being the cattle this year to avoid the taxation (they reportedly said that they would send cattle to Northern Bahr al Ghazal). Although this is likely to be a statement with little substance, herd taxation clearly raises the costs of coming South (of course it also establishes a contract with the government whose advantages may outweigh the cost).

5. Peace Committee/Conferences/Peace structure Analysis

The above considerations will be assessed in combination with a perception of the robustness of the peace and security structure in operation.

Date	Development	Significance
13th January 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreement signed in Mayom Then signed by Governor in Bentiu with Misseriya present Approved at Juba level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not instigated by an organisation UNMISS witnessing added weight “the peace with UNMISS”²⁸²
April 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two year agreement signed in Bentiu 4 county commissioners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitated by Concordis Int. UNMISS witnessing added weight Misseriya were very confident

²⁷⁸ Interview, Adam Abdalla Salim, Mayom Market, 18th April 2013

²⁷⁹ Interview, Misseriya traders, April 18th 2013

²⁸⁰ Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Mayom, Misseriya Tax Office, 18th April 2013

²⁸¹ Interview, Misseriya traders, various, Mayom Market 18th April

²⁸² An expression commonly heard among the Misseriya in the market and on the Misseriya Peace Committee.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor 	
November 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Peace Committee training. • At border with Abiemnom • 10 Nuer Chiefs, Misseriya traders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not really form JPC • Important refresher on agreement before dry season (a statement that the Bentiu agreement was still valid).



The State Security Advisor (now Acting Governor) and State Police Commissioner arrive in Abiemnom to promote cross border cooperation in 2011-2012

5.1 Overarching Misseriya Peace Committee

5.1.1 History

The peace between Awlad Omran and Nuer was first made on 17 April 1986 at Rubh Ngai amidst heavy fighting. Bul, Leik (led by current Vice-President Riek Machar) and Misseriya agreed to cooperate on a peace market. The history of Awlad Omran peace with southerners, then, is the history of peace with Nuer. This special relationship remains to this day, as the committee chairman said of comparative relations between Abiemnom and Mayom “we believe Nuer 100 % more than Dinka”.^{283, 284}

The latest peace, called variably the “big peace” or the “peace with UN” by Misseriya and local government officials in Unity State was signed in April in Bentiu by the 4 commissioners of the border counties and the Misseriya Awlad Omran committee of Khiir. The Misseriya placed great confidence in the agreement due to its scale and the witnessing roles of the international community, particularly UNMISS, “We thought if this peace breaks out, there will be no more peace agreements to come – if this is not

²⁸³ Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom, And members of the committee, March 25th 2013

²⁸⁴ At the same time, relations between Nuer and Misseriya can not be described as 100%. During wartime, the Misseriya groups aligned with SAF and therefore fought alongside SDDF for their own reasons. When these did not align they could clash with either party. This gives the sense that “Misseriya are never fully aligned with anyone, they are for themselves” says Kong Kong, security officer, UNMISS. Importantly, post-CPA, the Misseriya are not ‘southern’. John Garang summarized and led a mood when he said “even those who fought us were there for one reason or another”, the perspective that allowed for reconciliation of the Nuer. However, since the CPA, the Misseriya have just been Arabs.

strong enough, nothing will be”.²⁸⁵ Since it’s signature, all four commissioners have been changed. This has allowed communities and newly appointed officials to distance themselves from the agreement.

5.1.2 Aim: The Misseriya peace committee works with the Local Government of Mayom to facilitate peaceful trade and migration. According to the Deputy Chair Abu Bakr “the peace is for traders”. and Tthe committee works to inform the cattle camps that there is peace, and to works with them to ensure that traders are allowed to pass (“otherwise no lorries could come”).²⁸⁶ However, he also says that there are two problems to solve: 1) the traders; and 2) the cattle and other members of the committee, notably the Chair, are adamant that the Misseriya Peace Committee is responsible for both facilitating trade and cattle migration.

5.1.3 Structure of Overall Miss Committee: The Misseriya Peace Committee is predominantly made up of Awlad Omran. Indeed, a number of officials called it “the committee of Omran”.²⁸⁷ The structure of the committee is that two members are drawn from each of the 11 Khashm al Bayt of the Awlad Omran and it is explicitly, a tribal affair, “We are a gabilla”.²⁸⁸ This said, there is a representative of Awlad Kamil on the committee and 2 Mezagna traders who coordinate with the committee. Khiir Ismail Khiir says that the character of Awlad Kamil is good for peace when the system is working, but that “if you play with them, then they will break away easily, as they did in Warawar (at some point).²⁸⁹ There are no youth on the committee (they remain in Abyei). The reason given by Misseriya committee members for the absence of youth is that peace makers are traditionally elders, wise men known for their tried and trusted leadership.

The peace committee has 37 members and is organized into 4 sub-committees, covering all Khashm al Biyut of Awlad Omran. Khiir Ismail Khiir also said that “no Khashm al Bayt of all Misseriya is outside, because if their members do something, we can capture their family and enforce the agreement”. Members are selected and then half are sent back to the home areas to coordinate that side – some to cattle camps, some to the towns and some stay in Mayom. Of these 37, 17 attended the peace talks in January 2012.²⁹⁰

Khiir Ismail Khiir			
Peace Mediation Sub-Committee	Cattle Keepers Sub-Committee (Gadeed Omara)	Services	Informations

Members are selected in community meetings according to their character, their behavior and their strength in word and influence in their communities. None of the 12 members met in producing this report had received education beyond a basic level.

Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chairperson of the Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom, was present at Rubh Ngai in 1986. He was also one of 10 Misseriya to make the peace in

²⁸⁵ Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom, And members of the committee, March 25th 2013

²⁸⁶ Interview, Deputy Misseriya Peace Committee Chair, Abu Bakr, and Misseriya Peace Committee members Sheikh Ismail Hamid, Isiah Hamil, Trade Union member, and Sheikh Hamdoun, member, 25th March 2013

²⁸⁷ For examples, Executive Director, Mayom, 25th March 2013; Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013

²⁸⁸ Interview, Deputy Misseriya Peace Committee Chair, Abu Bakr, and Misseriya Peace Committee members Sheikh Ismail Hamid, Isiah Hamil, Trade Union member, and Sheikh Hamdoun, member, 25th March 2013

²⁸⁹ Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir’s English teacher, Mayom, Khiir’s compound, 26th March 2013

²⁹⁰ Interview, Mr Gadet, Administrative Officer, Scribe of Peace Agreement, 25th March 2013

Warawar in 1991, where he stayed for nearly 3 years as a leader of the committee. The relationship at Warawar and Rubh Ngai were extremely strong – “like metal”. Northerners would stay on one side and southerners on the other side with their armies and there was no problem. Although the market was burned down in the fighting between Dinka –Nuer, it was only following the CPA that clashes occurred between Awlad Omran and Nuer. Khiir Ismail Khiir is a resource for the committee who brings a peacemaking reputation and address book that gives him the status and experience to do the job. He says himself, “to make peace you need people with experience’.

Gadeed Omara is leader of the cattle keeping committee and represents all Awlad Omran cattle keeps in Mayom. “If cattle keepers come here, he is responsible for them”. If there is a problem then Gadeed will sort it out. When the Nyakong raid took place, the committee sent 3 people back to arrange the compensation and this was done. When the Misseriya raised 180 cattle and killed 1 SPLA soldier, Gadeed Omara was not present. However, he was sent for, came, investigated and then returned to try and resolve the matter. Gadeed is known across Dar Misseriya as the focal point for the relationship between Awlad Omran and communities in Unity State, and as the coordinator with South Sudan authorities regarding eastern corridor migration (involving Awlad Omran, Zeyud and Al Fadliya Amirates). Last year, on February 8th, nearly a month after Khiir’s initial peace, Gadeed Omara led a separate delegation of Misseriya to meet with the State Security Advisor and negotiate entry to Unity State. After an initial meeting, the delegation did not return. At that time, communities in Abiemnom expressed deep unease at Gadeed’s presence in Awarpinny and refused to negotiate with him, citing atrocities attributed to his groups in the past.²⁹¹ He is alleged there to have participated in the displacement of the Abiemnom people in 1983 and 1984 and to have lived in Abiemnom during the rest of the 80s and 90s until the CPA, when he “switched to Mayom”.²⁹²

5.1.4 Cattle, Selection and Authority and interests: The Misseriya Committee contains a number of Omdas and Sheikhs. However, these represent community representatives selected by the community involved in the cooperative endeavor, as Khiir says, “ this nation is different to that nation. Our Omda can talk here and can discuss things with their Omda there”. It is clear however that the committee has some authority over cattle keepers from Awlad Omran but also, at least, Awlad Kamil. The soldier killed in Abiemnom on 20th January was murdered by a group of 7 Awlad Kamil. The Awlad Omran committee put pressure on the Kamil and the compensation was paid. Jadeed Omara is the key member of the Misseriya committee capable of controlling his cattle populations, and with significant power behind him to do so. He is not acceptable in Abiemnom due to his conflict history.

²⁹¹ The members of the committee said we are “Cur”, the elder generation “those who don’t even fight any more”.

²⁹² Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 18th April 2013



The Chair of the Misseriya Peace Committee
Khiir Ismail Khiir signed the 4-counties agreement in April 2012

The involvement of cattle keepers in peace structures is critical. The cattle keepers have the power to prevent the trade, “if the cattle keepers didn’t support this then no lorries would arrive in Mayom! And if they hear that South Sudan will never let cattle through, then there will be no more lorries!”²⁹³ Despite this, the committee is not concerned about their behaviors for two reasons: 1) The inclusion of their “absolute” leader Gadeed Omara in the peace committee; and 2) That cattle-keepers are aware of their long-term imperative to come to South Sudan. Despite appearing focused on trading, the first reason tempers the cycle of conflict; and the second more so. The deal is that the traders build the peace and that when the level of trust is such, then the cattle will follow. If the Government of South Sudan try and restrict the cattle for too long, then the Misseriya Peace Committee can respond with trade restrictions. The trouble is the whether there is a balance of interests. On the local government side, there is an understanding that the “only thing they have is trade – as their families will just try and come again next year”.²⁹⁴ Is this enough leverage to push a working migration agreement? And will the internal interests of the committee work to that end at a cost of trading revenues?

This throws the relationship between cattle keepers and traders into the spotlight. Cattle keepers have guns to pressure traders and they have the benefit of cultural imperative on their side – the Misseriya identity and livelihood structure still revolves around the cow. However, the distinction between cattle keepers and traders is of course misleading. Misseriya traders in the market say that every member of the peace committee owns cattle (the deputy chair of the Peace Committee Abu-Bakr has over 500) and are committed to opening the route for cattle, close relatives will be pastoralists with no trading interests because each family is split between fariq, village and town. These overlapping interests only reinforce the need for a migration agreement in addition to a trading one. Indeed, one trader said “don’t you see! they are organizing the trade in order to get the cows in!”²⁹⁵

5.1.5 Power struggle/Link to JEM: In December, SPLA officers arrested Khiir Ismail Khiir. A number of stories recount the episode. One says that Khiir was moving together with JEM, accompanying the movement of commodities to Mayom. During the movement he was arrested by the SPLA as an ‘agent’ of JEM (initially SPLA said he was a part of JEM and had received a rank in the organisation). The Government of South Sudan said that cooperation with JEM on southern territory would not look good for the south and had taken action on this basis. Khiir was held for three days but released after intervention

²⁹³ Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Mayom, 18th April 2013

²⁹⁴ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Mayom, 26th March 2013

²⁹⁵ Interviews, various Misseriya traders, Awlad Omran, Mayom Market, 18th April 2013

from George Mbanj (Concordis International) and UNMISS CA who persuaded the government that the repercussions for South Sudan's reputation among Awlad Omran Misseriya was also of import (Khiir Ismail Khiir's family had already told George Mbanj that there would be repercussions in the South if he was not released). Key also to his release is Khiir's impeccable peace building credentials and relationship to the Vice-President Riek Machar, with whom he signed the peace of Rubh Ngai in 1987 and which were tabled as leverage. There is some suspicion that the Deputy Peace Committee Chair Abu Bakr, a young angry man, may have tipped off or misled the local government in an attempt to take control of the committee and a division between the two men over revenue shares was alive at that time. It is notable that others in the market also link Khiir Ismail Khiir to JEM saying JEM used to stay just north of Kaikang with the Misseriya and pointing out that many Zaghawa are in Mayom Market, and that relations between Khiir Ismail Khiir and JEM are strong (Khiir publicly supports JEM as "fighting for our rights").²⁹⁶ However, a second version of the story states that, in fact, Khiir was arrested by JEM for not having paid fees for the provision of security along the road. It is possible that a combination of the two stories are correct - a number of first hand accounts describing the detention by South Sudanese authorities were collected.

5.1.6 Resources and Motivations: The main motivation for Khiir Ismail Khiir appears to be the status and satisfaction associated with his position, an ideological conviction for peace/justice and his deep and heartfelt opposition to the Government of Sudan. However, the committee certainly also extracts resources from the flow of trade. The Misseriya Peace Committee have a tax office to which all lorries first report on arrival at Mayom market. The tax is 20SSP on a sack of onions selling at around 500SSP, or roughly 4% of market value of commodities (one truck carries in excess of 200 sacks of onions). Various interviewees all gave an estimate of around 5-20 lorries arriving in Mayom per day. A rough and very unscientific estimation of monthly revenue is therefore possible. Using the estimate of 5-10 lorries per day the revenue to the Misseriya Peace Committee could potentially sit within the range of: 600,000SPP/\$200,000 and 1,200,000SPP/\$400,000. This is based on the following equation: 20SSP tax per sack x 200 sacks per lorry x 5-10 lorries x 30 days. This represents a considerable resource with which to accommodate key stakeholders in the enterprise.

5.2. Challenge: Compensation and Cycle of Conflict

Maintaining the peace will be difficult. The Misseriya peace committee (and indeed, some Nuer in Mayom) argue that the vast majority of Awlad Omran are in support of peaceful relations with South Sudan. However, they also argue that due to their unpaid compensation claims it is getting more difficult for the committee to carry the support of their communities, "some of those at home are starting to say you are Nuer now. Why don't you stay with them?"²⁹⁷ Members of the Misseriya Committee and passing Misseriya all expressed the fear that "If we don't get compensation for the road, we can not be responsible and we don't know what will come next. The Misseriya at home are making plans, they will just come to the bush. Our donkeys and camels will take us where the Nuer cars have got stuck. Debab only talks of peace but if we go back without cows they will come and fight - and everyone there, women, old people and children, know what is happening here".²⁹⁸ Testing this concern on numerous Misseriya gave the understanding that without any change in the current compensation payments, this

²⁹⁶ For example, Kray Na Dong Mai Dong, Trade Union Secretary, 18 April 2013

²⁹⁷ Interview, Deputy Misseriya Peace Committee Chair, Abu Bakr, and Misseriya Peace Committee members Sheikh Ismail Hamid, Isiah Hamil, Trade Union member, and Sheikh Hamdoun, member, 25th March 2013

²⁹⁸ Interview, Adam Bul, a very Nuer looking Misseriya (and brother of Kong Kong Deng, a senior SPLA general), Khiir's compound, March 26th 2013

probability of coming violent revenge attacks is an ‘automatic’.²⁹⁹ Khiir Ismail Khiir said that although “even Gadeed Omara will not be able [or willing] to stop this”.³⁰⁰

The Misseriya peace committee outlined two options for avoiding revenge attacks in the coming rainy season: 1) Payment of at least some compensation for deaths on the road and cattle raiding; 2) A direct communication from the Governor of Unity State to the leaders of murhals staying in Mayom (From whom the message can be taken back to the cattle camps). Although there has been no movement on compensation to date (20 April), Khiir Ismail Khiir and other peace committee members appeared visibly heartened by a visit to Mayom by the Acting Governor of Unity State on 16 April 2013. He said the Acting Governor publicly and privately delivered three messages during the visit: 1) Relations between Misseriya and Nuer will be neighborly; 2) Criminals will now be punished and put in prison; 3) Cattle raiding was totally unacceptable and will be punished. Khiir Ismail Khiir said that if a specific message or meeting could be established to communicate this message to Misseriya and outline a commitment to peace in the future, particularly in new political circumstances, then there was a chance Misseriya would accept. But an affirmation of Misseriya dignity is required to prevent individuals seeking it through revenge.

5.3 Coordination: The Misseriya Peace Committee works through direct coordination with the Commissioner of Mayom Jon Bol, a former bodyguard to Paulino Matieb and State Security Advisor. The basic model is that if there is a problem Khiir Ismail Khiir or his Deputy Abu Bakr will visit the commissioner to discuss it. They will go “straight to the commissioner, we are familiar with the government but not with the chiefs”. When compensation is brought it is similarly delivered to the commissioner.

If an incident involves a crime by a Nuer, then the government investigates. For example, following the killing of a Misseriya on February 13th 2013, the Executive Director, security forces and a representative of Concordis travelled to the location of the death near the border with Abiemnom. The people of Abiemnom said that the person was killed by a Mayom citizen and vice versa. The commissioner of Abiemnom and Executive Director of Mayom agreed that because the tracks away from the incident led towards Abiemnom, then Abiemnom should take responsibility. The father of the deceased Misseriya went to stay with the commissioner in Abiemnom and was paid 75 cows in compensation.³⁰¹

There is strong coordination between the Misseriya Peace Committee and the Trade Union. The Trade Union is a committee of 14, appointed by the government, which acts like a court, hearing cases between traders. Ultimately, Stephen Maker, the Chairman will judge cases. The Chair and Deputy Chairperson of the Misseriya Committee are members (indeed, the Trade Union addressed an argument between the two Misseriya that broke out in December 2012 pertaining to the accusation that the Deputy Chair was taking a bigger share of the Misseriya Committee tax than was agreed. This was resolved amicably). The Trade Union has the cooperation of the police force and prison service to implement its decisions and fines.

Coordination

Authority	Description	Comments
Trade Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collects market taxation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established by commissioner

²⁹⁹ According to Khiir Ismail Khiir, if you do or say a bad thing to the real cattle keepers two times then they can control their angers. But a third time and they will break. Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Mayom, 18th April 2013a

³⁰⁰ Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Mayom, 18th April 2013

³⁰¹ The previous commissioner had set the compensation at 75 cows, commissioner John Bol has reduced it to 31, Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, 26th March 2013

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Registration and rental tax (customs taxation elsewhere) • Misseriya representatives seen as 'token' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominated by Bul
Commissioner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Misseriya Committee reports problems to the commissioner. • Concern that the new commissioner is not committed to the peace agreement. • Former commissioner Martin Mashod had good relations with Misseriya – change has 'interrupted' the peace.³⁰² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority appears invested in the person, not the office. • Commissioner's compound full of people re-opening cases settled by previous commissioner. • Issue when previous commissioner signed peace agreement.
Misseriya Peace Committee (Awlad Omran)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiates relationship and all issues directly with commissioner. • Members of all houses of Awlad Omran and one Awlad Kamil involved • Well organized. • Talks to UNMIS CA by phone and Concordis • All traders arriving in Mayom visit their tax office • Sends people by foot to resolve problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receives potentially large tax revenues • Chairman central to committee authority • Committee struggling to maintain support at home due to perceived unpaid compensation claims
Darfur Peace Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7 members • Signed an agreement with government 3 months ago to stay in Mayom • Including non-cooperation with JEM agenda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mechanism allows all Darfurians to raise matters to the commissioner, who could otherwise not do so
Baggara Awlad Omran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well armed and can stop the traffic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee job is to ensure they continue to support the trade
Misseriya Peace Committee (Fayareen)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knows the PC in Warawar – knew Dukshum and Habet. Habet sent message he would visit • Communicate via Secretary of the Fayareen PC present in Mayom market. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are one movement

Transport remains a large problem for coordinating peaceful relations in the event of an incident. However, the newly appointed commissioner directed transport costs to be reduced to 5SSP from one payam to another (previously 15) and 50SSP to Bentiu (previously 100SSP). This has increased communication and volume of people circulating in the county. It has also stimulated the market and reduced prices.

5.4 Communication: Network coverage is a major challenge. There is a need for Thurayas and radios, whilst H-F radio is sub-optimal because it is a target for rebels. Two Thurayas were donated to the government two years ago but are now spoiled.³⁰³ The only way to get information from the payams without network is to send a motorbike. For this reason, there may be no communication between the Misseriya Peace Committee, government, and payams for days after an incident. In addition, cattle camp youth may keep their cattle secret – “they have their leaders, they don't sit

³⁰² Interview, Abu Bakr, Deputy Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee; and Interview, Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chair Misseriya Committee, also present: Omda Hassibo Sharia, Abdelbagir Mohamed Hamedin, Omda Fadlallah Momen, Jadeed Omara and Khiir's English teacher, Mayom, Khiir's compound, 26th March 2013

³⁰³ The Executive Director said that there was a lack of training in maintenance. Interview, Executive Director, Mayom, 24th March 2013

together with big people, they do things there in the toic”.³⁰⁴ This is a problem of both authority and communication.

Payams with Network (Zain)	Payams with No Network
Kuirbona (includes Kaikang and Mayom) but there is no network around Chakchak.	Kueryiek
Mankien	Bier
Rodnibol	Rierk (Warrap borders)
Wankay (borders Miss including has Tumor)	Poop (Tam is HQ, borders Miss)
	Wangbor (border Warrap)
	Ngop (borders Miss)

The community of Mayom is very skeptical about the peace, and the Misseriya Peace Committee Community engagement, together with the commissioner, could do a lot to move the peace forwards.

Youth on both sides are penniless and unemployed and uneducated. Workshops in a neutral place (UNISFA, or at the border) would help, then in Abu Kedama, then in Mayom.

6. “Joint Peace Committee”

The Joint Peace Committee in Mayom is not active. The words ‘joint committee’ do make sense but only to those who signed the peace agreements in Mayom in January 2012 and Bentiu in April 2012 And the committee (Executive Chiefs, Misseriya Committee members and some selected county officials) has reportedly not met without the presence of the NGO and have simply been “busy with business”.³⁰⁵ The administrative officer who typed the peace agreement said that all the signatories are simply busy with their business. The assessment of George Mbany, Concordis Field Officer for Unity State, is that the current Joint Committee will not operate without incentives, particularly in times of hardship like now when “everyone is just thinking to struggle for anything, thinking of themselves”.³⁰⁶ This would generate regular reports but is unlikely to confer upon the Joint Committee the authority necessary of a functional court.

Three meetings have taken place bringing together the chiefs and the Misseriya Committee; two ‘trainings’ and one problem solving discussion linked to prices in the market, each time with Concordis facilitation. At the November training, participants raised the objection that the “chiefs are busy with their activities, they don’t need to be in the committee too – they should select people from the town”.³⁰⁷ Within the Misseriya Peace Committee, there is some appetite for the idea of a Joint Peace Committee, in particular to “move around the area together, and to introduce people to this peace, together”.³⁰⁸

6.1 Dissemination: The individual ‘members’ have played their own roles in disseminating the peace agreement if the committee has not been active as such. For example, Executive Chief Jok Teyak Gatwich, of Wangbor Payam was one of the chiefs who signed the agreement with Misseriya in January 2012 in the accounting office and in Bentiu. Following the conferences he said that he convened meetings with all the youth of his payam and informed them of the peace.

³⁰⁴ Interview, Barnardo, Local teacher who was present at the November ‘Joint Peace Committee’ trainings, 25th March 2013

³⁰⁵ Interview, Mr Gadet, Administrative Officer and ‘Scribe’ of the peace agreement, Teashop, Mayom, 25th March 2013

³⁰⁶ Something like 50SSP per month airtime would be sufficient to bring the members together on a monthly basis

³⁰⁷ This is not a dissimilar solution to that found at the Joint Peace Committee in Gok Machar in Northern Bahr al Ghazal. Barnardo, Local teacher who was present at the November Concordis training, 25th March 2013

³⁰⁸ Khiir Ismail Khiir, Chairperson, Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom, And members of the committee, March 25th 2013

COUNTY CONTEXTS 4: ABIEMNOM/PARIANG - Misseriya

1. Background

1.1. Conflict History

In 2012-2013, there has been no Misseriya migration into the current Abiemnom County. In 2012, the commissioner and Executive Chiefs signed the 4-counties Bentiu agreement. However since then, the community has distanced itself from the agreement and current officials argue that, “the former commissioner made peace, this one has not. So it would need to be renewed”.³⁰⁹The reason is the conflict history and what the local community still see as occupation of their areas: According to community elders Misseriya have permanent villages and cattle camps in Awila Boma (of the ‘original’ Pangyang area) and in Awarpinny Boma (of the original HQ of Manajoga payam). The Dinka are not living in these places but may move around for hunting, honey or fishing.³¹⁰ The east of this area of ‘Ngol’ is nearer Heglig where there are reportedly no security forces from any country or mission.³¹¹ Pariang shares a similar conflict history with Misseriya Fallaita and the community does not welcome them either. The Alinny Executive Director said on 16th April that “the Misseriya are not even near at the moment. They are hidden from sight. They may go to Laloob (Rubkhona) but they fear attack by SPLA here – the Dinka are not hospitable to Misseriya”.³¹²

³⁰⁹ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Abiemnom County, Abiemnom HQ, 18 April 2013

³¹⁰ Following the complete displacement of Dinka Alor

³¹¹ Marco, Director, Abiemnom Development Organisation, 26th March 2013

³¹² Interview, Executive Director, Alinny Payam, Pariang County, 16th April 2013

1.2 Community and History

The reason is simple, says Kong Kong, a Nuer language assistant at UNMISS in Mayom, “they hate Misseriya in Abiemnom”.³¹³ The Executive Director of Abiemnom recognized that the government agreed a 4 counties memorandum in April 2012 saying that the “relationship with the government is established, but the citizens have rejected the Misseriya completely”.³¹⁴ When they came to Abiemnom in 2012 to make an agreement, they initially arrived in a Hilux with mounted 12mm gun on it. The commissioner told them to go and return unarmed. Subsequently, an agreement was reached and supported by the community on the day, but subsequently, the community distanced themselves from the project. In 2013, the Government organized a meeting with the Executive Chiefs of all payams, and they universally rejected the migration of Misseriya whilst welcoming Fellata. This feeling is all pervasive in the market of Abiemnom.

In 1963/4, Misseriya Awlad Kamil attacked Dublod area in southern Abiemnom. Meanwhile Awlad Omran burned Benjadit/Nourkur. The Fallaita took parts of Pariang the same year. In 1982-1984, the Misseriya split into 3 columns to attack: 1) Kaljak (Rubkhona); 2) Mayom; and 3) Abiemnom. In 1984, the Executive Chief of Dinka Alor/Ruweng stood at his tree in Abiemnom and refused to run saying “We have already moved too far”. He was killed by a group of Misseriya containing a young Gadeed Omara, now head of cattle committee in the Misseriya Peace Committee in Mayom. Chief Kamillo Kuot Kur was an educated man who had been an MP in the National Assembly in Khartoum and was recalled by his community. Following the death, the community fled and the death was a primary reason people of Abiemnom joined the SPLA in numbers. The Misseriya then took the cows and burned the sorghum and that “fire is still in the heart of Alor today”. By mid-1984, Abiemnom was “a place for Arabs” with Misseriya living, grazing and planting the entire county. Following the CPA, Gadeed Omara “switched to Mayom”.³¹⁵ The history is very much alive and burning. In 2007, the community brought Franco Maget Kuor, the brother of Camillo Kuot Kur to be the county commissioner, a post he held for two years.³¹⁶

Dinka youth of Abiemnom have few guns relative to those of Rubkhona and Mayom. This is because of the population was less involved in the liberation struggle as a result of their displacement. The Executive Director of Abiemnom argues that the Misseriya are in primary danger of raiding from Bul Nuer youth. The day before the interview (on March), for example, a group of 40 Bul youth moved through Abiemnom, “searching for Arab cows”. After failing to find any, they moved into Warrap and raised Twic.³¹⁷ On 16th April, Bul Nuer also stole 45 goats from Dinka at Bang Bang (south of Abiemnom). Despite a lack of population and community-held arms in Abiemnom’s northern payams, the SPLA are heavily present in the areas of Awila, Awarpinny and Manajoga and represent a deterrent to migration without a strong support underpinning it.³¹⁸

1.3 Trade

Abiemnom is cut off from all directions at the height of the rainy season. The roads to Wau (1.5 days drive southwest in dry season), Bentiu (4 hours southeast in dry season), and Muglad (1 day drive north in dry season) are all impassable from around June-October. This leads to extremely high prices for the community and a strong incentive

³¹³ Interview, Kong Kong, UNMISS, 27th March 2013

³¹⁴ Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013

³¹⁵ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Abiemnom County, Abiemnom HQ, 18 April 2013

³¹⁶ Marco, Director, Abiemnom Development Organisation (ADO), 26th March 2013; Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013; Simon Achut, Deputy Commissioner of Pariang, 16th April 2013; Interview, Kong Kong, UNMISS, 27th March 2013; Interview,

³¹⁷ Bytong is about 3 km east of Bentiu

³¹⁸ Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013

³¹⁹ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Abiemnom County, Abiemnom HQ, 18 April 2013

to allow Misseriya traders to enter, in order to stock the market for the rainy period. As the Deputy Executive Director of Abiemnom said “It’s no to Misseriya but even we might be able to receive goods from them”.³¹⁹ On April 13th, 1 lorry manned by 5 Misseriya arrived from Muglad to Abiemnom carrying fuel and received a relatively warm reception.

The Misseriya had communicated in advance with both Khiir Ismail Khiir and the Abiemnom commissioner. They also met the commissioner on arrival and he apparently told them “lorries are fine. Confine yourselves to the market and fine. But no cows”.³²⁰ The 5 Misseriya were Awlad Omran. 3 of the Misseriya immediately returned to Muglad and 2 remained for 5 days before departing. The 2 Misseriya knew Khiir Ismail Khiir and showed strong support for the peace committee in Mayom, saying Khiir had been selected as a mediator due to the Misseriya’s respect for his long experience and knowledge of South Sudan. They added that Khiir Ismail Khiir is “the reason why the level of thieves is low”, that the community respects him and his role. He added that Khiir and Um Jodd (who form the backbone of Fadila’s JEM) had helped to clear the roads of thieves and of SAF. Um Jodd were described as the most powerful of Awlad Omran clans, carrying the most weapons.³²¹

The route was from Muglad to Abu Kedama and Dembaloya entering Abiemnom through Awila payam; they did not come accompanied by UNISFA through Abyei but through the forest. The commissioner of Muglad is still not facilitating trade despite the high level agreements (19th April), so on the road, Misseriya communities provide security for lorries. Family members sometimes travel alongside the lorry for a length of 5-6kms, before leaving. However, there is still a need for further protection; lorries can not be accompanied for the whole journey, so they carried two guns, which were inside the trucks at Abiemnom.

COUNTY CONTEXTS 5: PARIANG AND ABIEMNOM - Fellata

1. Overarching Structure:

1.1 Fellata Structures

The Fellata are pastoralists originating from West Africa. They are Sunni Muslims and speak a version of Fulani as well as a simple form of Arabic. The Fellata in Unity State are exclusively pastoralist, though Fellata take prominent government positions in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum. The society is cattle orientated. They are rumored to be relatively well armed, carrying 12mm machine guns on camels and bulls in Pariang.³²² The clan structure that follows is not comprehensive but covers those sub-tribes that are present, or traditionally present migrating to Unity State.

	Fellata				
Male	Wela	Danet	Jafwon	Gemba ³²³	Ombororo
From Ferdab, near Kadugli	Talodi/Leeri, South Kordofan		Talodi	Blue Nile	Roving
Cattle chief: Osman Mohamed heads relations with	Cattle chiefs: Musa Osman Musa Gibril	Under the leadership of Osman Mohamed and Musa Osman (as far as relations with South Sudanese authorities goes). Abdulla Gemba, chief of the Gemba, is also present in Wuncur and			

³¹⁹ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Abiemnom County, Abiemnom HQ, 18 April 2013

³²⁰ Interview, Misseriya Trader, Abiemnom, 18th April, 2013

³²¹ Interview, Misseriya Trader, Abiemnom, 18th April, 2013

³²² Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³²³ Meaning ‘Bull’ in Fellata/Fulani

Abiemnom	Leaders managing relations with Pariang	takes a coordinating role.			
Abiemnom and Pariang	Abiemnom and Pariang	Abiemnom and Pariang	Pariang	Abiemnom and Pariang	Not present (last came 3 years ago)

The Fellata have the familiar Native Administration system of Nazir, Omda and Sheikh but Omdas and Sheikhs are reported be permanently settled in towns.³²⁴ The Nazir of the Fellata from Blue Nile to Kadugli, including the sections that migrate to Unity State is Ibrahim Mohamed Thereyb based in Kadugli, South Kordofan. The Fellata of Darfur, with their headquarters at Tulus, follows a different Nazir, as do Fellata in Chad and so on. Sub-tribe leaders have authority among their sub-tribe, such as Male, within this given territory (so Osman Mohamed, for example, has authority among Male from Abiemnom to Damazin), though the sub-tribes will have other branches in other locations. The Omdas and Sheikhs live in urban and sub-urban environments and do not move with the cattle. Cattle camp chiefs are in control of negotiating relations and implementing justice in pastoralist and cross-border contexts.

The host community does not know the Fellata by clans. A veterinary director who has interacted with Fellata since 2003 said “we know only Fellata – we don’t know sub-clans”. He first heard of the clan ‘Wela’ on reading the peace agreement supplied during the interview.³²⁵ This was echoed by the extremely knowledgeable Executive Director of Abiemnom who said, “I think they have 10 sub-clans but we just call them Fellata like they call us Dinka”.³²⁶

1.2 Migration patterns

Fellata groups have a long history of migrating to Pariang County during the dry season; there are two historically main routes.

- 1) The first route enters at Lake Jao and follows the southeasterly leaning border of Pariang to the border with Upper Nile, passing through the following grazing areas: Panyang Payam (Panyang Toic), Bar Thoi (Yida Toic). To Dir (Gumriak Payam), then Aget (Jamjang Payam), onto Chung Anuk (the toic of Wuncur). From Chung Anuk Fellata move to Wun Mijak (the large toic bordering Tonga County. Others continue to Wak Yer, Wat Nar, Wmo Alo (toic in Biu Payam). In 2012-2013, due to fear of the conflict actors of the Nuba rebels, the Fellata in Wuncur entered directly from the Talodi road into Wuncur Payam.
- 2) The second route enters through the toic of Alliny Payam to Nyiel and continues on to Manga in Guit County.³²⁷ Last year they did not reach Nyiel, having scattered earlier due to the outbreak of fighting in Heglig.
- 3) The Fellata enter Abiemnom through Awarpinny and Awila payams.
- 4) Most local cattle are taken to Biu payam for dry season grazing.

³²⁴ Interview, Fellata Youth, Abiemnom, 19th April 2013

³²⁵ John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, 22 March 2013

³²⁶ Peter Kuol Mac, Executive Director, Abiemnom County, 27th March 2013

³²⁷ Manga is contested by Pariang County where Dinka Panaru say the Governor has annexed the land for his farming and cattle interests. Alliny Payam is the second most populated area of Pariang after Jamjang, though there are no Dinka living in Heglig town. Nyiel is the site of a Nuba refugee camp along the road from Bentiu to Pariang town.



Fellata youth

1.4 Historical relations

Historically, the Fellata came to Pariang and Abiemnom but the wars interrupted their migration. During the second war, therefore, the Fellata adapted their migration routes and stayed closer to El Obeid and eastern South Kordofan. They have returned in greater numbers after the CPA but the impression that they are new to the area is not correct. A delegation of 3 or 4 would traditionally visit the county HQ and receive a written letter of permission in advance of migration. Musa Osman and Musa Jibril were both known to the Pariang veterinary director since at least 2003.³²⁸ And the chiefs are known to the recently elected Paramount Chief of the Panaru, Malual Jao (born in Jao and recently elected Executive Chief of Pangyang Payam) but particularly to the Paramount Chiefs of Wuncur and Jamjang.

Fellata tribes were reportedly mobilized by the Government of Sudan into PDF during the early 1990s. Indeed, Fellata proved strong initial supporters of the Al-Ingaz regime precisely because, for Muslims it promised an inclusive state where before they had faced persecution (and even calls to be deported to West Africa due to their 'outsider' status). Musa Kabiir and Musa Saghiiir (the nicknames for Musa Osman and Musa Jibril respectively)³²⁹ gained fierce reputations as fighters during this time.³³⁰

³²⁸ John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, 22 March 2013

³²⁹ Musa Kabiir and Musa Saghiiir means Big Musa and Little Musa respectively. It is common for Sudanese to be known by nicknames. For example, the commissioner of Talodi uses the name 'Assen' – simply 'the best'.

³³⁰ Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

However, during the latter years of Lupa Dier's command and through those of George Athor in Pariang, the Fellata assisted the SPLA through smuggling maize, flour, ammunitions and medicine into SPLA territory. Musa Kabiir and Musa Saghiir would bring these items into Pariang. Osman Mohamed would supply Peter Gadet's Mayom (Abiemnom was then a part of Mayom County).³³¹ They also threatened Osman Mohamed, demanding he also turn against the Government of Sudan and support SPLA in Mayom County. Musa Saghiir has a particularly fearsome reputation. In 2011, a group of 15 apparently tried to kill him in Heglig area but he fought his way free and killed 2 attackers in the process.³³²

2. The Individual Choice

2.1 Community security - Abiemnom

Fellata cattle are desirable stock, sporting good brown color and high milk yields. Raiding in the region is largely undertaken by youth based in the toic of eastern Mayom County, where there is a strong belief in the magical character of Fellata: "These people simply can not be raided. The youth believe the cattle can speak and they will just escape and go home... if you steal then a magician will curse you and God himself cannot protect you. Even Christians believe this. Their magic comes from Nigeria – did the Misseriya ever reach Nigeria?"³³³ It is true that Misseriya cows are preferred because they are hardier (they cost about the same in the market) but the role of fear is of relevance especially considering the cattle camps' traditional relationship to the spiritual leaders. Further, although Fellata do not revenge raid in the same way as Misseriya, they will ensure that the raider does not benefit from the cattle – either by calling them back or simply by shooting them.³³⁴ Fellata are allowed to carry reasonable arms for protection purposes. E.g. On 16th April, the researcher saw Fellata watering goats at a hafir, with two AKs strapped to their camel.

2.2 Community security – Pariang

The general security environment raises the risks of migration. Although local government support to the Fellata migration in 2012-2013 has outweighed these the proximity of conflict in Nuba has nevertheless affected migration routes. The withdrawal of the SPLA from Jao to Arial and Tishwin to Daraquatch has exacerbated fear of a security vacuum at Jao and Tishwin. As a result, instead of entering Unity State at Jao and moving south-east to reach Wuncur, the Fellata entered from the north-east directly into Wuncur. The conflict in Nuba Mountains and the presence of Nuba IDPs may also affect the progress of the migration. On 15th April, an attack killed a youth in Gumriak payam whilst he was harvesting. Various explanations have been given, for example: 1) An attack by Shenabla³³⁵ intended to scare people from the area in order to facilitate their grazing; 2) An attack by Nuba rebels to destabilize the area and inhibit the movement of Nuban IDPs from Yida to Ajuong Thok.³³⁶

Despite generally fair relations, host communities have threatened Fellata and attacked them. On one occasion the Fellata called the Executive Director and passed the phone to the youth threatening to steal their cattle – the Executive Director spoke the youth out of the attack. On at least one other occasion, they have been attacked. Fellata leaders in

³³¹ Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³³² Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³³³ Interview, Deputy Executive Director, Mayom County, 23 March 2013

³³⁴ Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³³⁵ Shenabla are an Abala nomadic group present in North Kordofan and White Nile and migrating southwards in the dry season. Former PDF, they have a reputation for violent attack among South Sudanese, "they will just rocket your vehicle for 'challenging their camels at load-carrying", Executive Director, Pariang, 16th April 2013

³³⁶ The Commissioner of Pariang, Majok Angelo Gedit, said that Nuba rebels were said to want to prevent this movement for a number of reasons, chief among these is access to wives and women in the camps, though the camps are also conduits for supplies of food and ammunition, and in times of need, recruits, 16 April 2013

Wuncur said that they lost 21 cattle between 21-24 March but affirmed that the local authorities were pursuing suspects. On around 10th April, a group of youth took 7 cows, shoes, watches and cash from the Fellata in Wuncur. The government sent police and SPLA and returned the 7 cows and 5000SSP cash, which was a part of the amount. These incidents and recent threats made to Fellata led the Commissioner to send a platoon to Wuncur to prevent any further difficulties. The Deputy Executive Director of Pariang said that key to the functioning of the agreement was that the Fellata were allowed to carry some weapons in order to protect them from thieves, although he “pretends not to know about this and tell[s] the community that this is just 1 or 2 firearms to protect them from wild animals”.³³⁷ The new local government of Commissioner Majok Angelo Gedit is also testing a new system aimed at increasing government control over the activities of youth in cattle camps; the government has appointed a cattle chief over and above the spiritual authority of the area. The idea is that this person, himself an influential cattle leader with large herds, will be able to enforce government policy under fear of sanction himself.³³⁸

2.3 Vaccinations and host community relations

As the veterinary director for Pariang puts it “we [the community] know they pay tax to a committee, but we don’t know anything more about that”.³³⁹ Host community require cattle to be vaccinated. “They know our system since long time. They must be vaccinated to enter. If not, they will not come in. The arrival of Ombororo from Equatoria following the CPA brought CPP, which is now endemic”.³⁴⁰

As of 25th March, the SPLA were containing the Fellata in an area of Wuncur payam, Pariang County, at a distance from the “real toic” pending vaccination. Although the government has delivered vaccines before, for example in 2010 to Nyiel, the Director General of the SMARF ran a program using vaccines donated by VSF. According to CAHWs at the time, the Ministry charged a fee on a ‘cost recovery’ basis but failed to share the payment with the CAHWs as agreed and as customary.³⁴¹ Distrust between county SMARF officials and the State Ministry is high. The Ministry allegedly “disappeared” a grant of 65000SP given for training by VSF and “what other support it has received we don’t know”³⁴² A further problematic is the unsupplied demand for vaccination of Dinka cattle, of which the veterinary director of Pariang asserts there are 200,000.³⁴³ The Fellata are also extremely protective of their cattle and prefer to implement the vaccination themselves, as was done in 2010 in Nyiel. Their cattle are considered highly intelligent, well trained, or in possession of magical powers depending on your perspective. They respond to name-calling and can differentiate outsiders by voice.

2.4 Symbolic, Informal Information

Families: The local community in Wuncur Payam told the Fellata in the first week of March that if they come with their families they will be trusted. The Fellata responded that their families would join them within 3 days. This has happened.

3. Individual Economic Condition

³³⁷ Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³³⁸ Interview, Executive Director, Pariang County, 15 April 2013

³³⁹ John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, 22 March 2013

³⁴⁰ John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, 22 March 2013

³⁴² John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, 22 March 2013

³⁴³ In 2013, for example, the Director General of SMARF appeared to be under some pressure to re-direct the vaccines provided by FAO and facilitated by USAID to Manga, where the Governor keeps the majority of his herds. Interviews, various including Director General, Dr Botino, SMARF; Silvestor Okoth, Veterinary Consultant, AECOM; John Mabel Makuei, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Pariang County, all 22 March 2013

Trade Profit(Tax, -Road) + Cattle Benefit(Grazing, -Tax, -Stress) > Cost(Grass, Water, Stress) + Alternative(Wage, Militia) + Cost(Strategic)

3.1 Trade

3.1 Pariang Trade

There were no crossing points in operation for trade on 16 April 2013. However, Local Government was preparing to open crossing points and joint markets at Daraquatch (for Misseriya and some Fellata traders from Heglig-Bentiu) and at Wuncur Payam (primarily Fellata traders from Talodi-Pariang/Bentiu). A third could be opened at Nyabole in Gumriak, but only if Shenabla nomads could be evacuated from the area. The Acting Commissioner was clear that no border crossing point could be opened at Jao even if the National Government ordered, due to the insecurity that can be produced by SPLA-N and JEM movements in the area. The livestock market at Wuncur is lively and the host community has benefitted from a drop in the price of meat – from being completely unavailable to 20SSP per kilo to 5SSP. The population of Nyiel was waiting hopefully for the arrival of the Fellata from Alliny, because there was no supply of meat. In 2013, PACT has built a permanent butcher’s market in the village for their use.

3.2 Abiemnom Trade

Fellata do not engage in trade beyond the sale of livestock on the day-to-day basis of need. All trade is undertaken by local Dinka petty traders, bringing goods from Mayom or from Wau. Prices in the market are as follows.

Onions	670 large sack	500-600 (Mayom)
Wheat Flour 50kg	330	300 (Mayom)
Sugar 50kg	380	340 (Wau)
Sugar 25kg	190	160

3.3 Clinic - Abiemnom

The Fellata in Abiemnom are using the local clinic on a daily basis. Abiemnom Development Organisation has also visited the cattle camps and vaccinated Fellata as part of an WHO funded polio eradication program.

4. Fellata Peace Committee and Peace Structures

4.1 Overall Structure: Pariang

In February 2013, Fellata and Local Government officials signed a coexistence agreement in Pariang. The agreement was signed by the three sector officials of Pariang County (Jamjang, Pariang and Pangang).³⁴⁴ Since then a cultural workshop was convened on 4 April that involved discussions between the communities, though these continued to focused mostly on migration arrangements. At this session, some Fellata indicated that, if allocated grazing land and the government remains cooperative then they would like to stay the complete year in Pariang.³⁴⁵ The agreement was signed by Musa Osman and Musa Jibril and between Wela and Jafwon Fellata and the local government. The leaders also represent other Fellata groups in Pariang County.

³⁴⁴ In 2010, the Panaru community began strongly advocating for the splitting of Pariang into 3 counties: “The Eastern”/Jamjang (Wuncur, Gumriak and Jamjang payams); “The Southern/Pariang” (Pangang, Jao and Yida); and “The Northern/Pangang” (Pariang, Alliny, and Nyiel). The division broadly represents the tribal division between Awet (northern) and Kwil (southern and eastern). This is indicative of political constituencies in the county that require a careful balancing by the administration. The current commissioner, for example, comes from the Awet. He was put in position partly as a strategy by dominant and majority Kwil local politicians to publicly redress the perceived imbalance that two national representatives are from Kwil and only 1 from Awet.

³⁴⁵ Simon Achut, Acting Commissioner, Pariang County, 16 April 2013

A joint committee as mandated by the February agreement has been formed. However, nobody except those directly involved had knowledge and it really serves as a way of including key interests from the Dinka side, to accommodate support for the work. Pariang has established a peace committee. This has 10 members and is headed by the Executive Director Simon Achut. It is composed of the 8 Executive Directors of the other payams. In each location, the Executive Director is responsible for relations with Fellata. This was quite clear in a visit to Nyiel, in which the Acting Executive Director Chol Minguel, was maintaining direct mobile communication with Musa Kabiir as he was expected to arrive any day to the area.

This committee undertakes the taxation of the Fellata. The model designed by the Executive Director to accommodate interests in the peace is that the committee manages collection of the monies and distributes it as follows: 5% goes to security agencies who facilitated the taxation, 5% goes to the Fellata team who implemented the taxation, 5% goes to Musa Kabiir and Musa Saghiir. The 85% is then called 100% and 40% of this is given to the payams in the sub-sector of Pariang. The remaining 60% is called 100% and 40% of this is given to state government. The remaining 60% is given to the 10 members of the peace committee. This he says is a difficult balance, because “if you don’t do corruption then the others will begin to get jealous”. Taxation is implemented by a joint team of the three payams for each sub-sector of Pariang along with a member of the county authorities. The taxation of Fellata has played an important role in shifting opinion among both government and community towards the migration. The commissioner was originally said to be against the policy but has come to support it as revenue has developed. The same is true of payam administrators in the eastern district.³⁴⁶

4.2 Abiemnom

In Abiemnom, Fellata began to come once more two years ago and last year’s migration was peaceful, with Fellata spending up to 8 months in Abiemnom (October-mid July). This year, Fellata approached SPLA soldiers at the border and a group of 4 were brought to the commissioner. Local Government made an agreement with Osman Mohamed. The Executive Director, Peter Kuol Mac, is leading relations with Fellata. All indicators suggest that relations are extremely positive. From local government officials to hard-up Dinka and from Fellata leader Osman Mohamed to boys selling livestock in the market, everyone was extremely positive about the relationship.³⁴⁷ The Fellata are in Awarpinny, Pangok, and Manajoga payams and at Wargur (in Magok payam). They are also at Kolinang, two hours walk north of Abiemnom and “right next to the UNISFA”.³⁴⁸ The areas remain very sparsely populated by Dinka so there are very low chances of cattle-related conflict with host community. Peter Kuol Mac visited the Fellata on 24th March to arrange for taxation and was given a sheep as a gift.³⁴⁹ He found 2000 heads of cattle, 1150 sheep and goats, 7 camels and 8 donkeys. The Fellata in Abiemnom come from El Obeid area in North Kordofan.

Key characteristics of peace structure: Pariang

Pariang

³⁴⁶ Nb/ the commissioner has a qualification in Accounting from Makerere University in Uganda, where he was Finance Officer for the Unity State Student’s Union, and had a good record for financial accountability. He was called to service before he even received his results. Interview, Matthew Thor, class-mate of commissioner at Makerere, 18th April 2013.

³⁴⁷ In a tea shop, a drunken man entered violently approaching the research discussion involving two Fellata youth. The man aggressively demanded to know whether the youth were Misseriya or Fellata. On being told they were Fellata he started shaking hands and welcoming them. It is hard to imagine this reaction to be a performance staged for our behalf. Abiemnom, 26 March 2013

³⁴⁸ Interview, Fellata Youth, Abiemnom, 19th April 2013

³⁴⁹ This was passed to the commissioner (but unclear whether this was good protocol or just because the Executive Director was suffering a hernia).

Osman Mohamed (Male), Chair
6 Person Committee composed of 5 Male Fellata, representing all Fellata in Abiemnom. Educated, literate chiefs.
From El Obeid and Talodi
Allowed a few weapons for protection of cattle and from wild animals
Good communications by phone. All comms through Osman Mohamed (to Commissioner for security information, Exec. Director for practical arrangements, Veterinary Director for health. ³⁵⁰ Acting commissioner adamant that Fellata have Thuraya.
Executive Director directs them to grazing and water areas. Limited or no role for chiefs in decision-making.
Collected 50% of agreed tax fees. Second payment due before departure. Receipt given and no problems
UNMISS invited to come, take photos and witness a signing of a peace document. Date TBC (26 th March)
1 HF radio in each of 7 Abiemnom payams critical for local government responses. ³⁵¹
Grass is main challenge; Challenge is water – both communities need hafirs, donkeys, water pumps; and price of goods in market for both communities. ³⁵²

The peace committee began as a group of 5 Fellata, all from the Male tribe. The Fellata peace committee has 6 members, where 3 of them are based in cattle camps, 1 in Pangok, 1 in Wangur and 1 in Awarpinny.³⁵³ According to the Executive Director of Abiemnom, these people can summon the entire Fellata community in their areas. Osman Mohamed can call an 'All Fellata' conference in the area by telephone and sending of messengers. Osman Mohamed has the telephone numbers of the Commissioner and Executive Director and they speak regularly.³⁵⁴ Some Fellata youth also have mobile phones and say that they raise questions with and receive information from Mohamed Osman by phone.³⁵⁵ Osman Mohamed is the central authority among the Fellata of Abiemnom, and represents all Fellata groups as far as their relations go with the local authorities. Fellata selling livestock, or attending the clinic, or just sitting in Abiemnom all initially refused to talk about anything substantive, referring us up to Osman Mohamed. After they had spoken to him on the phone they would then discuss their issues with outsiders.

Availability of grass is the major issue (along with commodity prices) and Osman Mohamed had recently sent a delegation to Abyei to discuss with UNISFA a potential agreement with the Ngok Dinka – but the delegation had not yet reached their destination (26 March), explaining it was “due to an absence of water. We want to cross into Bahr al Ghazal if the community there would accept us. But currently there is no arrangement with them or with Mayom”.

4.3 Communications

Communication is by mobile phone³⁵⁶ but was initiated by direct contact. The support of Concordis International, and the dedication and personal commitment of its field

³⁵⁰ “No one talks to anyone except to Osman Mohamed”, Interview, Santino Mayor, Veterinary Director, SMARF, Abiemnom, 26 March 2013

³⁵¹ Provided by USAID

³⁵² Fellata said that they strongly support the Misseriya coming because it would reduce the price of goods in the market. Interviews, Fellata, Abiemnom Market, 18th April 2013

³⁵³ Telephone Interview, Osman Mohamed, Fellata peace committee leader, 24 March 2013

³⁵⁴ Telephone Interview, Osman Mohamed, Fellata peace committee leader, 24 March 2013

³⁵⁵ Interview, Fellata Youth, Abiemnom, 19th April 2013

³⁵⁶ There are Zain network masts in Pariang town and in Jamjang. The network reaches some areas where the Fellata stay. In the morning and evening, when the weather is cool, it will reach into Yida Payam, Wuncor toic and occasionally into Biu Payam.

officer George Mbanj has been critical to achieving this, and subsequently to building and maintaining cooperation in Pariang. Whatever his motivations, the political work of Simon Achut has also been instrumental in building support for a relatively unpopular policy and maintaining calm (even if, rumor has it, sometimes with a heavy handed approach). Contact between the two groups was initiated by Concordis facilitating a visit by the Executive Director involving a long search through the forest to find Fellata. After an initial mutually suspicious confrontation, discussions were held in the bush on key issues. This resulted in an invitation by the local government to the Fellata to move to the *toic*. Both individuals have spent professional and personal capital in order to pursue this endeavor.

Coordination between Pariang officials and the administration of Talodi have been strong. The Fellata in Wuncur introduced the Executive Director of Pariang by telephone to the commissioner of Talodi, known as 'Assen'. The two are in regular communication and a visit is being planned to Talodi to make arrangements for trade and for procurement of tractors for agricultural assistance to Pariang communities.³⁵⁷ For example, following the alleged Shenabla attack of 15 April 2013 at Gumriak, the commissioner of Talodi spoke to Simon Achut to deny any involvement or responsibility for the attack and to instruct the government of Pariang that as far as he was concerned SPLA could kill the attackers if they could be caught and there would be no repercussions from their side. Simon requested for this communication to be sent in an SMS so that it could be presented to the county security committee for actioning. 'Assen' is an NCP official but is dependent upon trade and an open border for political survival and for security reasons. The Fellata (both cattle keepers and traders) are a key constituency to which he must respond (his deputy is a Fellata) and trade a source of revenue for his government. Strategically, an alliance with the SPLA is also key to relieving the threat of attack from SPLM-N.

³⁵⁷ The Executive Director said he intends to hire 5 tractors (1 for government and 4 for communities) to use with ACTED provided seeds and Nuba labour ("These Nubans are expert at planting". He also said he wishes to speak with his counterpart about the exporting of Gum Arabic. There is currently no irrigated agricultural project in Pariang county. The largest farm is rainfed but mechanized, belonging to the Governors' company NYK and run with labour from his native Guit County.